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ARTICLES
THE REHNQUIST COURT,
STRUCTURAL DUE PROCESS, AND
SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW
DAN T. COENEN*
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Professor Hans A. Linde published his pathbreaking paper,
Due Process of Lawmaking.' That article focused attention on a subject of
subtlety and importance: To what extent should the processes by which
laws are enacted affect their validity under seemingly substantive
constitutional provisions like the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause?2 Anticipating a flurry of recent scholarship,3 Justice
* J. Alton Hosch Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. B.S., University of
Wisconsin, 1974; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1978. The author thanks Jason Alloy, Mace Gunter,
Melissa Kotun, Gracie Waldrup, and Kay Bramlett for their technical assistance in completing this
article.
1. 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 197 (1976). Soon thereafter Professor Linde became Justice Linde of
the Oregon Supreme Court. His service on that court ended in 1990.
2. Id. at 199-201. As the title of the article suggests, it dealt largely with the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments, including what restrictions-substantive or
procedural-those provisions impose on lawmaking bodies. See id. at 199. The "due process of law
making" slogan, however, has since come to be closely associated with process-centered restraints on
legislative and other lawmaking authorities. See, e.g., infra note 630 (noting Justice Stevens' use of the
term in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980)).
3. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 328, 330-32 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REV. 87, 89-91 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 80, 83-87 (2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1169-72 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
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Linde took particular interest in whether the absence of legislative findings
offered in support of an otherwise duly enacted law should bear upon that
law's constitutionality.4
Drawing in part on Justice Linde's work, Professor Laurence Tribe
began in the same time frame to advocate a style of judicial review that
combines both process-centered and substance-centered components.5 In
doing so, he documented the pre-Rehnquist Court's use of this technique in
high-profile cases-such as New York Times Co. v. United States,6
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 7 and Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan8-to invalidate statutes and rules.9  Professor Tribe also gave this
approach to constitutional decisionmaking a name, calling it "structural due
process."' For a variety of reasons, I prefer the more encompassing term
"semisubstantive review." 1I
Semisubstantive review, as I use that label, entails four key features.
First, the subject matter of judicial inquiry is not the process applied in
REV. 695, 697-98 (1996); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, Ill YALE L.J. 1707, 1708-09
(2002). My own earlier reflections on semisubstantive constitutional findings rules appear in Dan T.
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of
Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1655-89 (2001). A central message of that
article is that legislative findings rules cannot be viewed in isolation; they must be seen and evaluated as
one part of a rich mosaic of semisubstantive rules. See id. at 1685-89.
4. Linde, supra note 1, at 226-32. Notably, Justice Linde expressed much discomfort with
permitting the absence of findings to influence determinations of constitutionality. See id.
5. Professor Tribe devoted a chapter of the second edition of his treatise to this subject. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 17-1 to 17-3 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
TRIBE, CON. LAW]. See id. § 17-3 at 1682 n.2 (noting Justice Linde's seminal work). Notably,
however, Professor Tribe's initial work in this area predated publication of Justice Linde's article. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269-70 (1975)
[hereinafter, Tribe, Structural Due Process].
6. 403U.S.713,714(1971).
7. 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976).
8. 458 U.S. 718, 727-33 (1982).
9. TRIBE, CON. LAW, supra note 5, at §§ 17-2 to 17-3. New York Times Co., also known as the
"Pentagon Papers" case, was the case in which the Court overturned a presidential effort to block
publication of government documents that concerned military operations in Southeast Asia. 403 U.S. at
714. In Mow Sun Wong, the Court invalidated a Civil Service Commission prohibition on employment
of legal resident aliens. 426 U.S. at 116. Mississippi University for Women struck down the exclusion
of men from a public university program. 458 U.S. at 727-33.
10. See Tribe, Structural Due Process, supra note 5, at 269.
11. There are three main reasons that I prefer the label "semisubstantive review." First, as we
soon shall see, the Supreme Court has used the technique described by Professor Tribe not only to
protect rights related to "due process" values, but also to protect the constitutional value of federalism.
Second, even to the extent that the Court has used this technique to protect individual rights, it has
derived its doctrines more from texts like the First and Eighth Amendments than the Due Process
Clauses themselves. Third, the term "structural due process" might suggest that the Court in these cases
is only, or at least mainly, interested in the fairness of the rulemaking processes as a general matter. In
my view, however, the Court in these cases is keenly interested in how legislative processes interact
with those particular constitutional values that drive the Free Speech Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and other "substantive" constitutional constraints.
1282
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adjudicating a discrete dispute; rather, the matter at hand is the
constitutionality of a statute or other generalized expression of legal policy.
Second, some procedural omission by the lawmaker-rather than an
incurably substantive flaw in the end product of its work-lays the
groundwork for a judicial intervention that invalidates the challenged rule
or negates how that rule otherwise would operate. It may be, for example,
that a federal statute read as a whole, in context and in light of its
legislative history, leaves no serious doubt that Congress meant to say "X."
The Court, however, might refuse to read the law to say "X" because of the
procedural failure of Congress to "mak[e] its intention unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute."'1 2 Third, this type of constitutional ruling is
provisional, rather than conclusive, in nature. In the wake of our
hypothetical statute "X" case, for example, Congress may go back to the
drawing board and enact a new law that provides for "X" so long as it
satisfies the Court's process-centered requirement of facial clarity.' 3 For
this reason, analysts sometimes describe semisubstantive rulings as
"remanding the question to the political processes"' 14 or as embodiments of
"second-look" review. 15  These rulings contrast with judicial actions
ordinarily associated with constitutional decisionmaking-namely, rulings
that declare, once and for all, whether the substantive requirements of a
challenged rule are compatible with the supreme law of the land. Fourth
and finally, the Court confines its use of semisubstantive rulings to cases in
which the substantive values at stake are (in the Court's view) distinctively
deserving of judicial protection. These process-centered invalidations, for
example, seldom take hold in garden-variety cases that trigger only low-
level, rational relation scrutiny. 16 Instead, they surface most often in cases
that involve judicially emphasized free expression, state autonomy or
suspect classification values. 17  It is the interaction of these substantive
values with demands for heightened procedural regularity that justifies
describing this judicial approach as involving semisubstantive review. 18
12. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (emphasis added).
13. See id. (noting clarity requirement).
14. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 169 (1980).
15. See Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 (1991).
16. See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1980); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960).
17. Most of this article tends to support this proposition. See, e.g., infra notes 185-191, 192-209,
and 228-263 and accompanying text (discussing rulings concerning affirmative action, the First
Amendment, and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
18. This style of judicial review is also connected with many different slogans. See, e.g., Bryant
& Simeone, supra note 3, at 335 (describing it as "on the record review"); Coenen, supra note 3, at
1583-84 (describing semisubstantive rules as "'rights-driven rules of deliberation and dialogue,"'
"'structural safeguards of substantive rights,"' and "structural doctrines"); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
20021 1283
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In this Article, I examine how semisubstantive doctrines have fared in
the hands of the Rehnquist Court. In Part I, I evaluate the modem Court's
use of four varieties of these rules-what I call semisubstantive "how,"
"why," "when," and "who" rules. 19  This discussion reveals that
semisubstantive review pervades the Rehnquist Court's work. Indeed,
many of the Court's most prominent rulings-in cases like Reno v.
ACLU,20 City of Boerne v. Flores,21 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,22 as well as its recent decisions on the rights of aliens 23-involve
important and varying features of semisubstantive analysis.
Part I also provides an initial outline of recurring themes that overarch
the Rehnquist Court's semisubstantive work. Three themes are of
particular importance. First, this Court is broadly open to semisubstantive
decisionmaking; indeed it has invoked semisubstantive doctrines in
virtually every field of constitutional law. 24  Second, notwithstanding the
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593, 646 (1992) (using the phrase "quasi-constitutional law").
19. All of these rules, of course, are to be contrasted with constitutional "what" rules, under
which the Court makes a nonprovisional, once-and-for-all decision that focuses solely on a challenged
law's substantive content.
20. 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (invalidating Federal Communications Decency Act in part
because of lack of supportive congressional findings).
21. 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997) (invalidating Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
emphasizing the absence of necessary congressional findings).
22. 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (invalidating a state beachfront land use restriction as applied
because it was based solely on legislative determination of need rather than a judicial determination of
nuisance).
23. See infra notes 44-46, 59-65, 77 and accompanying text (discussing Court's use of clear
statement rules in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) to
vindicate rights claimed by aliens).
24. We shall see, before we are finished, that this attribute of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence corresponds with a common tendency to prefer a "minimalist" style of constitutional
review. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT xi (1999); Devins, supra note 3, at 1211 n.182 (citing "ever-burgeoning literature on judicial
minimalism"). In addition, many observers have reflected fruitfully on the potential values of various
forms of semisubstantive decisionmaking. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 646 (citing
"powerful arguments for quasi-constitutional law"). Other scholarship recently has touched on the
theoretical foundations for semisubstantive review. E.g., Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 61-68; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1266 (2001) (noting that "American lawyers and political
scientists have dichotomized American law between the 'higher lawmaking' entailed in the Constitution
and 'ordinary lawmaking' entailed in statutes" but urging that there is a need "to break down this
dichotomy"); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1294 (2001) (discussing values of congressional deliberation); Mark Tushnet,
Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1871, 1874-75 (2001) (discussing concept of "policy space," within which policymakers are willing to
pursue goals through use of varying means, some of which are less threatening to constitutional values).
Of particular significance in this regard is the potential these doctrines hold to reduce the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" commonly associated with the more traditional "on-off' modes of
judicial review. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 23-28 (1962). See also Coenen, supra note 3, at 1834-51 (providing a brief
enumeration of arguments for and against semisubstantive decisionmaking).
1284
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Rehnquist Court's evidenced receptivity to semisubstantive
decisionmaking, it has often shown ambivalence toward the application of
these doctrines (with the exception of the now-familiar, constitutionally
driven, clear statement rules of statutory interpretation). Third, the
Rehnquist Court has deployed semisubstantive review techniques in large
part to advance much the same policy agenda that finds expression in its
more traditional, once-and-for-all constitutional jurisprudence. More
specifically, in a bevy of prominent "what" rule decisions, the Court's so-
called "Federalism Five"25 (made up of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) has given energetic
protection to state autonomy values in a way unseen since the early days of
the New Deal.26 In keeping with this theme, the current Court has used all
forms of semisubstantive doctrines-"how" rules, "why" rules, "when"
rules, and "who" rules-to deflect authority from federal policymakers to
state and local officials.
In Part II of the Article, I review the Court's semisubstantive work on
a Justice-by-Justice basis. This study confirms the three themes developed
in Part I. Yet Part II also does something more. It reveals that the more
controversial forms of semisubstantive decisionmaking (most notably,
findings-based "how" rules and purpose-centered "why" rules) have
generated ambivalence not only within the Court as a whole, but within the
minds of the individual Justices as well. 27
Finally, in Part III, I turn to an evaluation of the key themes that
emerge from my analysis of the Court's work in Parts I and II. I note, for
example, that a gravitation toward semisubstantive decisionmaking fits
comfortably with depictions of this Court as preferring a "minimalist"
approach when it engages in constitutional review. In addition, I ask
whether this Court's ready use of semisubstantive doctrines to protect
federalism values is justifiable in this day and age. In particular, I point out
that strong federalism-based semisubstantive approaches took root as a sort
of constitutional gap-filler in an era when the Court recognized no (or
virtually no) hard and fast doctrines that shielded states from congressional
overreaching. Now that the Rehnquist Court has forged many strong
substantive protections of state autonomy values, it is an open question
25. James J. Kilpatrick, Court's Term Ended with a Bang, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 2, 1999, at
A16.
26. See infra notes 568-573 and accompanying text (summarizing recent decisions).
27. See, e.g., infra notes 199, 639-649 and accompanying text (discussing various Justices'
ambivalent expressions about role of findings-based "how" rules).
20021 1285
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whether semisubstantive safeguards of federalism interests continue to
make sense.
I close Part III by building on my Justice-by-Justice analysis in Part II
to explain why inevitable departures from and appointments to the Court
may greatly affect the future prevalence of semisubstantive
decisionmaking. To be sure, the replacement of one Justice with another-
especially when, as now, so many of the Court's rulings are closely
divided-always portends some shifts in constitutional doctrine. With
respect to semisubstantive decisionmaking, however, the opportunities for
a marked change in direction are distinctively rich. This is the case, in part,
because of the Justices' ambivalent attitudes toward provisional rulings that
this Article repeatedly highlights. It is also the case because the subjects of
whether, why, and how to use these rules remain deeply under-theorized
within the current Court's work. In this environment, semisubstantive
review-although pervasive-is jurisprudentially fragile, at least in the
broad set of cases that do not involve constitutionally inspired clear
statement rules of statutory interpretation. In short, within the present
Court, the phenomenon of semisubstantive decisionmaking does not rest on
a firm foundation of clearly articulated and widely accepted theory.
Against this backdrop, it is significant that Justice Stevens (the Court's
oldest member and most senior associate Justice) is also the most ardent
proponent of a "due process of lawmaking" philosophy.28 On the other
hand, Justice Scalia (whom many perceive as an intellectual leader of the
Court29) has revealed a hardy skepticism toward most forms of
semisubstantive doctrines.30 The potential implications of these real world
conditions are not hard to see. Given President Bush's expressed
inclination to make future appointments in the mold of Justice Scalia,
31
semisubstantive decisionmaking-despite its recent ascendance in the work
of the Rehnquist Court-may soon find itself on the decline.
28. See infra Part 11.B.
29. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 159 (1999)
(claiming "it is Justice Scalia's orientation toward structural inference that seems to have galvanized a
majority on the current Court").
30. See infra notes 584--600 and accompanying text.
31. See Robin Toner, The 2000 Campaign: Focus on the Issues; Both Sides on Abortion Issue
Step Up Fight, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2000, at A29.
1286 [Vol. 75:1281
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I. SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES AND THE
VALUES THEY SERVE
A. CONSTITUTIONAL "How" RULES
What are constitutional "how" rules? They are not rules that direct
attention to how-in terms of a law's content-the lawmaker seeks to
achieve a permissible purpose. For example, when the Court invalidates an
antileafleting statute because a ban on littering provides a less restrictive
alternative for keeping streets clean, 32 it is not applying a constitutional
"how" rule. Rather, it is applying a "what" rule. The latter label applies
because the legislature must alter the substantive content of the law-that
is, shift from a ban on leafleting (which is one thing) to a ban on littering
(which is quite another)-to sidestep the constitutional trap. "How" rules,
in contrast to "what" rules, focus on curable omissions in the lawmaking
process that permit the lawgiver to reenact the very same substantive
restriction the Court has rejected, or at least the restriction's functional
equivalent.
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,33 for example, the Court
refused to read highly suggestive statutory language (and even more
suggestive legislative history) to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
irmnunity from suit under the Rehabilitation Act.34 The Court based this
ruling on what it saw as an important substantive constitutional value: the
federalism-based value of protecting state authorities from congressional
interference in allocating scarce state resources. 35 The Court, however, did
not block Congress from abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity once and for all. Rather, it left open the possibility that Congress
could effectuate an abrogation if it jumped through a judicially constructed
"how" hoop by expressing its intention with crystal clarity.36
The Eleventh Amendment rule applied in Atascadero is merely one of
many constitutionally inspired clear statement rules the Court has
developed over the years. 37 Other "how" rules concern: (1) the role of
studies conducted by the lawmaker in evaluating the constitutionality of
statutes or the like (legislative-findings rules), (2) judicially constructed
default rules that require affirmative legislative overrides of judicially
32. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939).
33. 473 U.S. 234, 234 (1985).
34. See id. at 241-47.
35. See id. at 238 & n.2.
36. See id. at 242-46.
37. See infra Part I.A. 1.
2002] 1287
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constructed protections of constitutional values (constitutional common law
rules), and (3) constitutional doctrines that focus on the proper "packaging"
of a law, either (a) with regard to the form the legal treatment of a subject
takes (for example, as an affirmative monetary subsidy, rather than an
economically equivalent tax break) or (b) with regard to the surrounding
legal context into which a law is placed.38 The remainder of Part I.A.
probes, on a doctrine-by-doctrine basis, the Rehnquist Court's use of these
various constitutional "how" rules. The ensuing Part I.B. shifts attention to
the Court's application of constitutional "when" rules, "why" rules, and
"who" rules.
1. Clarity-Based Constitutional "How" Rules
No set of semisubstantive doctrines has done more heavy lifting than
the many constitutionally inspired clear statement rules of statutory
interpretation. In Atascadero, for example, the Court used a clear
statement rule to vindicate the Eleventh Amendment-based value of state
fiscal autonomy. 39 In effect, the Court stripped a duly enacted statute of
the consequences it otherwise would have had in order to give this value a
healthy dose of judicial protection. The Atascadero rule, however,
protected "state's rights" in only a semisubstantive manner. It did not
foreclose federal interference with state fiscal autonomy. Instead it insisted
that Congress use a specialized process (in this case, by speaking with
extreme clarity) if it wished to override this value.4 0  Atascadero thus
raised the prospects for productive legislative deliberation on a
constitutionally troublesome subject and, in so doing, reduced (but did not
eliminate) the chances that a congressional coalition in favor of abrogation
would take hold.41
The use of clear statement rules to advance constitutional values is
nothing new. These doctrines date back to the time of Chief Justice
Marshall.42 In both the Warren and the Burger Courts, clear statement
reasoning drove important-even landmark-rulings. 43  Nor has the
38. The doctrines described in 3(a) will be referred to as "form-based-deliberation rules" and the
doctrines described in 3(b) as "surrounding-territory rules."
39. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
40. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 237-40.
41. See id. at 243.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805).
43. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-602 (1983) (applying clarity-
based rule to read federal legislation to bar claim of tax-exempt status to religious institution that
prohibited interracial dating); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 503-08 (1959) (construing federal
statute to authorize revocation of security clearances with resulting likelihood of job losses only after
adversary hearings, so as to protect against false charges of subversive activity); Trop v. Dulles, 356
[Vol. 75:12811288
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Rehnquist Court abandoned this tradition, for it too has invoked many
different rules of clarity to safeguard all sorts of constitutional values.
The Court's use of clear statement doctrines gives rise to two
questions of particular importance. First, which specific constitutional
values does-and should-the Court protect with this brand of
semisubstantive decisionmaking? Second, just how explicit must the text
of a federal statute be to cross the judicially constructed "clear statement"
threshold? This second question bears a close relation to the first.
Judicially required levels of statutory clarity, after all, can vary from
substantive context to substantive context. As a result, the Court can
protect one set of constitutional values more aggressively than another by
ratcheting up or down the rigor of any particular clear statement rule it
creates. The following Section will examine how these two key
questions-about which substantive values this Court protects and about
what levels of clarity it requires-have played out in the precedents of the
Rehnquist Court. It will show that the Rehnquist Court has used clear
statement rules to protect a variety of constitutionally grounded liberty,
equality, and property interests. Not surprisingly, however, it will also
become apparent that the present day Court's most important innovations
with regard to rules of clarity have come in the federalism field.
(a) Clear Statement Rules and Non-Federalism Values.
The Rehnquist Court has used the tools of statutory interpretation in
the service of a rich mix of constitutional values. In INS v. St. Cyr, for
example, a five-Justice majority (made up of Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) reaffirmed what they saw as the
"longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to
repeal habeas jurisdiction."44 In doing so, these Justices vindicated all of
the many constitutional rights that prisoners (including state prisoners)
might assert in federal habeas corpus litigation.45 The ruling thus illustrates
U.S. 86, 98-104 (1958) (narrowly construing congressional grant of authority to executive branch with
respect to denying passports to citizens; thus protecting associational and travel rights of Communist
Party members).
44. 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001). The Court found that "[i]mplications from statutory text or
legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate
specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal." Id. at 299. It also noted the clear
statement doctrine's purpose of ensuring "that the legislature has in fact faced" issues presented in
"traditionally sensitive areas"-here with regard to removing habeas corpus jurisdiction. Id. at 299 n.10
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)). But see id. at 333-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority's claim that past authorities established an anti-habeas-removal clear statement rule).
45. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1610-11 (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), and
anticipating Court's explicit iteration of this interpretive canon). See also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998) (holding that habeas petition filed after dismissal of earlier petition as
premature is not "second or successive" petition under statute; otherwise "dismissal ... for technical
2002] 1289
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a simple, but important, point: The Rehnquist Court does not act in
monolithic fashion to protect only state autonomy interests when it wields
the tools of semisubstantive review.46
Nor is St. Cyr an aberrational decision, for the Rehnquist Court has
embraced many clear statement doctrines that protect constitutional values
other than the promotion of "states' rights." This Court, for example, has
held that: (1) "[w]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear;" 47 (2) any legislative
override of a decision applying the dormant Commerce Clause requires "an
expression of the 'unambiguous intent' of Congress;" 48 and (3) criminal
statutes must be read in light of the "preference for traditional jury
determination" envisioned by the Sixth Amendment, at least when the fact
at issue will greatly increase a mandatory minimum sentence. 49
In recognizing each of these constitutionally driven interpretive
principles, the Rehnquist Court did not launch significant doctrinal
innovations. The first two of these clear statement rules had rich
precedential pedigrees; in embracing them the Court did nothing more than
reaffirm well-settled principles.5 ° The third rule-though perhaps setting
forth a new doctrine-also had strong roots in familiar precedents, 51
particularly in the many decisions that require any "ambiguous criminal
statute.., to be construed in favor of the accused. 52
procedural reasons" would permanently bar review); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000)
(holding that habeas petition filed after earlier dismissal for nonexhaustion is not "second or
successive"; otherwise a complete exhaustion requirement would "trap... the unwary pro se prisoner"
(quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982))).
46. It is not surprising, on the other hand, that the majority's ruling drew a vigorous dissent from
four members of the "Federalism Five," who argued that the anti-habeas-removal clear statement rule
invoked by the majority lacked support in precedent. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326-47 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
47. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. 498
U.S. 479, 496-98 (1991). See also Shalala v. I11. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 45
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that this "presumption favors not merely judicial review 'at
some point,' but preenforcement judicial review"). But cf id. at 19-20 (majority opinion) (arguing that
"any such presumption must be far weaker than a presumption against preclusion of all review").
48. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992). Accord, e.g., New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 171 (1992).
49. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 131 (2000).
50. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (requiring "'a clear expression of approval by
Congress' to relax judicially crafted dormant Commerce Clause restrictions) (quoting South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wannicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984)); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians,
476 U.S. 661, 681 (1986) (citing 'strong presumption" that Congress did not mean to prohibit all
judicial review') (quoting Dunlop v. Buchowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975))).
51. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958) (invoking
"strong federal policy" that favors jury determinations, even in civil matters).
52. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994).
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In a more interesting move, the Rehnquist Court has repeatedly and
strongly endorsed the "presumption against retroactive legislation."
Indeed, the "[c]ases where this Court has found truly 'retroactive effect'
adequately authorized by statute have involved statutory language that was
so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.5 3 Although this
canon has ancient origins, the Rehnquist Court can take full credit for its
current vitality because Burger Court precedents had created doubts about
its continuing efficacy. 54  No less significantly, the Rehnquist Court
grounded this doctrine in the very democracy-forcing, deliberation-
heightening values that are said to justify semisubstantive review as a
general matter. As the Court observed in Landgraf v. USI Film Products:
"Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and
determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing
benefits." 55
What underlying substantive constitutional values does the
presumption against retroactivity protect? In the criminal justice field, this
principle safeguards constitutional concerns about proper notice and
legislative fair dealing that are closely connected with both the Due Process
and Ex Post Facto Clauses. 56 It is important to recognize, however, that the
Rehnquist Court has broadly employed this presumption to protect all
manner of expectancy interests based on preexisting law. 57 As a result (and
not surprisingly), the modern Court's emphasis of this doctrine dovetails
with its energetic protection of private property rights in an ever-growing
number of hard and fast constitutional rulings. 58  In this way, the
53. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316-17 (2001) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328
(1997)) (emphasis added). Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)
54. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 277 (1994) (discussing Bradley v. Sch. Bd.,
416 U.S. 696 (1974), and its suggestion of a "categorical presumption in favor of application of all new
rules of law," including in a retroactive manner).
55. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73 (emphasis added). Accord St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316-17.
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (interpreting statute, in light of
Ex Post Facto Clause values, to preclude retroactive application of new sanctions upon revocation of
supervised release "[albsent a clear statement of that intent"). See also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,
439 (1997) (citing antiretroactivity presumption in Ex Post Facto Clause case).
57. Thus, the Court has emphasized that "the presumption against retroactivity applies far
beyond the confines of the criminal law." St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324. In particular, the presumption
broadly safeguards "settled expectations," thus fostering "creativity in both ... commercial and artistic
endeavors." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66.
58. See, e.g., Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (holding that the right to assert
a regulatory taking claim is not barred to a person who acquired property after the value-diminishing
regulation was imposed); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998) (holding that
lawyer-trust-account monies placed in state-created Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")
constitute private property, so that state use of interest proceeds may constitute unlawful taking); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1994) (finding unconstitutional taking in government
conditioning of grant of building permit on dedication of landstrip for flood-control and
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antiretroactivity rule operates as one-half of a double-barreled approach-
built on both substantive and semisubstantive doctrines-to protect
expectancy-centered constitutional interests that are distinctively valued by
the Rehnquist Court.
The current Court invoked another important rule of clarity in the final
days of its 2000-01 term. The St. Cyr case did not present only an issue
about the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. 59  It also presented
the substantive question of whether a new immigration statute-which
blocked all discretionary suspensions of deportation for resident aliens
convicted of aggravated felonies-applied to those persons whose
convictions had become final prior to the statute's enactment. In refusing
to give this statute the sweeping reading advocated by government lawyers,
the Court relied in part on the settled presumption against the retroactive
application of newly enacted legislation. 60 The Court, however, also relied
on another, and less well-known, clear statement rule of statutory
interpretation. Noting that this law concerned solely the treatment of
noncitizens, the Court invoked the "the long-standing principle of
construing lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien." 61
From one perspective, the Court's deployment of this alien-favoring
clarity rule was not of earthshaking importance; in fact, the Rehnquist
Court itself had recognized and applied this same canon on at least one
prior occasion. 62 In previous cases, however, the Court had not suggested
what it proposed in St. Cyr-namely, that this rule of clarity should and
does draw support from the representation-reinforcement theory of
constitutional interpretation long associated with Professor John Hart Ely.
63
In particular, the majority in St. Cyr noted (in a lengthy footnote) that
constitutional concerns become more acute when a retroactive law targets
an "unpopular group," 64 and it cited secondary authority for the proposition
pedestrian/bicycle-corridor purposes); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 394-95 (1992)
(recognizing and applying principle that regulatory deprivation of all economically beneficial use of
property constitutes a per se taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (finding
taking when agency conditioned development permit for beachfront residence on grant by landowner of
easement that provided public access to beach). See also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998)
(invalidating Coal Act's health care benefits for retirees funded through retroactively imposed changes).
59. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
61. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 319 (quoting with approval INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449
(1987)).
62. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
63. See ELY, supra note 14, at 43-72.
64. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994)).
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that "because noncitizens cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to
adverse legislation." 6
5
These passages tie the Court's "pro-alien" clear statement rule of
statutory interpretation to resilient strains of constitutional theory most
famously expressed in "footnote four" of United States v. Carolene
Products Co.66  This blending of constitutional and statutory reasoning
bespeaks an openness to semisubstantive review as a general matter.67
Even more important, this theoretical move offers support for an approach
to statutory interpretation that broadly protects ethnic minorities, women,
and all other so-called "Carolene groups." 68 As the era of the Burger Court
closed, distinguished commentators suggested that a pro-Carolene-groups
canon of construction-though never identified by the Court itself as
such-lay beneath many important precedents of the 1970s and early
1980s.69  With much justification,70 however, these commentators later
65. d. at 315 n.39.
66. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting possibility that "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" or "legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" may "call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry").
67. Another set of clear statement rules through which the Court has given protection to a
"Carolene group" concerns federal statutes and rules directed at the interests of Native Americans. See,
e.g., C&L Enters. Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (asserting
that "[t]o abrogate tribal immunity, Congress must 'unequivocally' express that purpose") (quoting
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)); id. (citing Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (holding that the clear statement rule extends to suits based on contracts made
between an Indian tribe and a non-Indian even if executed outside of Indian Country)); Minn. v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194 n.5 (1999) (noting that "treaties are to be
interpreted liberally in favor of... Indians ... and treaty ambiguities to be resolved in their favor");
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (holding that a "clear and plain"
indication of congressional intent is required for congressional diminishment of reservation
boundaries); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 110 (1998) (holding
that states may not tax Indian reservation land unless "Congress has authorized such taxation" and
"'made its intention to do so unmistakably clear") (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765
(1985))). See also, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991) (holding that, to relinquish its immunity, a tribe's own waiver must be "clear"). See Coenen,
supra note 3, at 1613-14 n.160 (collecting other Rehnquist Court authorities); Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 18, at 610 (discussing the modem Court's use of these interpretive rules).
68. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 602-03. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1032 (1989) (claiming that various interpretations
of statutes reflect a "special equal protection scrutiny applied by the Court" to protect "Carolene
groups"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 473
(1989) (stating that "aggressive construction of ambiguous statutes designed to protect disadvantaged
groups provides a way for courts to protect the constitutional norm of equal protection in a less intrusive
manner").
69. See supra note 68.
70. In particular, the Rehnquist Court has rejected plaintiff-favoring interpretations of federal
antidiscrimination statutes in an ever-lengthening line of rulings. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (rejecting a private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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asserted that the "Carolene groups" canon of interpretation had lost its
sting during the years of the Rehnquist Court.7 1
Does the rhetoric of St. Cyr signal a change in judicial direction likely
to bring greater judicial protection-through semisubstantive statutory
construction-to those "discrete and insular minorities"7 2  historically
favored in the Supreme Court's hard and fast equal protection
jurisprudence? Only a dreamer would suggest that an isolated footnote
concerning the special difficulties faced by aliens is likely to trigger newly
activist interpretations of Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. 73
Yet a seed has been planted. At the least, St. Cyr illustrates the rich
possibilities that lie in linking doctrines of statutory interpretation to the
theoretical underpinnings of settled constitutional law.
One final (and uncontroversial) clarity rule pervades the Rehnquist
Court's work. The Court has long recognized that "when there are two
reasonable constructions for a statute, yet one raises a constitutional
question, the Court should prefer the interpretation which avoids the
constitutional issue." 74  Through the use of this so-called "doctrine of
constitutional doubt,"75 the Court can and does protect fundamental values
71. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 614.
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). Of course, the rule has its limits;
thus, the Court has made it clear that "[t]he condition precedent for application of the doctrine is that the
statute can reasonably be construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty .... We cannot press statutory
construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question." INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000));
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 n.9
(1996)). Accord, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) ("No matter how
severe the constitutional doubt, courts may choose only between reasonably available interpretations of
a text."). The Court also has recently recognized-as I have suggested elsewhere-that the principle of
constitutional doubt serves multiple purposes. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1607. First, it serves a
backward-looking goal of implementing congressional intent. Solid Waste Agency v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). Second, it looks to the future in implementing the
"prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues." Id. See also St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305
(citing "desirability of avoiding [the] necessity" of "resolving ... a serious and difficult constitutional
issue" as lending support "to requiring a clear and unambiguous statement"). Thus, whenever the Court
ducks a lurking constitutional issue by interpreting a federal law narrowly, it invites Congress to revisit
that issue and then enact in a clear form a statute that has the effect the Court has provisionally averted.
See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1608-10. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 285-97 (1994); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 163-68 (1990); Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the
Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 835-39,
869-74 (1997); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As a Three-Branch Problem, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The
Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3-
9 (1996); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1004-06
(1994); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 71-74 (1996).
75. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (internal quotations omitted).
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by eschewing interpretations otherwise ascribable to statutes that would
push those statutes into constitutional danger zones. The Rehnquist Court
has employed the doctrine of constitutional doubt in many cases.7 6 In one
of its most publicized decisions from the 2001 Term, for example, the
Court relied on this principle to outlaw the indefinite detention of aliens
held back from deportation because they had no country to go to, despite
powerful claims that Congress authorized this practice.77 This ruling
illustrates the power of statutory interpretation rules to protect
constitutional interests that reach beyond the federalism field.
Not surprisingly, however, a great deal of the Rehnquist Court's work
with the doctrine of constitutional doubt has come in federalism cases. The
following section examines how the current Court has used this doctrine
and other clarity-based "how" rules to protect not personal, but state
autonomy, values.
(b) Clear Statement Rules and Federalism Values.
76. In fact, few rules of law connected with our Constitution have found more frequent
expression in the opinions of the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 122 S.
Ct. 2390, 2399, 2401-02 (2002) (relying on the Petition Clause and the doctrine of constitutional doubt
to preclude the Labor Board's enforcement of rules sanctioning the filing of nonmeritorious suits
against union organizers); Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 122 S. Ct. 999, 1005 (2002)
(refusing to apply federal tolling statutes to the state because doing so "raises serious doubts about the
constitutionality of the provision given principles of sovereign immunity"); Calcano-Martinez v. INS,
533 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2001) (holding that "Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity to strip the
district courts of jurisdiction" over claims based on deportations for felonious behavior because of
"serious constitutional questions" that would arise by "leaving [these] aliens without a forum for
adjudicating claims"); St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299 (noting that "where an alternative interpretation of the
statute is 'fairly possible' . . . we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid [serious constitutional]
problems"); Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172; Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000)
(applying the avoidance principle to eschew construction of a federal arson statute that makes it
applicable to burning of homes that, among other things, receive power or gas by way of interstate
transmission lines); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787
(2000) (finding conclusion that federal qui tam statute does not apply to actions against states is
"buttressed" because there is a "serious doubt" about whether such an application would be
constitutional (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999) (interpreting federal carjacking statute to require jury
determination as to penalty-heightening matter of victim's "serious bodily injury [or] death" because
otherwise "the statute would be open to constitutional doubt in light of a series of cases over the past
quarter century, dealing with due process and the guarantee of trial by jury"); United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77-79 (1994) (citing avoidance canon in reading scienter
requirement into law regulating indecent expression); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170
(1992) (citing principle in federalism case); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (citing, but not
applying, principle in abortion-related speech context); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864
(1989) (applying constitutional doubt rule in reading federal act not to permit magistrates to preside at
jury selections at felony trials); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (applying principle to protect free expression and association values). See
also Utah v. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191, 221 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (relying on canon to preclude Census Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputation" techniques).
77. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001).
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The reach of the doctrine of constitutional doubt-as even a moment's
reflection will confirm-always moves with the currents of the Supreme
Court's substantive constitutional jurisprudence. For this reason, it is
hardly shocking that the Rehnquist Court has increasingly applied the
canon to interpret federal statutes narrowly 78 in keeping with its expanding
willingness to protect state autonomy interests against ambitious exercises
of Congress' enumerated powers.79  In Jones v. United States,8° for
example, the Court was asked whether Congress had authority under
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution to outlaw the burning of private
homes because they receive power through electric interstate transmission
systems.8' A unanimous Court noted that pushing the congressional
commerce power this far would raise serious constitutional problems under
the Rehnquist Court's earlier decision in Lopez v. United States.82  As a
result, it read the phrase "property used in interstate or foreign commerce"
to exclude private homes, thereby in effect remanding the matter of the
arson statute's coverage to Congress for a studied reconsideration.83 Had
the Rehnquist Court not previously constricted the commerce power with
its full-bore constitutional ruling in Lopez, it might well have lacked the
tools with which to whittle down the arson statute's reach with its
subconstitutional statutory-interpretation ruling in Jones.84  The case thus
reveals the linkage between this Court's substantive retrenchment in the
states rights area and its resulting ability to vindicate federalism values with
semisubstantive second-look rulings based on clear statement doctrines.
78. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172 (relying in part on doctrine of constitutional
doubt to read the Clean Water Act not to authorize agency regulation of small, localized ponds in light
of the Supreme Court's Lopez and Morrison rulings). See also supra note 76 (noting other Rehnquist
Court federalism-based uses of avoidance canon).
79. The Court's major innovations in this area have come in four well-recognized forms. (1) It
has placed meaningful substantive limits on Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-19 (2000); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549,
564-65 (1995). (2) It has narrowed congressional authority to commandeer state authorities to enact or
implement federal regulatory programs. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992). (3) It has jettisoned Congress' previously recognized
ability to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunities pursuant to exercises of its Article I powers.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57-73 (1996). See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
730-31 (1999) (applying the antiabrogation principle from Seminole Tribe to state court, as well as
federal court, litigation). (4) It has repeatedly reined in attempted exercises of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634-48 (1999); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-33 (1997).
80. 529 U.S. 848, 848 (2000).
81. See id. at 850.
82. See id. at 852.
83. Id. at 853-55.
84. See id. at 851-52 (discussing Lopez).
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The Court's use of clarity rules to protect state autonomy reaches
beyond the rule of constitutional doubt. As discussed earlier, for example,
the Court has held fast to its holding in Atascadero that imposes a clear
statement requirement for Eleventh Amendment abrogation,85
notwithstanding a potent argument that the logic of this rule has been
undermined by later decisions.86 Pro-federalism values also help explain
the Court's repeated insistence that Congress must speak clearly when it
conditions state entitlements to federal funds on the surrender of significant
state regulatory authority.87
85. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 597. See Raygor v. Regents of the University of
Minn., 122 S. Ct. 999, 1004-05, 1007 (2002) (finding clear statement principle applicable whether
congressional action was based on Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause or other powers); Bd.
of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-65 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-78
(2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-70
(1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723-27 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 n.9
(1996); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-32 (1989).
86. The argument goes something like this: Atascadero was handed down in an era when most
abrogation issues concerned congressional attempts to negate the Eleventh Amendment immunity
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. In Seminole Tribe, however, the Court held that Congress
cannot ever invoke the commerce power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunities, regardless of
the clarity with which it speaks. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44. As a result of this ruling, the
Atascadero doctrine came to apply only in cases where Congress was basing the abrogation on its
enforcement powers under the Civil War amendments. In City ofBoerne v. Flores, however, the Court
gave these enforcement powers a limited reach, by holding that Congress could invoke them only to
remedy or prevent genuine constitutional violations as established by the courts. 521 U.S. 507, 5 19-20
(1997). The practical effect of these post-Atascadero rulings is thus to limit that holding's effect to the
narrow set of cases in which Congress appears to be trying only to effectuate a remedy against states for
a true infringement of constitutional rights. Because the Atascadero rule now serves to foreclose
remedies against states only for actual constitutional violations, it arguably subverts, more so than it
serves, those substantive constitutional values that should drive semisubstantive constitutional rulings.
See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1627-28. Notably, this challenge to the continuing viability of
Atascadero's strong rule of clarity may have gained added force from the Court's decision in INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). There the majority noted the observation of Professors Eskridge and Frickey
to the effect that "[tlhe Court... has tended to create the strongest clear statement rules to confine
Congress' power in areas in which Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything." Id.
at 299 n. 10 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 597). There is good reason to believe that
this underenforcement-counterweight rationale helped underpin the Atascadero rule at the time it was
first embraced. Indeed, Professors Eskridge and Frickey advanced precisely this view. See Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 18, at 597-98. Accord, Sunstein, supra note 68, at 468-69. Any such rationale,
however, has long since faded from view. After all, Seminole Tribe, Alden v. Maine, and the post-City
of Boerne Section 5 abrogation decisions have rendered the Eleventh Amendment abrogation field
anything but one in which "Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything." St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 299 n. 10 (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 597). See supra note 79.
87. The rule originated in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981). Decisions of the Rehnquist Court have reaffirmed it. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 172 (1992); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356-62 (1992) (disallowing section 1983 suit under
federal statute based on spending power pursuant to Pennhurst's unambiguousness rule and quoting that
case's "contract" reasoning); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). Notably, although
the Court has invoked a contract law rationale in support of this rule, see, e.g., Bares v. Gorman, 122
S. Ct. 2097, 2100-01 (2002), considerations of federalism seem no less supportive of it. See Sunstein,
supra note 68, at 501. See also Coenen, supra note 3, at 1625 n.208.
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The Rehnquist Court's most significant moves with regard to
federalism-driven rules of clarity, however, have not involved the
specialized subjects of Eleventh Amendment abrogation or conditional
spending. Instead they have involved its rethinking of canons of statutory
interpretation, handed down decades ago in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.88 and United States v. Bass,89 that deal with the reach of numerous
federal regulatory measures. Rice held that courts, when evaluating claims
of federal preemption, must "start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 90 In Bass,
the Court likewise emphasized that it would read federal criminal laws
narrowly to protect traditional state interests in defining and prosecuting
local crimes. 91  The Court in Bass highlighted the democracy-forcing
purposes of these rules: "In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures
that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
88. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
89. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
90. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added). Citing Rice, Justice Breyer recently asserted that
there is "a stong presumption against pre-emption" in areas of "traditional state regulation" such as
family law. See Eglehoff v. Eglehoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 157 (2001) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107 (2000); Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996) (applying presumption against preemption in light of "federalism concerns and the historic
primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety"); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79
(1990); P. R. Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 503 (1988); Rose v.
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 636 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Notably, Professor Frickey detected a subtle, but significant, extension of the Rice canon by the
Rehnquist Court. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A
Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 211 (1999) (likening the Court's
application of a Rice-based clear statement rule in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544
(1994), to the super-strong-clear statement rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
91. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339. Later Rehnquist Court opinions have applied Bass in this manner.
See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000) (relying on Bass in refusing to read a
federal mail fraud law to cover misrepresentations aimed at getting a state video-poker license; fearing a
"sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress"
because "[e]quating issuance of licenses or permits with deprivation of property [as required by the
statute] would subject to federal mail fraud prosecution a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated
by state and local authorites"); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (applying the Bass
principle to read federal arson statute as inapplicable to the burning of a private residence not used for
commercial purposes); id. at 859-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing that the Bass principle applies
and noting the principle's "kinship [to] our well-established presumption against federal pre-emption of
state law"); Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 681 (2000) (rejecting a broad construction of the
term "benefits" under a federal antifraud statute in part because a contrary result "would turn almost
every act of fraud or bribery into a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance"); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (reading a federal mail fraud statute not to reach assignment of
state's insurance business to agency required to make kickbacks where scheme results in no loss to
state; noting aversion to any national "setting [of] standards of ... good government for local and state
officials"; adding that "[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than it has").
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critical matters involved in the judicial decision." 92  Put another way,
requiring clarity forces Congress to confront directly, and then squarely
rule on, the constitutional federalism problems raised by legislative
proposals that concern spheres of action traditionally governed by states.
In keeping with it s general pro-state-rights stance, the Rehnquist Court
has reaffirmed and applied the Rice and Bass presumptions on many
occasions. 93 Even more important, the Court has made two noteworthy
moves that significantly expand the reach of these federalism-driven, clear
statement rules. First, it has applied the Bass rule not only in interpreting
federal criminal statutes, but in interpreting noncriminal statutes as well.
Second, even in dealing with noncriminal regulations, the Court has
signaled that it will expansively define the areas of traditional state
regulatory behavior to which these rules apply.
The Court's most prominent invocation of Bass in narrowly
construing a noncriminal federal law came in Gregory v. Ashcroft.94 The
92. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349. Accord, Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 122 S. Ct. 999,
1006 (2002).
93. See supra notes 90-91. It is important to recognize, as explained elsewhere, that the Rice
and Bass rules have a force that exists wholly apart from that of the avoidance canon. See Coenen,
supra note 3, at 1616-17 & 1622 n.197. The Court recognized this same point when it noted recently
that the presumption raised by the doctrine of constitutional doubt "is heightened where the
administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment
upon a traditional state power." Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
159, 173 (2001) (emphasis added). It is also important to recognize that the Court does not always
apply the Rice nonpreemption canon to protect state autonomy claims. In fact, the modem Court-
attentive perhaps to countervailing "conservative" values-has often upheld preemption claims,
especially when resulting rulings have protected business interests from invasive state regulatory
controls. See Richard H. Fallon, The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CM. L. REV. 429, 462-63 (2002). It is a complex question whether the Rehnquist
Court's most recent decisions in the preemption area comport on the whole with the profederalism
tendencies it has revealed in other contexts. See id. at 462 & n.221 (noting that, in thirty-five
preemption decisions handed down from the 1991 term onward, the Supreme Court has found
preemption in sixteen cases, nonpreemption in thirteen cases, and both preemption and nonpreemption
in six cases). At the very least, however, the Rehnquist Court has never retreated from the clear
statement rhetoric of Rice, and (as shown immediately below) it has applied the kindred principle of
Bass in an unmistakably aggressive way. In a similar vein, as Professor Fallon has recently noted, the
Rehnquist Court has repeatedly used tools of statutory interpretation to protect local governments from
damages liability under civil-rights and other federal statutes. See id. at 463. For another recent work
that highlights the Rehnquist's Court's frequent willingness to override the antipreemption presumption
established in Rice, see Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HAST. L.J. 431 (2002).
Notably, in each of the cases from the 2001-02 Term that involved claims of federal preemption of
state law, the Court invoked the Rice presumption in holding that the challenged state law continued to
operate. See City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2226, 2232 (2002);
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2002). Each case, however, also
generated dissenting opinions written and joined by Justices typically associated with the Rehnquist
Court's pro-states-rights stance. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 122 S.Ct at 2237 (Scalia, J.,
joined by O'Connor, J., dissenting); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 2171 (Thomas, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
94. 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991). Notably, the Rehnquist Court had previously cited Bass in
interpreting a civil statute-42 U.S.C. § 1983-in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491
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issue in Gregory was whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA")-a civil-remedies statute clearly meant to cover most state
employee plaintiffs-gave protection to state judges who sought to
challenge mandatory retirement rules.95 In holding that the ADEA did not
authorize suit by this specialized category of potential plaintiffs, the Court
drew directly on Bass' deliberation-forcing logic, 96 adding that the "plain
statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledgment that the States
retain substantial sovereign powers." 97  Gregory's newly hatched rule of
clarity was subject to a closely circumscribed reading, however, because
that case concerned not only an area of "traditional" state control, but an
"authority that lies at 'the heart of representative government'-"-namely,
the ability of the state's body politic to choose on its own those
decisionmakers who will oversee its most critical affairs.98 Even so, in
more recent decisions, the Court has not hesitated to invoke the Bass and
Gregory principles in narrowly construing noncriminal federal statutes of
other kinds. 99 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens,1'0 for example, the Court relied on both Bass and Gregory to
read the governing federal statute not to authorize qui tam civil actions
against state, as opposed to private, defendants.'l'
Is this extension of the Bass principle to the noncriminal context
justifiable? In logic it is. After all, Rice established long ago that courts
must interpret noncriminal federal statutes narrowly when invoked to
preempt state laws that operate in a "field which the States traditionally
have occupied."' 10 2 But states often engage in policymaking by choosing to
U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Will was arguably distinguishable from Gregory, however, on the ground that it did
not focus on duties created by Congress, but instead involved essentially whether state sovereign
immunity from constitutional claims would be deemed congressionally removed. See generally supra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing Atascadero rule).
95. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239-43 (1983)
(deeming state game wardens subject to the ADEA).
96. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461. See also supra note 92 and accompanying text (quoting pertinent
passage).
97. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
98. Id. at 463. See Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of "Process
Federalism," 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 192-93 (1994) (deeming Gregory rule applicable when
"congressional action.., bites into the core of state sovereignty").
99. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172
(2001); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 170 (1992). See also Gonzaga University v. Doe,
122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275-77 (2002) (relying on a closely related interpretive principle set forth in Will v.
Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
100. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
101. Id. at 787. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp, 511 U.S. 531, 544-46 (1994) (illustrating
the Court's strong inclination to confine the operation of a federal civil statute). Professor Frickey's
excellent prior treatment of the BFP case demonstrates in detail why that case fits this pattern. See
Frickey, supra note 90, at 208-13.
102. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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leave important fields of activity free of regulation. In these instances,
federal rules that overarch the otherwise unregulated field are just as
invasive of state policy choices as federal laws that preempt specific rules a
state has enacted. It would seem to follow that there is little, if any, more
reason to apply federalism-based clarity rules in preemption, than in
nonpreemption, cases. It thus makes sense that the Rehnquist Court has
moved to give equal rule-of-clarity treatment to all federal statutes that
genuinely threaten to invade those areas traditionally regulated by the
states. 103
This observation brings into focus a question of enormous practical
importance: Just when, and how freely, should we say that a congressional
enactment concerns "the historic police powers of the States"? °4 A five-
justice majority of the Rehnquist Court (made up, not surprisingly, of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas)
displayed a willingness to give this rubric an expansive reach in Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.10 5 The issue in
that case was whether Congress had empowered the Corps of Engineers to
block the filling of small ponds on the ground that migratory birds
frequented them.'0 6 In finding that the Clean Water Act's grant of federal
regulatory authority did not extend to these localized non-navigable sites,
the Court first invoked the doctrine of constitutional doubt. 10 7 The Court,
however, augmented its reliance on that doctrine by forging another and
more specialized clear statement rule. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained:
Permitting [the Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and
mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird Rule" would result in
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use .... Rather than expressing a desire to readjust
the federal-state balance in this manner, Congress chose to "recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States...
to plan the development and use.., of land and water resources ......
We thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional
and federalism questions raised by [the Corps's] interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative deference.10 8
103. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859-60 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(discussing similar point in context of interpreting federal criminal statute).
104. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
105. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
106. Id. at 162.
107. Id. at 172.
108. Id. at 174 (internal citations omitted).
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In responding to this reasoning, the dissenters did not question the
majority's newly minted local land use variation on the Bass clear
statement theme. 109 Instead, they challenged the majority's invocation of
this local land use principle on the facts presented. As explained by Justice
Stevens:
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, the Corps' interpretation of the
statute does not "encroac[h]" upon "traditional state power" over land
use .... "Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the
land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular
uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used, damage
to the environment is kept within prescribed limits.".... The CWA is
not a land-use code; it is a paradigm of environmental regulation. Such
regulation is an accepted exercise of the federal power. 110
The battle of ideas waged in these passages concerns a matter of
characterization. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
characterized the Corps' proposed action as involving land use regulation, a
field traditionally dominated by the states."' l Justice Stevens, writing for
the minority, characterized the rule as involving environmental control, a
field in which the federal government has long played a prominent role.
This debate over characterization was of pivotal importance. Only by
deeming the Migratory Bird Rule a land use regulation could the Court
apply the historic-police-powers clear statement rule set forth in the Bass
decision.
The broader message of Solid Waste Agency may well be that the
Court's "Federalism Five"1 12 stand ready to characterize at a high, state-
favoring level of generality the fields of regulatory action that federal
authorities have entered for purposes of applying the Rice and Bass clarity
canons. 113 This tendency contrasts with the proclaimed preference of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia to characterize potentially rights-
creating traditions at low levels of generality in defining protected
109. See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the "power to regulate land usage" as "at the heart of the
States' traditional police power").
110. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Ill. Id. at 174. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (upholding a
zoning ordinance and stating that such rules involve "economic and social legislation where legislatures
have historically drawn lines which we [ordinarily] respect").
112. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
113. Of course, reaching this conclusion would not mean that every exercise of federal authority
falls within the canon of Rice and Bass. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S.
341, 347 (2001) (reiterating Rice's antipreemption rule, but finding the rule inapplicable because
"[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally
occupied"' (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
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liberties.114 These divergent approaches to characterization, however, fit
neatly together with a more general agenda of broadly safeguarding "states'
rights."" 5 On this view, by narrowing the range of constitutional liberties
subject to protection by federal courts and expanding those areas of
regulation presumptively free of congressional tinkering, the Court
maximizes state autonomy in the face of different forms of would-be
federal interference.
There is another way of viewing the Court's decision in Solid Waste
Agency. From this alternative perspective, the decision is not as closely
connected with federalism values as with the Rehnquist Court's eagerness
to give private property rights energetic constitutional protection." 6 The
use of clear statement doctrines to block federal interference with "land and
water use, 117 after all, not only protects state autonomy values but also
safeguards the interests of private property owners otherwise subject to an
overlapping set of regulatory controls. Put simply, because of the Court's
ruling in Solid Waste Agency, landowners could pursue a real estate
development project otherwise stopped dead in its tracks solely by a federal
agency rule.
In the end, the Court's decision in the Migratory Bird Rule case killed
two birds with one stone. Built on a clarity-based principle of statutory
interpretation, the decision simultaneously vindicated now-ascendant Tenth
Amendment interests in state autonomy 118 and Fifth Amendment interests
in the free use of private property." 9 In so doing, this provisional ruling
safeguarded substantive constitutional values of recurring concern to the
Rehnquist Court.
(c) How Clear is Clear?
As insightful commentators have noted, some rules of clarity carry
more clout than others. In particular, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have
drawn a distinction between ordinary clear statement rules (which do not
require clarity on the face of the statute) and "super-strong" clear statement
rules (which do). 120  These commentators also have shown that the
Rehnquist Court has tended to channel super-strong rules of clarity into the
field of constitutional federalism, most notably in its Eleventh Amendment
114. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
115. See, e.g., supra note 79.
116. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
117. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
118. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
120. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 611-12
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abrogation decisions and in its adoption of the specialized internal political
functions principle of the Gregory case. 121 In a separate work, Professor
Frickey has argued that the Court has recently gone a step further by
transforming the traditionally "soft" rules of clarity of Rice and Bass into
super-strong rules, at least when federal legislation threatens certain forms
of local choice. 122  The overall point is clear and predictable enough: In
keeping with its formulation of full-scale substantive constitutional
doctrines that cut down federal congressional power,' 23 the Rehnquist
Court-subtly, but effectively-has shaped rules of statutory interpretation
to advance the same constitutional end.
The foregoing discussion shows how the Court can fortify protections
of particular constitutional values by explicitly adopting hard or soft clear
statement rules. On other occasions, however, the Justices may reveal
substantive policy preferences not in formulating rules, but in applying
them. In Solid Waste Agency, for example, Justice Stevens disagreed with
the majority's conclusion that the vindication of federalism values justified
application of a super-strong clear statement rule. 124  His opinion also
suggested, however, that federal authorities had spoken clearly enough
even if a super-strong rule of clarity applied. 125
The difficult question of "how clear is clear" lurks in every case that
involves application of a clear statement "how" rule.' 26  Even so, that
question often draws little attention, at least on the face of the opinions in
the case. The "how clear is clear" issue did take center stage, however, in
the Court's recent decision on the availability of federal habeas relief in
INS v. St. Cyr.127  There, the Court's dissenters not only challenged the
121. See id. at 597. For a discussion of the abrogation decisions, see supra notes 33-36, 85-86
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Gregory, see supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
122. Frickey, supra note 90, at 211 (discussing BFP case).
123. See supra note 79.
124. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 191-92 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (reasoning that the
canon of constitutional doubt is inapplicable because of the unambiguousness of a section of the Clean
Air Act ("CAA") when "interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its
importance to the CAA as a whole").
127. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). St. Cyr also highlights another important and recurring question
concerning rules of clarity driven by substantive constitutional concems-namely, how those rules
interact with other interpretive presumptions. In particular, the Court in St. Cyr held that the
antiretroactivity clear statement doctrine completely trumped the principle, set forth in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), of judicial deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes. See id. at 320 n.45. Some of the many questions raised by this
ruling are as follows: Is this trumping principle properly generalized to all clear statement rules built on
concerns about substantive constitutional rights? If not, why not? And just when, in the end, will such
trumping occur? See, e.g., C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411,
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majority's recognition of a super-strong presumption against removal of
habeas corpus jurisdiction; 128 they also argued that, even if such a rule
exists, the Court misapplied it by, in effect, "fabricat[ing] a super clear
statement 'magic words' requirement... unparalleled in any other area of
our jurisprudence."' 129 This characterization of the majority's action rested
on a detailed argument about the facial clarity of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"). In
particular, the dissenters claimed that Congress' express negation of
"jurisdiction to review" deportation orders based on an alien's past
felonious conduct extended both to review proceedings brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and to freestanding actions initiated
under the federal habeas corpus statute. 130 The majority rejected this
position based on the proposition that courts historically have understood
the terms "judicial review" and "habeas review" to have different
meanings.131 The dissenters responded by pointing to a companion statute
that specifically indicated that "[j]udicial review" could occur "in a habeas
corpus proceeding" concerning noncrime-based deportation orders.132
Whether the statute at issue in St. Cyr was clear enough to negate the
clear statement rule invoked by the majority is a fact-specific question
beyond the scope of this Article. It is, however, worth reflecting on Justice
Scalia's specialized argument that the Court's aggressive, clear statement
approach in St. Cyr markedly departed from the Court's past use of clarity
rules, particularly its use of clarity rules in the Court's federalism-friendly,
Eleventh-Amendment-abrogation cases. 133 In particular, did the majority
in St. Cyr wander far beyond the boundaries of past precedent by requiring
not only a "clear statement," but also a clear statement framed in particular
"magic words"? 134 The better view is that it did not.
To be sure, the majority in St. Cyr held that an express statutory
exclusion of "jurisdiction to review" conviction-based deportations was not
explicit enough to negate habeas corpus jurisdiction, even when other
421 (2001) (declining to decide whether all features of clear statement jurisprudence applicable to state
waivers of sovereign immunity carry over to tribal waivers of sovereign immunity); Chickasaw Nation
v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528, 535 (2001) (noting that canons of interpretation "are not mandatory
rules," that "other circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force," and that
they are "'often.... countered by some maxim pointing in a different direction').
128. See supra note 46.
129. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 327-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Seeid. at310-14.
132. See id. at 329-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See supra notes 33-36, 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Atascadero line of
cases).
134. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sections of the statute lent support to the contrary view. 135 In its Eleventh
Amendment cases, however, the Court also has held that certain forms of
statutory language-for example, a "general authorization for suit in
federal court"136-do not suffice to abrogate state immunities even when
"various provisions of the ... Act are addressed to the States."' 137  In
castigating the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the Court's state
sovereign immunity precedents had never required an "explicit reference to
the Eleventh Amendment."' 138 This argument, however, is beside the point
because the majority's opinion in St. Cyr did not require explicit reference
to the Suspension Clause' 39 or any other constitutional provision. Rather,
the majority held that, absent further clarification, a negation of
"jurisdiction to review" deportation orders was not adequate to defeat a
strong presumption (directly akin to the Court's presumption in favor of
retaining state immunities) that habeas corpus jurisdiction should be
preserved. In the end, the Court no more required magic words in St. Cyr
than it required magic words in its Eleventh Amendment cases. Rather, in
both contexts, the Court now has specified only that certain verbal
formulations are not enough to overcome countervailing constitutional
concerns.
140
Whatever one ultimately concludes about the merits of Justice Scalia's
parsing of the IIRIRA, this discussion highlights an important dynamic in
135. See id. at 311-13.
136. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
137. Id. at 247. See also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (collecting authorities holding that "a State does not consent to suit in federal
court merely by consenting to suit in the courts of its own creation" or by "stating its intention to 'sue
and be sued, or even by authorizing suits against it 'in any court of competent jurisdiction').
138. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 333 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also C & L Enters., Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 421 (2001) (rejecting view that waiver of
immunity to suit by Indian tribe "to be deemed explicit, must use the words 'sovereign immunity')
(quoting Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., 86 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir.
1996)).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
140. Perhaps the most interesting feature of Justice Scalia's excoriation of the majority for
requiring "magic words" is that Justice Thomas joined it. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. Yet if any opinion
of the Court in fact requires "magic words" to satisfy a clear statement rule, it is Justice Thomas'
concurring opinion in Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 99 (2000). See generally infra notes
163-74 and accompanying text (discussing at length Justice Thomas' approach in Kimel). Justice
Thomas' different views of statutory clarity requirements in Kimel and St. Cyr thus raise the perennial
question: Do some substantive constitutional values have stronger claims to structural protections than
others? If the federalism interests in Kimel in fact have a stronger clear-statement claim than the liberty
interests in St. Cyr, the proponents of that position should pause to explain why. Moreover, in doing so,
they should take account of the argument, made elsewhere, that the Eleventh Amendment clear
statement rule that drove Justice Thomas' opinion in Kimel stands on particularly shaky ground
following the tectonic movements of Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment doctrine caused by Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See supra
note 86 (explaining why these authorities place Atascadero's clear statement rule in doubt).
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the operation of semisubstantive constitutional rules. The point is that as
individual Justices make contextual judgments about "how clear is clear" in
particular cases, underlying allegiances to distinctive constitutional values
may well creep into the decisional calculus. For this reason, it is not
surprising that those Justices most closely associated with the protection of
a vibrant federalism (led by Justice Scalia) found the statutes at issue in St.
Cyr sufficiently clear to override an assertion of federal habeas jurisdiction.
On the other hand, those Justices least eager to protect "states' rights" (and
probably most eager to protect the rights of "Carolene groups" as well 141)
voted to preserve for aliens the protections afforded by federal court habeas
corpus review.
(d) The Special Case of Extra-Super-Clear Statement Rules.
Thus far, it is evident that the Rehnquist Court frequently applies
constitutionally driven "how" rules of statutory clarity when interests the
court deems worthy of protection have been placed in jeopardy. 142 Put
differently, when confronted with two plausible constructions of a federal
statute, the Court will read it narrowly to protect substantive constitutional
values-often federalism-based values-while simultaneously inviting
Congress to broaden the statute's reach notwithstanding the constitutional
price to be paid.
Federal courts, however, have no power to review state court
interpretations of state statutes. 143 As a result, the Supreme Court cannot
invoke clear statement rules of statutory interpretation to counter
constitutional problems posed by state court interpretations of state law. In
addition, federal courts cannot invoke garden-variety clear statement rules
to rein in constitutionally troublesome federal statutes if those statutes
genuinely lack the level of facial ambiguity necessary to trigger an
interpretive rule resolving the ambiguity. 144 Even when the Court cannot
apply a clear statement rule of statutory construction, however, it might
invoke other semisubstantive doctrines that remand to the legislature a law
that rubs up against constitutional concerns. The Court, for example, has
often given specialized-albeit only provisional-protection to First
Amendment values by applying the vagueness doctrine to invalidate state
laws construed by state courts to cover speech- or association-related
141. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 39-119 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982).
144. See, e.g., supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (noting this limit on the operation of the
rule of constitutional doubt).
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conduct. 145  In these cases, the Court says, in so many words, something
like this: We recognize that lower courts have construed this law to cover
the behavior at issue in this case. Notwithstanding the defendant's claims
that that behavior is constitutionally protected, we do not say that it lies
beyond the state's power of regulation. We do say, however, that state
lawmaking authorities must produce a less vague-and thus more
thoughtfully constructed-prohibition if they wish to prohibit the conduct
the defendant has engaged in. In the meantime, this statute cannot stand.
146
The Rehnquist Court's most noteworthy brush with the vagueness
doctrine came in City of Chicago v. Morales. 147 At issue in the case was a
Chicago ordinance that created a loosely defined authority to disrupt
private activity "[w]henever a police officer observes a person whom he
reasonably believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any
public place."' 48 The Court's invalidation of the ordinance confirmed the
continuing vitality of the semisubstantive, process-centered principles
inherent in the vagueness doctrine. 149 No less important, as in St. Cyr, a
sharp splintering of the Court-largely along federalist/nonfederalist
lines-confirmed the potential importance of underlying substantive values
(here, free movement, free association, and local autonomy values) in the
application of semisubstantive, as well as fully-substantive, constitutional
rules. 150
Does the vagueness doctrine constitute the only "how" rule approach
available to courts forced to deal with linguistic fuzziness in statutes not
amenable to clear-statement-based narrowing interpretations? Justice
145. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means to an End, 109
U. PA. L. REV. 67, 87-88 (1960) (noting that "free speech vagueness cases have begun to proliferate" in
"the post-New Deal period"). See also John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) ("As Professor Amsterdam has taught
us, a paramount concern is whether the law's uncertain reach implicates protected freedoms.").
146. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 24, at 201 (noting this dialogic feature of vagueness doctrine).
147. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
148. Id. at 47 n.2.
149. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 8-9, at 1372-73 (3d ed.
2000) (discussing Morales in structural due process terms).
150. The three dissenters in the case were those Justices often most closely associated with values
of local autonomy-namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas. See Morales,
527 U.S. at 73, 98. In addition, only Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined the lead opinion for the Court,
which was authored by Justice Stevens. Id. at 45. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer each wrote
separate concurring opinions that relied on an analysis more cautious and less far-reaching than that of
Justice Stevens. Id. at 64, 69-70. For example, Justice O'Connor-in obvious keeping with second-
look theory-emphasized that "there remain open to Chicago reasonable alternatives to combat the very
real threat posed by gang intimidation and violence." Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id.
at 73 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the "city might have enacted a different ordinance" or that
"the Illinois Supreme Court might have interpreted this ordinance differently" in a way that "permitted
the city to apply that different ordinance (or this ordinance as interpreted differently) to circumstances
like those present here").
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O'Connor's extraordinarily semisubstantive concurring opinion in
Thompson v. Oklahoma151 shows that the answer to this question is "no."
Thompson presented the issue whether a state could, consistent with
the Eighth Amendment, execute murderers who were younger than sixteen
at the time of their offenses. Four members of the Court (led by Justice
Scalia) said "yes" on the theory that the execution of juvenile offenders,
including offenders who had committed their crimes when not yet sixteen,
had long been authorized in many states.152 Four other members of the
Court (led by Justice Stevens) said "no" because, in their view, the
execution of this class of offenders abridged "evolving standards of
decency" in light of the modem-day rarity of imposing the death penalty in
this class of cases.' 53 Supplying the decisive fifth vote to block the
inmate's execution, Justice O'Connor constructed and applied an extra-
super-clear statement rule founded squarely on a semisubstantive, structural
due process rationale.
1 54
According to Justice O'Connor, the problem was not that the
dissenters in Thompson had failed to apply an applicable clear statement
rule of statutory interpretation. Rather, Justice O'Connor conceded that the
federal courts had no authority to find the relevant statutes ambiguous
because the state courts had construed them to authorize capital punishment
in precisely this set of cases.' 55 Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor found a
clarity-based deficiency in the governing state statutes that precluded the
defendant's execution under federal constitutional law. The problem,
Justice O'Connor reasoned, was that the Oklahoma legislature had never
enacted a single law that specifically authorized the death penalty for this
class of youthful offenders. 56 Instead, the state had put in place two
separate statutes-one that authorized imposition of the death penalty for
adult offenders, and a second that authorized trying certain youthful
offenders, including the defendant in Thompson, as adults.157  Justice
O'Connor acknowledged-as she had to-that this combination of statutes
exposed the defendant in Thompson to the death penalty as a matter of state
law.' 58 In Justice O'Connor's view, however, the Constitution required
something more. As she explained:
151. 487 U.S. 815, 848-59 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 859-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion).
154. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1630-34.
155. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982).
156. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
157. See id.
158. See id.
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Because it proceeded in this manner, there is a considerable risk that the
Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have
the effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not
give the question the serious consideration that would have been
reflected in the explicit choice of some minimum age for death
eligibility. 159
Talking the talk and walking the walk of serious semisubstantive,
constitutional decisionmaking, Justice O'Connor insisted that the
legislature had to act with "special care and deliberation" 160 in "this unique
situation."1 6 1 To evidence such care and deliberation, she continued, the
legislature would have to enact a single, focused statute that "specifies [a]
minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the
offender's execution."' 162
Are there other examples of a structural insistence on such "extra-
super" clarity in the work of the Rehnquist Court? In fact, a line of
reasoning very similar to Justice O'Connor's-although invoked on behalf
of a very different set of constitutional values-recently surfaced in Justice
Thomas' concurring opinion in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.163 At
issue in Kimel was whether Congress had satisfied Atascadero's "clear
statement" requirement in attempting to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the ADEA. 164 A seven-Justice majority had
little difficulty finding a clear abrogation in the joint operation of two
statutes. First, section 626(b) of the ADEA specifies that it "shall be
enforced in accordance with" section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"). 165 Second, as stated by the Court's majority, "[s]ection
216(b)... clearly provides for suits by individuals against States,"
including "actions for backpay."'' 66  According to the majority, the
language of these statutes "[r]ead as a whole.., clearly demonstrates
Congress' intent to subject the States to suit for money damages" under the
ADEA. 167
Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Kennedy) dissented from this
ruling, invoking a rationale that bore no small measure of similarity to
159. Id.
160. Id. at 856.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 857-58.
163. See 528 U.S. 62, 99-109 (2000) (Thormas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. See id. at 66-67.
165. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
166. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-76 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994)).
167. Id. at 74.
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Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson.'68 At the core of Justice
Thomas' critique was his assertion that "Congress likely did not
contemplate the impact of... § 216(b) on the ADEA" when it amended
FLSA to authorize money damages recoveries from states. 69 According to
Justice Thomas, the difficulty was that Congress revised section 216 only
after it had separately enacted the ADEA, including its generally phrased,
"incorporation by reference" remedies provision, section 626(b) 7 ° In
these circumstances, Justice Thomas was "unwilling to indulge the fiction
that Congress, when it amended § 216(b), recognized the consequences for
a separate Act (the ADEA) that incorporates the amended provision."' 171 In
sum, without focusing on the clarity of the statutory text itself, Justice
Thomas declined to find an effective abrogation because he lacked
"confidence that Congress ha[d] deliberated on the consequences of the
amendment for the other Acts."' 17 2
The parallels between Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson and
Justice Thomas' opinion in Kimel are striking. In each setting, a Justice
who was moved by a commitment to underlying constitutional values
refused to give effect to the joint operation of two statutes that, on their
face, produced a presumably permissible-but constitutionally
troublesome-result. In each case, the Justice refused to let an otherwise
unremarkable incorporation-by-reference statutory scheme operate because
of the "unusual" circumstances raised by substantive constitutional
concerns. 173 And in both cases, the Justices in effect demanded that the
legislature speak pointedly, in one statute instead of two, so as to reveal a
focused "attention" to the precise constitutional problem its dual statutory
enactments had created.174
Does the demonstration of these parallels mean that Justice Thomas-
if given the chance-would have joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Thompson?175 One senses that this outcome is unlikely, and there are
possible distinctions between the cases that might (at least at first blush)
give Justice Thomas an "out" if called on to carry over his semisubstantive
reasoning in Kimel to the question posed in the Thompson case. One
possible distinction is that Thompson, in contrast to Kimel, involved state,
168. See id. at 99 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. See id. at 103 n.2.
170. See id. at 102.
171. Id.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 858 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 109.
175. Justice Thomas, of course, did not get this chance because the Thompson case was decided in
1988, four years before his appointment to the Supreme Court.
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rather than federal, statutory law. It is doubtful, however, that this
distinction holds water; after all, it seems strained to say that the Court has
more authority to reject the "form" of legislation enacted by Congress 176
(which is, after all, a "co-ordinate department" of the national
government' 77) than the "form" used by state legislatures, over whose work
national law is supreme. 1
78
Another possible distinction might rest on the notion that Justice
Thomas' approach to Kimel concerned the construction of a statute,
whereas Justice O'Connor's approach to Thompson involved an outright
constitutional invalidation. In particular, it might be said that the latter
judicial act is more difficult to overturn than the former when the
legislature revisits the policy question pursuant to the Court's defacto call
for a "second look." This argument, however, ignores legislative realities.
Under Justice O'Connor's rationale in Thompson, the state legislature
retained the same measure of freedom that Congress would have possessed
if the Court had adopted Justice Thomas' approach to Kimel. Because in
each instance the legislature was (or would have been) free to replace two
statutes with just one, the claimed distinction between a "constitutional"
ruling and a "statutory" ruling involves nothing more than word play.
From a functional perspective, the rules invoked by both Justice O'Connor
and Justice Thomas hinged on a provisional, semisubstantive intervention.
Finally, one might try to distinguish the cases by saying that the
federal law in Kimel was at least arguably ambiguous, while the law in
Thompson was definitively not open to interpretation because of the
meaning previously ascribed to it by the state courts. 17 9 There is, however,
a deep problem with this suggestion because Justice Thomas' anti-
incorporation-by-reference reasoning in Kimel simply did not turn on the
presence of statutory ambiguity in any ordinary sense. As the majority
explained, Justice Thomas' problem in Kimel was not with "what Congress
did enact" (and thus with the ambiguity of its words), but instead with
"when it did so' 180 (and thus with the "legislative processes" that produced
the troublesome result). 8 '
176. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing Justice O'Connor's
focus on "the precise form the state legislation must take").
177. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 154 (1893).
178. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., Law and the Court,
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920) (suggesting greater legitimacy of judicial review
with regard to "the laws of the several States" than with regard to "an Act of Congress").
179. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
180. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 76 (2000) (emphasis in original).
181. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In the end, Thompson and Kimel seem subject to distinction, if at all,
solely because they involved different substantive constitutional values-
Eighth Amendment just punishment values in Thompson and Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment state rights values in Kimel. Making this point,
however, merely raises the question whether courts might more
legitimately construct semisubstantive constitutional rules to safeguard the
latter values over the former. At least for many observers, it will be a
matter of no little difficulty to say that substantive constitutional interests
are more deserving of protection in a case that involves exposing a
concededly lawbreaking state to damages liability 182 than in a case that
involves putting fifteen-year-olds to death. To be sure, there may be other
reasons for finding Justice Thomas' approach to Kimel reconcilable with a
rejection of Justice O'Connor's treatment of Thompson.183  Ultimately,
however, one senses that if there is any real distinction between the cases it
lies in Justice O'Connor's greater attachment to what we might call
"human rights" values and Justice Thomas' greater attachment to what
might be called "states' rights" values. The more general point is clear
enough: Different allegiances to different constitutional values may lead
different Justices to fashion very similar semisubstantive approaches but
then apply them in very different areas of constitutional law.
This last observation brings into view a matter of practical importance
for advocates who operate in a legal world pervaded by semisubstantive
constitutional doctrines. The point is that what the Court does in one
substantive area of law with these doctrines may well influence how such
doctrines later come to operate in seemingly unrelated fields. It is unlikely
that the Justices perceived any connection whatsoever between Thompson
and Kimel. But as modern commentary throws light on the pervasiveness
of semisubstantive decisionmaking, such connections are less likely to
escape notice. Rich opportunities for argument by analogy lurk in the
Court's evergrowing web of semisubstantive constitutional precedents.
182. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-55 (1999) (explaining that states have obligations to
comply with federal statutes even if Eleventh Amendment shields them from damages liability).
183. For example, one might distinguish the semisubstantive approaches taken by these two
Justices on judicial manageability grounds. From this perspective, Justice Kennedy's approach to
Kimel involved only a modest "tweaking" of the already well-established super-clear statement rule of
Atascadero. Justice O'Connor's approach to Thompson, in contrast, involved a bold new adventure that
held the potential of "infecting" all sorts of areas of constitutional law. Once again, however, this line
of reasoning holds little persuasive power. Justice O'Connor, for example, was careful to limit the
principle she relied on to the death penalty context, and there is no reason to say that Justice Thomas'
approach in Kimel logically extends only to Eleventh Amendment abrogation cases. See generally
supra notes 39-119 and accompanying text (discussing Rehnquist Court's use of various clear
statement rules).
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2. Findings-Based "How" Rules
Rules of clarity test the constitutional adequacy of a lawmaking
process by focusing on its product or output. If a law is clear enough, the
Court will, in effect, conclusively presume that constitutional concerns
were appropriately considered as policymakers went about adopting the
now-challenged rule. The Rehnquist Court, however, also has given
impetus to a very different set of process-driven, semisubstantive "how"
rules. These doctrines test the adequacy of a lawmaking process, when
significant constitutional values are at stake, by focusing directly on how
that process in fact unfolded. As a general proposition, "[t]here is no
principle of constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature,
otherwise competent, in the absence of a special investigation." 184 In some
fields of ostensibly "substantive" constitutional law, however, this general
rule has given way to important qualifications. Most significantly, the
Rehnquist Court has explored-and at least sometimes embraced-
semisubstantive findings-based "how" rules in the important areas of (1)
affirmative action, (2) free expression, and (3) state autonomy from
congressional control.
(a) Affirmative Action
One area in which the Court seems concerned about lawmaker
findings involves the government's use of so-called "affirmative action."
Although it was Justice Powell who initially asserted that the
constitutionality of remedy-based, race-conscious programs may hinge on
the quality of legislative findings, 185 the post-Powell Rehnquist Court has
shown a receptiveness to this same semisubstantive, process-centered
approach.1 86 Most significantly, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,187
the Court's five-Justice majority (in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor and joined in relevant part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy) focused squarely on the lack of
184. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).
185. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307, 309-10 (1978). See also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Laurence H. Tribe,
Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 864, 877 (1978) (describing Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as "responsive to a sense that, if such
quotas are to be imposed at all, they should be imposed in a more deliberate and cautious manner and
by a more broadly accountable body than was the case in Bakke").
186. For a highly structural treatment of affirmative action issues that presaged, to some extent,
later developments in the Rehnquist Court, see Mark S. Kende, Principles of Competence: The Ability
of Public Institutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 585-92
(1986).
187. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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"[p]roper findings"'188 made "with the particularity required by the
Fourteenth Amendment"'189 in striking down a race-based contractor-set-
aside program. 190 As Justice O'Connor explained: "While the States and
their subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence
that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior
discrimination, they must identify that discrimination with... some
specificity before they may use race conscious relief."''
(b) The First Amendment
The Rehnquist Court has also directed attention to the quality of
legislative investigations in applying the First Amendment. For example,
in striking down an outright ban on commercial "dial a porn" messages in
Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,192 the early Rehnquist Court reasoned
that "the congressional record contains no legislative findings that would
justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable less
restrictive means... to achieve the Government's interest in protecting
minors." 193  Eight years later, Justice Stevens-writing for the much-
altered, present day version of the Rehnquist Court-again pointed to
findings-based concerns in invalidating the Communications Decency
Act's sweeping restrictions on "indecent" Internet speech. 94  The issue in
Reno v. ACLU was (once again) whether the congressional prohibition was
"carefully tailored" in light of potential alternatives for safeguarding
188. Id. at 510.
189. Id. at 492.
190. Id. at 510-11. Justice O'Connor's opinion contained 'a variety of sections, only some of
which spoke for a majority of the Court. Five justices, however, did join Part IV of the opinion, which
focused on legislative findings. Id. at 476.
191. Id. at 504 (emphasis added). See also id. at 520 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (noting that
the "legislative record" suggested that the set aside program was not remedial). The ruling in Croson
tracked prior signals in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The plurality in
that case noted that: "[A] public employer... must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative
action program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted." Id. at 277. Notably, in
its most recent affirmative action, set-aside decision, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court
quoted this passage directly. 515 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1995). See also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290, 277
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing that this mode of analysis does not "require[ ] that public
employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal discrimination" but does require that
"convincing evidence" be present "before [the government] embarks on an affirmative action
program"). The Court's democracy-forcing approach to remedial affirmative action programs has
garnered significant scholarly support. For example, Drew S. Days, III, suggests that:
When Congress has taken the extraordinary step of adopting an explicit racial
classification, ... the Court has the responsibility to assure itself that the decision was
reasoned and deliberate ... not because Congress lacks the constitutional power to enact such
legislation, but because it may have enacted legislation without proper attention to the degree
that its actions may threaten "values of permanent significance" in our society.
Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 469-70 (1987)
192. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
193. Id. at 129.
194. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997).
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minors against harmful pornographic communications.'9 5 In finding a First
Amendment violation, the Court relied on process-centered considerations.
As it explained: "Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed
findings by the Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems
of the CDA, we are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that
requirement has any meaning at all."' 196 The Court added that "[t]he lack of
legislative attention to the statute at issue in Sable suggests [a] parallel with
this case."'' 97
Members of the Rehnquist Court have focused on legislative studies
and findings in other First Amendment cases as well. 198 These decisions,
195. Id. at 871.
196. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 875 n.41. Curiously, Professors Bryant and Simeone cite Sable Communications (see
supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text) as undermining rather than supporting the significance of
judicial findings in the First Amendment context. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 367-69. In
doing so, however, they point solely to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in that case. Id. at 368-69.
See also infra notes 597-99 and accompanying text (noting Justice Scalia's opinion). Their reasoning
is that "no other Justice disputed Justice Scalia's view that the constitutionality [under the First
Amendment] of a federal statute should not depend on whether Congress had created an adequate
record." Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 369. What is significant about Sable, however, is that
Justice White's unanimous majority opinion clearly indicated that legislative factfinding did matter (see
supra note 193 and accompanying text); that Justice Scalia (who was significantly concerned about this
line of reasoning) objected to it pointedly in a separate concurrence; and that no other member of the
Court elected to join in his disclaimer. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115. 131-33
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority's allusion to the "parallel" with Sable in Reno v. ACLU
further undercuts the notion that the Court in Sable meant to de-emphasize, rather than to consider, the
absence of legislative findings in First Amendment cases. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 & n.41.
198. E.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1405 (2002) (noting, in striking
down 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D), that "[w]hile the legislative findings address at length the problems
posed by materials that look like child pornography, they are silent on the evils posed by the images
simply pandered that way"); Thompson v. Western Medical Center, 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 (2002)
("Nowhere in the legislative history.., or petitioner's briefs is there any explanation of why the
Government believed forbidding advertisement was a necessary as opposed to a merely convenient
means of achieving its interests"; urging that "regulating speech must be a last-not first-resort,"
though here "it seems to have been the first strategy the Government thought to try."). Of particular
interest in this regard are the Court's decisions in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622 (1994) ("Turner I"), and Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ("Turner
If') (affirming lower court decision after remand in Turner 1). Those cases are discussed at length (and
fruitfully) in Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 332-39. See also William E. Lee, Manipulating
Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261, 1315 (1998)
("The dominant theme of Justice Kennedy's Turner II opinion is judicial deference to Congress's
judgment about complex communications issues."); Comment, Constitutional Substantial-Evidence
Review? Lessons from the Supreme Court's Turner Broadcasting Decisions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1162,
116374 (1997); Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After
Turner Broadcasting, 1 1 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2329 (1998). I have previously discussed the Turner
decisions, and noted their "findings and study" rhetoric, in Coenen, supra note 3, at 1683 n.438 & 1685
n.442. Another set of First Amendment cases that have elicited differing views on the relevance and
role of findings concern restrictions on so-called "adult entertainment." See id. at 1681 n.437. In City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., the Court avoided deciding whether a city could rely in
litigation on a study, not considered in the legislative process, that was made by another city to justify
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as commentators have noted, leave open many questions about the
significance of the lack of legislative inquiries in First Amendment
litigation. 199 The Court's repeated references to legislative findings in
these cases, however, leave no doubt that they have come to play a
meaningful role in the application of free speech principles.
Any doubt in this regard was removed by the Court's recent decision
to invalidate a key provision of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 in
Bartnicki v. Vopper.200 The issue in Bartnicki was whether Congress could
prohibit a newspaper's publication of true information, which addressed a
matter of public concern and which the newspaper's editors had lawfully
obtained, when they should have known that that information had initially
come to light by way of a third party's illegal electronic surveillance. 20 1
The Court found a First Amendment violation notwithstanding the
government's entreaties that the statute was needed to deter illegal
invasions of privacy by drying up the market for unlawfully intercepted
information. 20 2 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that there
was "no empirical evidence to support" it,203 including no "evidence in the
legislative record., 204  The Court also emphasized that "petitioners cite no
evidence that Congress viewed the prohibition against disclosures as a
response to the difficulty of identifying persons making improper use of
scanners and other surveillance devices and accordingly of deterring such
conduct. 20 5 It explained that: "The dissent argues that we have not given
proper respect to 'congressional findings' or to 'Congress' factual
predictions.' But the relevant factual foundation is not to be found in the
its adult-business zoning rule. 122 S. Ct. 1728, 1735-36 (2002). The majority saw no need to address
the issue because "Los Angeles conducted its own study of adult businesses." Id. at 1738. In an earlier
portion of the opinion the majority noted that "the Los Angeles City Council is in a better position than
the judiciary to gather and evaluate data on local problems." Id. at 1737. See also id at 1743 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that "courts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound
empirical assessments of city planners").
199. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 339 (citing "ambiguity in Justice Kennedy's
opinions regarding the significance of the formal legislative record" in the Court's Turner Broadcasting
cases); id. at 338, 334 (concluding that "Turner II appeared to undercut the Turner I plurality's
suggestion that the Court may oblige Congress, like an administrative agency, to substantiate its
findings ... with evidence on the formal record," but noting that this purported holding may not carry
over to "strict scrutiny" cases because Turner Broadcasting involved intermediate scrutiny of a content-
neutral law); Lee, supra note 198, at 1262, 1281 (noting findings-related questions that would be raised
by television programming restrictions or reenacted ban on distribution of anonymous campaign
literature).
200. 532 U.S. 514, 530-34 (2001).
201. See id. at 517-18.
202. See id. at 529, 535.
203. Id. at 530-31.
204. Id. at 531 n.17.
205. Id. at 530.
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legislative record. '206  Bartnicki, like its precedential predecessors, does
not spell out the precise role that legislative studies will play in future strict
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny First Amendment cases. 2°7  The case,
however, follows the lead of others in which the Rehnquist Court has
scrutinized the quality of legislative findings in assessing the
constitutionality of legislation under the First Amendment.20 8
206. Id. at 531 n.17. The dissenters endorsed "the 'drying up the market' theory [as] both logical
and eminently reasonable" and wondered "how or from where Congress should obtain statistical
evidence about the effectiveness of these laws." Id. at 552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at
551-52 (noting that in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Court "did not demand, nor did
Congress provide, any empirical evidence to buttress [the state's] basic syllogism" that "[t]he most
expeditious if not the only practical method" of protecting children from pornography producers "may
be to dry up the market for this material") (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760). But cf. Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 530 n. 13 (majority opinion) (distinguishing Ferber as involving "speech... of minimal value").
The dissenters also faulted the majority's reasoning as incompatible with the judiciary's adoption of the
deterrence-based Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule without "first requir[ing] empirical evidence."
Id. at 551 n.7 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See id. (asserting, for this reason, that the Court's rationale
reflected a "do as we say, not as we do" presumptuousness). One might respond to this criticism by
positing that the common sense inferability of deterrence is stronger with regard to the exclusionary rule
than in Bartnicki's no-publication context. Even if this distinction is rejected, however, another
distinction exists that jibes well with a rights-centered semisubstantive approach. On this view, both the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Barnicki's First Amendment pro-publication principle reflect
a judicial willingness to make assumptions about "chain of causation" issues that favor the vindication
(rather than the subordination) of important substantive constitutional rights.
207. In particular, it is not clear in this regard whether Bartnicki itself involved strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny or something in between. Compare id. at 526 (characterizing the challenged rule
as content neutral), with id. at 526 (noting that the rule nonetheless constitutes "a regulation of pure
speech"). It is also unclear if this matter is of analytical significance with respect to the role of findings.
See supra notes 198-99 (citing treatments of the Turner Broadcasting cases and their impact on this
issue).
208. It also raises the question whether findings-and-study rules lurk in cases outside the First
Amendment area that concern threats to liberty, property, and equality. Professor Cass R. Sunstein, for
example, has suggested that a sort of findings-and-study logic underlay the Rehnquist Court's seminal
ruling in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). He suggests that:
Virginia is linked with Kent insofar as it requires a current legislative judgment-here, that
same-sex education is necessary to promote educational diversity .... If the state reached its
decision deliberatively and without infection from stereotypes about gender roles, and the
decision promoted rather than undermined equal opportunity, the Court might uphold the
program.
Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 75-76 (1996). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
485 (1987) (distinguishing an earlier decision invalidating coal-mining subsidence law on the ground
that the new law was supported with "detailed findings" by way of which the "[Ilegislature specifically
found that important public interests are served by enforcing [the challenged] policy"); Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (stating that "customary deference accorded the judgments of
Congress is certainly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the question of the
Act's constitutionality"); Frickey, supra note 3, at 724 ("In upholding the exclusion of women from the
selective service in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court stressed that the Congress had recently 'carefully
considered and debated' the alternatives."); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 201 (1988) (stating "it is a commonplace that a legislative judgment that a statute
is constitutional is generally entitled to some deference from a court, especially when that judgment is
made after detailed consideration of the constitutional question"). A subtly related point was touched
on in the Court's recent ruling in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), which involved applying the
constitutionally inspired, antiretroactivity rule of clarity. See supra note 53. In choosing to apply this
rule, the majority deemed the statute's "legislative history ... significant because, despite its
comprehensive character, it contains no evidence that Congress specifically considered the question of
1318
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There is much to be said about the advisability of using findings-based
"how" rules in the free speech field.2°9 One thing, however, can be said for
sure: In taking this tack, which lacked any firm basis in prior authority, the
Rehnquist Court has made a distinctive contribution to both the law of the
First Amendment and the law of process-centered, semisubstantive review.
(c) Federalism-Driven Findings-Based Rules.
The Court's most pointed treatments of legislative findings have come
in assessing federalism-based challenges to attempted exercises of
congressional power. These decisions have concerned two separate
the applicability of [the Act] to [pre-Act] convictions." St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 n.44. In effect, the
Court looked for at least some focused legislative consideration on the constitutionally troublesome
retroactivity question. As Justice Stevens (quoting from then-Justice Rehnquist) put the point: "In a
case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively
unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration
the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night." Id. (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396
n.23 (1991) (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting))).
209. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 395 (asserting that in "a series of recent
cases"-including First Amendment cases-the Court has focused on "Congress's [sic] formal
legislative record" in a way that "is highly questionable on precedential, constitutional, and practical
grounds"). It is noteworthy in this regard that the Rehnquist Court's focus on less restrictive
alternatives and the persuasiveness of predictive judgments necessarily entails a second-look approach,
regardless of what the Court says explicitly about the significance of legislative findings. See supra
notes 192-97 and accompanying text. The Court's decision in United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000), is instructive in this regard. There the Court considered a law that
required cable television operators to fully block, or to limit to very late night hours, sexually oriented
programs. Id. at 806. The government defended the law by arguing that neither proposed less
restrictive alternative--"targeted blocking" or customer-requested blocking-would work to safeguard
minors from viewing indecent material. Id. at 815, 821. The Court, however, rejected this argument.
Although the Court in doing so noted that it confronted a "near barren legislative record relevant to this
provision," its core reasoning was that the government had not discharged its burden of proof at trial to
establish the requisite compelling need for this form of regulation. Id. at 822 As observed elsewhere:
The key point to be made about Playboy Entertainment is that its burden-of-proof-driven style
of analysis leaves it open for Congress to fill the evidentiary void left behind by the
government's lawyers. Thus, if Congress reenacted precisely the same statute struck down in
Playboy Entertainment-after using its distinctively powerful investigatory tools to
demonstrate the need for such a law based on the sort of sound "surveys and field tests" that
government lawyers had not presented-there can be little doubt that it could render valid
what was invalid before .... In this sense, means/ends invalidations-and particularly
invalidations based on a judicial sense that workable less restrictive alternatives seem to be
available-often have a structurally pure, though largely hidden, remand-to-the legislature
dimension.
Coenen, supra note 3, at 1676 n.423 (citation omitted). One question raised by this analysis is whether
the government's defense of such a congressionally reinstated program would fall victim to the doctrine
of collateral estoppel in light of its defeat in the earlier litigation. The answer is "no" (even assuming
the two cases were deemed to present the same question) because defensive use of nonmutual collateral
estoppel is unavailable against the United States government. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.
154, 162-64 (1984). A second question is whether it is worth spending time (even in a law review
footnote) on a scenario so unlikely to unfold in the real world. At least a partial answer is that
sometimes such reenactments occur. See Frickey, supra note 3, at 708-09 (discussing Grain Futures
Act, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), and Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. I
(1923)). See also supra note 208 (discussing Keystone Bituminous case).
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sources of federal legislative authority: the Article I Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Clause.
210
The Commerce Clause story begins with United States v. Lopez.
2 11
Faced with a federal statute that prohibited possession of a gun within 1000
feet of a school, the Court-for the first time in fifty-nine years-
concluded that Congress had reached beyond its enumerated Article I
lawmaking authority.212 In ruling that Congress could not base this statute
on the affecting-commerce prong of the commerce power, the Court relied
primarily on the fact that the activity Congress had regulated was not
"economic" in nature.213 The Court also observed, however, that "[n]either
the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express congressional
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession
in a school zone." 214 The Court added:
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce. But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
2 15
This aspect of the Court's reasoning in Lopez raised large questions
about the relevance of congressional findings in commerce power cases.
Should such findings matter at all? If so, should they matter only in cases
that involve the regulation of economic activity, only in cases that involve
the regulation of noneconomic activity, or in cases of both kinds? Should
findings be determinative in all cases or only in close cases, and just how
close must a "close case" be? The case also raised questions about how
explicitly and elaborately Congress must speak in making and setting forth
its findings. Must Congress make findings on the face of the law? May the
Court determine that Congress made findings implicitly if there is
210. See generally Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3; Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1326-27 (1999); Frickey, supra note 3; Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings
and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
757, 760 (1996); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 826
(1996); Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for Structural Analysis, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 699, 720 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2240 (1998); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 734 (1996);
Calvin R. Massey, The Tao of Federalism, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 887, 901 (1997); Robert F.
Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 652 (1996).
211. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
212. See id. at 566-68.
213. Id. at 560, 567.
214. Id. at562.
215. Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
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extensive support for them in committee reports or other legislative
materials? Is it enough that there is some measure of support for such
findings, even if that support is not extensive?216
The Court grappled with some of these questions in United States v.
Morrison,2 17 which concerned a provision of the Violence Against Women
Act ("VAWA") that created a federal private right of action for gender-
based assaults.2'8  A defendant sued under VAWA contested its
constitutionality, relying on Lopez and the "noneconomic" character of the
federally regulated conduct. 219  In seeking to distinguish Lopez, the
government pointed to the plethora of findings that Congress had
assembled to show that acts of gender-motivated violence do in fact
profoundly affect interstate commerce. 220  A majority of the Court,
however, was not impressed with the government's "how" rule argument.
Specifically eschewing a findings-based approach to the case, the Court
found that Congress had once again exceeded its Article I powers.221
In invalidating the VAWA's civil remedy provision, the majority
emphasized that the Act targeted only "noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct" and that Congress had relied on only a highly generalized "'costs
of crime' and 'national productivity"' rationale in invoking its commerce
power.222 At least in these circumstances, the Court concluded, even the
most elaborate findings would not do.223 It is noteworthy, however, that
Morrison held only that "the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation. 224 It also is noteworthy that the Court declined to "adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
activity" for purposes of applying the affecting-commerce aspect of the
216. Such questions recur in the sources cited supra note 210. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 3, at
707; Friedman, supra note 210, at 762; Krent, supra note 210, at 732.
217. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
218. See id. at 601-02.
219. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
220. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that:
Passage of the Act in 1994 was preceded by four years of hearings, which included testimony
from physicians and law professors; from survivors of rape and domestic violence; and from
representatives of state law enforcement and private business. The record includes reports on
gender bias from task forces in 21 states and we have the benefit of specific factual findings
in the eight separate Reports issued by Congress and its committees over the long course
leading to enactment.
Id. at 629-31 (footnotes omitted)). See also id. at 628-29 (citing "mountain of data assembled by
Congress... showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce").
221. See id. at 614-15, 626-27.
222. See id. at 612-17.
223. Id. at 617.
224. Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
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commerce power. 225 By penning these passages, the Court left itself room
to give weight to the presence or absence of legislative findings in some
future commerce power cases.226
Despite these subtly semisubstantive features of the Morrison opinion,
there can be no doubt about the Court's core message in that case. By
deeming extensive congressional investigations and findings wholly
inconsequential, the Court indicated that, as a rule, Congress cannot "study
its way around" the constitutional limits previously laid down in Lopez.227
Morrison, in short, signals that, for this Court, even the most meticulous
findings will seldom, if ever, matter in contests over the scope of the
affecting-commerce prong of the Article I commerce power.
Morrison's minimization of the role of findings in the Commerce
Clause context contrasts starkly with the Rehnquist Court's emphasis of the
significance of findings in its most recent treatments of the Fourteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause. Within two years after resurrecting
meaningful limits on the commerce power in Lopez, the Court struck
another blow for state autonomy by reining in Congress' "power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation," the substantive protections provided
by the Civil War Amendments.228 The Court's most critical move in this
direction came in City of Boerne v. Flores.2 29 There the Court confronted a
constitutional challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA"), which broadly proscribed generally applicable state laws that
had the effect of burdening religious conduct, even if the lawmaker lacked
the purpose of interfering with religious activities. Pointing to supportive
pronouncements in landmark Warren Court voting rights precedents,230
proponents of the legislation argued that the protection it gave free exercise
values reflected a permissible exercise of Congress' power to expand the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 231  The Rehnquist
Court, however, emphatically rejected this argument, holding instead that
Section 5 goes no further than authorizing Congress to enact "measures that
225. Id. at 613.
226. Accord, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 344 (concluding, for this reason, that
"Morrison ... furthered Lopez's ambiguity regarding the need for findings and record evidence").
227. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that, under majority's
analysis, "some particular subjects arguably within the commerce power can be identified in advance as
excluded, on the basis of characteristics other than their commercial effects").
228. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
229. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
230. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). See also Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982) (noting Katzenbach's one-way ratchet theory of congressional
power to define Fourteenth Amendment rights in nondilutive ways).
231. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has long been deemed
incorporated into the due process guaranty. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
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remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions" as determined by judicial
constructions of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive protections.232
The Court also held that, for a law to constitute an "appropriate"
enforcement measure, it must be marked by "congruence and
proportionality" to the underlying constitutional wrong Congress had
sought to rectify.233
Having stated this test, the Court in City of Boerne found that the
RFRA did not meet it in light of the Court's earlier interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause as ordinarily barring only those laws that
intentionally target religious groups or practices. 234  Most important, in
finding that the RFRA lacked "congruence" to remedial goals permitted by
Section 5, the Court focused squarely on the congressional investigation
that had preceded the RFRA's enactment. 235 The Court acknowledged that
Congress sometimes could invoke Section 5 to frame legislation that
reached farther than the Constitution's own proscriptions to remedy
constitutional wrongs. 236 The Court also explained, however:
In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the judiciary in
the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of
modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry .... Rather, the emphasis of the hearings was on laws
of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion. 237
Put another way, the essential question was whether the RFRA represented
a genuine effort to remedy an identifiable pattern of unconstitutional
conduct in the form of ostensibly neutral laws deviously deployed to
disadvantage religious behavior or adherents. And on this key point, there
was a fatal "lack of support in the legislative record.- 238
232. See id.
233. Id. at 520. The commentary on City of Boerne and its implications is extensive. See, e.g.,
David D. Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional
Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 31, 34; Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire,
47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 669-71 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for
Structural Analysis, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 720 (1998); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 748 (1998); Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 153-57
(1997); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 178-90 (1998).
234. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-30. See also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990).
235. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 530.
238. Id. at 531.
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Having squarely focused on the lack of proper findings assembled by
Congress in enacting the RFRA, the Court in City of Boerne went on to
offer a caveat rich with lawyerly equivocation. It stated:
Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the
legislative record Congress compiles but "on due regard for the decision
of the body constitutionally appointed to decide." . .. As a general
matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach
a decision. 239
With this passage, as Professors Bryant and Simeone have aptly noted, the
Court "assiduously preserved ambiguity as to the ultimate significance or
necessity of legislative findings of fact and supportive legislative record
evidence" in the enforcement-power context.24 °
A flurry of Section 5 cases descended on the Court in the wake of City
of Boerne.24 1 Moreover, the Court continued in these cases to send mixed
signals about the significance of congressional findings in assessing the
constitutionality of exercises of the Section 5 power. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,242 for
example, the Court invalidated Congress' invocation of the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent infringement actions.243 The
Court did so, however, only after painstakingly detailing why the
legislative record did not support subjecting states to such suits to remedy
claimed procedural due process violations. 24" Having gone to this trouble,
the Court quickly added that a "lack of support in the legislative record is
not determinative" of constitutionality.245 In Florida Prepaid, as in City of
Boerne, the Court thus left lawyers guessing about what role legislative
findings would play in future enforcement power cases.
The Court took a similar tack in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 246
There the Court was at pains to document the failure of the "legislative
record" to establish "reasons" based on the Equal Protection Clause for
abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under the
239. Id. at 53 1-32 (citations omitted).
240. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 347. For a parallel account, see Coenen, supra note 3, at
1668-69.
241. In addition to the Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett decisions discussed below (see infra
notes 242-58 and accompanying text), see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000) and
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 672-
75 (1999).
242. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
243. See id. at 630.
244. See id. at 637-48.
245. Id. at 646.
246. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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ADEA.24 7 Once again, however, the Court noted that, while "a review of
the ADEA's legislative record as a whole ... reveals that Congress had
virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of
age.... that lack of support is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry." 248
The drift of these passages was clear enough. They suggested that the
Court-following a pattern discernible in other contexts too24 9-held
ambivalent feelings about taking a strong findings-based, semisubstantive
approach to this important area of law. More particularly, the Court's
qualifying language in City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel
suggested that, even though legislative findings provided a proper starting
point for judicial investigation, able lawyers might defend Section 5
legislation by bringing before the courts, rather than Congress itself, the
sort of justificatory factual materials found missing from the legislative
record in each of those cases.
Push came to shove on this question in the Court's most recent
Section 5 decision. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett,250 the Court considered whether a congressional abrogation of
state immunity from suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") was a permissible exercise of the Section 5 power.251 The Court,
once again, found that Congress lacked the power it had asserted, but this
time the Court also left little doubt that congressional factfinding (at least
for now) lay at the heart of its Section 5 jurisprudence. 252 To begin with,
the Court in Garrett combed the legislative record with particular
meticulousness, concluding in the end that the requisite "pattern of
unconstitutional state action" needed to justify remedial legislation had not
been "documented" by Congress. 253 Next, the Court in Garrett tellingly
omitted the sort of dicta about the potential irrelevance of findings that had
marked its earlier Section 5 decisions. Finally and most important, the
Court in Garrett was in fact forced to confront probative evidentiary
material that lay outside (or at least at the periphery of) the legislative
record. It was in dealing with these materials that the Court had to, and
247. See id. at 88.
248. Id. at 91 (citation omitted).
249. See, e.g., supra notes 198-99 (discussing Turner Broadcasting cases).
250. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
251. Id. at 360-64.
252. See id. at 374.
253. Id. at 372. Indeed the majority's examination of the legislative materials was so energetic
that four dissenters described it as akin to judicial review of "an administrative agency record." Id. at
376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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did, tip its hand with regard to the decisive effect of inadequate legislative
factfinding.
The evidence in Garrett came from a detailed study, conducted by the
Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities, that documented unconstitutional pre-enactment
discrimination against the disabled by state governments. 254  The four
dissenters in the case had no difficulty finding that this evidence
established the challenged law's constitutionality; after all, they argued, it
revealed just the sort of pre-enactment unconstitutional behavior that City
of Boerne indicated Congress could remedy or prevent, including by
abrogating the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.255  The Court's
federalism-friendly majority, however, found this same evidence
inconsequential because it "consists not of legislative findings, but of
unexamined, anecdotal accounts." 256  Speaking directly to the need for
congressional responsibility, the majority added that this evidence was
"submitted not directly to Congress but to [a] Task Force ... which made
no findings on the subject of state discrimination." 257  The critical
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, which was joined by Justice
O'Connor, was no less suggestive of the need for investigation by Congress
itself. As Justice Kennedy explained: "The predicate for money damages
against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a
federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional
violations committed by the State in its official capacity. 258
How can one reconcile the Court's outcome-determinative
dismissiveness towards congressional findings in Morrison with its all but
simultaneous sanctification of the role of congressional findings in Garrett?
Perhaps the difference in approach comports with the different clauses at
play in the cases. On this view, the specialized aim of Section 5 puts
Congress, when it exercises this power, in much the same role as a court
granting an injunction. For this reason, just as surely as courts are required
to justify remedial decrees with underlying factual findings, when Congress
wields its remedial section 5 authority, the issuance of its supportive
findings may properly be insisted upon.259
254. Id. at 370-72.
255. Id. at 379-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 370.
257. Id. at 370-71.
258. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
259. It is noteworthy in this regard that the centerpiece of Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett was
his objection to the majority's purported willingness to treat "the Congress of the United States" like "a
lower court." Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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There is, however, a more plausible synthesis of Morrison and
Garrett. That synthesis focuses on that same tendency of the Rehnquist
Court encountered in the preceding descriptions of its work: the inclination
to vindicate, whenever fairly possible, underlying substantive constitutional
interests in federalism. But how can it be that this same substance-driven
instinct generated entirely different approaches to legislative findings in
two cases that both involved concerns about state freedom from
congressional overreaching? The answer to this question is that the two
cases arose against greatly differing precedential backgrounds.
In Morrison, the issue nubbed down to whether the Court should
constrict the protection of state autonomy it had initiated in Lopez by
constructing a "congressional findings" exception to its newly minted
noneconomic-activity nonaggregation rule.26° In Garrett, in contrast, the
issue was whether the Court should give defenders of legislation enacted
under Section 5 not just one bite at the apple, but two: first, by letting them
rely on congressional findings and second (should this effort fail), by
letting them rely in the courts on evidence assembled outside the legislative
record. 261 As has been seen previously, rhetoric in both Lopez and the pre-
Garrett cases left it open to the Court to resolve these issues in a way that
maximized or minimized state freedom from congressional regulation.
2 62
To give state prerogatives the broadest protection, however, the Court had
to reject the decisiveness of findings in Morrison, while endorsing the
decisiveness of findings in Garrett. And in keeping with the Rehnquist
Court's often evidenced commitment to federalism values,263 that is exactly
what the Court did.
(d) Semi-Structural Themes and Proper-Findings "How" Rules
Our study of findings-based "how" rules confirms each of the three
key themes we have previously detected in the Rehnquist Court's
semisubstantive work. The modern Court's use of these rules in the
affirmative action, free speech, and federalism fields evidences its
willingness to engage in semisubstantive reasoning all across the landscape
of constitutional law. The work of the current Court with these rules also
illustrates dramatically its ambivalence about more adventurous forms of
semisubstantive decisionmaking. To see this ambivalence, one need only
recall the Court's simultaneous emphasis and de-emphasis of congressional
findings in the series of cases that run from Lopez to City of Boerne to
260. See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 211-49 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 215-16, 248-49 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Florida Prepaid to Kimel.264 This same theme of ambivalence-as we
have seen-marks the Court's affirmative action and First Amendment
decisions as well.265
Finally, the Court's divergent treatment of findings in Morrison and
Garrett confirms the same lesson suggested by the Court's recent work
with clarity-based "how" rules-namely, that its process-based
semisubstantive doctrines, no less than its traditional once-and-for-all
rulings, reflect this Court's priorities with regard to substantive
constitutional values. Nearly a decade ago, Professors Eskridge and
Frickey advanced the thesis that values of federalism were predominantly
driving the Rehnquist Court's development of "quasi-constitutional
law." 266 Morrison and Garrett-and other intervening rulings as well26 7 -
leave no doubt that a federalism-centered approach to semisubstantive
decisionmaking has persisted and gained strength in the work of the
Rehnquist Court.
3. Form-Based Semisubstantive "How" Rules
There exists an important set of constitutional "how" rules that do not
depend on either legislative clarity or legislative findings. The operation of
these doctrines hinges instead on how a particular law is packaged. One
subset of these rules distinguishes between two different forms of
regulation even though those forms of regulation, upon adoption, have the
same real-world effects. Why do these rules glorify "form" over
"substance" in this way? Because judges sense that the form proposed
legislation takes, when it is under consideration, may well affect levels of
resistance and scrutiny in the lawmaking process. A second subset of
form-based "how" rules focuses on the context into which a law is placed.
Under this approach, legislative authorities may reenact exactly the same
law a court has previously struck down, but to do so they must-after
giving the matter focused attention-reshape the surrounding legal
landscape into which the invalidated law fits. We turn now to the
Rehnquist Court's work with each of these sets of semisubstantive
doctrines-what I call "form over substance" rules and "surrounding
territory" rules.
264. See supra notes 228-49 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 198-99 (concerning the First Amendment); Coenen, supra note 3, at 1673
n.407 (noting intricacies of Justice O'Connor's view of findings in the affirmative action context).
266. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 597-98, 619-28, 642-44.
267. See, e.g., notes 78-119 and accompanying text (discussing federalism-centered clear
statement rules).
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(a) Form-over-Substance Rules.
The most bandied-about form-over-substance rule finds its home in
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Foundational to this
body of law is the principle that states (no matter how clearly they have
spoken or how many findings they have made) may not enact tax breaks
that favor local firms over interstate competitors.268 The courts, however,
also have held that outright monetary subsidies that have the same
economic effects as impermissible tax breaks are constitutionally
acceptable. 269 The question becomes: How can this be? The main reason
for the distinction lies in the semisubstantive notion that differing forms of
state aid to local businesses lend themselves to differing levels of lawmaker
attentiveness and care. In particular, because an outright subsidy "involves
the direct transfer of public monies," it will be "subject to heightened
political visibility" and thus greater obstacles to securing enactment.
270
The underlying thought behind doctrines of this kind goes something like
this: Rule A and Rule B, if adopted, will have the same practical effects.
Those practical effects are constitutionally problematic. Nonetheless, the
form of Rule B generates a level and type of legislative transparency that
makes it less likely to be adopted than Rule A unless very strong reasons of
policy support it. As a result, Rule A, but not Rule B, is subject to
constitutional attack.27'
268. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-80 (1988) (invalidating
discriminatory tax credit afforded by state for sales of locally produced ethanol and ethanol produced in
states with a reciprocal tax credit).
269. See id. at 278 (asserting that a state's "[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of the [dormant Commerce Clause] prohibition"); Dan T. Coenen, Business
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 972-73 (1998) (collecting
authorities that focus on economic equivalence of subsidies and tax breaks).
270. Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125,
1137 (M.D. La. 1995). The point has been noted in discussions of the dormant Commerce Clause by
such distinguished commentators as Peter Enrich, Mark P. Gergen, Walter Hellerstein, and Donald H.
Regan. See Coenen, supra note 269, at 983-1002 (providing a detailed collection of authorities as well
as a much more refined development of the process-centered distinction between dormant Commerce
Clause tax-break and subsidy cases). No less significantly, the point builds directly on the pioneering
work of "tax expenditure" theorists, particularly Stanley Surrey. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Tax
Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
271. In addition, form-based deliberation logic may help support constitutional distinctions
between rules that do not have precisely parallel practical effects. In New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), for example, the Rehnquist Court held that Congress cannot forcibly enlist states to
implement a federal regulatory program. See id. at 149. The Court simultaneously reaffirmed,
however, that Congress can effectively entice states to implement a federal program by conditioning the
award of federal money on their doing so. See id. at 166-69, 171-72. See also id. at 208 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (highlighting this point). The Court in New York justified the
distinction on the ground that it reflects the different degrees of interference with state autonomy that
come from coercion on the one hand and inducement on the other. See id. at 166-77. In Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), however, the Court also pointed out that direct commanding-
unlike conditional spending-comes "at no cost" to the federal government. See id. at 922. The
2002] 1329
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Form-based deliberation rules live in constant peril of judicial
repudiation. Few starting points of argument are more familiar to lawyers,
after all, than the oft-incanted platitude that "substance" should prevail over
"form."272  Sonorous slogans, however, often mask important functional
realities. In particular, given the nature of the real-world legislative process
(in which lawmakers might well prefer to hide special treatment of favored
constituents in obscure and technical tax legislation), it is not so clear that
the subsidy/tax-break distinction falls on the formal, rather than the
substantive, side of the form-versus-substance line.273  Put another way,
thought behind this rationale seems not far removed from the form-based rationale for distinguishing
subsidies and tax breaks. On this view, the conditional spending form of exacting autonomy-
compromising state compliance with federal wishes will (at least sometimes) generate more care,
caution and restraint by Congress precisely because it is more visibly costly. The result (as with
subsidies) should be that Congress usually will not interfere with federalism values by involving states
in operating federal programs unless there are extremely good reasons for doing so. See, e.g., Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
"Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 865 (1998) (claiming that "the federal
government, burdened by deficits and public impatience with additional federal taxes.., cannot offer
unlimited bribes to nonfederal governments in return for unlimited cooperation"). In similar fashion,
one might view United States v. Lopez as embodying a quasi-form-based deliberation rule. 514 U.S.
549 (1995). The Court in Lopez, after all, did not foreclose Congress altogether from regulating guns
near school zones when it invalidated the Gun Free School Zones Act. See supra notes 211-16 and
accompanying text (discussing Lopez). It did require, however, that any such regulation embody a
"jurisdictional element" that tied the gun possession in some way to movement by the gun or its
possessor across a state border. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Such a requirement carries with it the
assurance that at least someone somewhere will give thought to the constitutionally mandated
commerce-connectedness of a federal regulation. Moreover, because the practical effect of these two
forms of congressional regulation is likely so similar, the ruling in Lopez had a rather pure remand-to-
the-legislature quality. Indeed, following Lopez, Congress reenacted-and the courts have upheld-he
Gun-Free School Zone Act prohibition augmented with a jurisdictional hook. See, e.g., United States v.
Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (3d ed. 2000).
272. E.g., Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 655 (1994) (suggesting that judicial
analysis under dormant Commerce Clause should focus not on "matters of form," but on how state laws
work "in substance").
273. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 n.6 (1983) (stating that "form [must be
examined] for the light that it casts on the substance" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971))). The Court, for example, has drawn lines in the Establishment Clause field between different
programs of religion-connected state aid even when their "economic consequences ... may be difficult
to distinguish." Mueller, 463 U.S at 397 n.6. In particular, the Court has recently noted that, even in
the context of ostensibly neutral programs, there may be "'special Establishment Clause dangers' when
money is given to religious schools or entities directly rather than ... indirectly"-with "indirectly"
meaning, for example, by way of cash grants or tax relief afforded to students or their families.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818-19 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). Accord id. at
855 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One explanation for this seemingly formal distinction has been
suggested by Justice Thomas: "The reason for such concern is not that the form per se is bad, but that
[direct-cash payments] create[] special risks that governmental aid will have the effect of advancing
religion (or, even more, a purpose of doing so)." Id. at 819 n.8. See also id. at 890 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the "risk of diversion [to religious education] is obviously high when aid in the
form of government funds makes its way into the coffers of religious organizations"). To be sure, many
will find the reasoning reflected in these passages difficult to follow and ultimately unpersuasive.
Mitchell reveals at least, however, that form-based distinctions connected with legislative processes
continue to play some role in the Rehnquist Court's Establishment Clause decisionmaking. In
particular, Justice Thomas' focus on legislative purpose suggests that the anti-direct-cash-payment rule
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form is often connected up with substance, and what is formal may not be
formalistic. In the law of contracts, for example, there is widespread
agreement that rules that channel promises into certain forms-whether
they be sealed instruments, signed documents, or bargained-for
exchanges-serve important instrumentalist purposes, including the goal of
inspiring caution and reflection when important choices are made.274 A
similar thought drives the foundational tax-break/subsidy distinction long
drawn by the Court in its dormant Commerce Clause case law.
Even so, it is not surprising that (as with findings-based "how" rules)
the form-over-substance subsidy-protecting "how" rule has stirred signs of
ambivalence within the Rehnquist Court. For now, however, there is little
in the Court's decisions that suggests that the subsidy/tax break distinction
stands in serious danger of judicial rejection.275 As a result, this feature of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine confirms the Rehnquist Court's
openness, in yet another context, to semisubstantive second-look oriented
styles of judicial review.
Another semisubstantive, form over substance rule took hold in the
Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.276 In that case, the
Court confronted a state statute that authorized increased punishment for
any criminal offense the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, to have been committed with the purpose of intimidating an
individual "'because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity.' '"277 In an opinion written by Justice Stevens
(joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg), the Court ruled
might be a sort of prophylaxis against government creation of those programs that-even though
superficially neutral and similar in practical effects to other unobjectionable programs-are most likely
to reflect an illicit decisionmaking process. See generally infra notes 390-469 and accompanying text
(discussing process-centered features of judicial proper-purpose inquiries). See also Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465 (2002) (emphasizing distinction between aid given "directly to
religious schools" from aid that "reaches religious schools only as a result" of private choices in
upholding school voucher program).
274. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941) (providing
"an inquiry into the rationale of legal formalities, and an examination of the common-law doctrine of
consideration in terms of its underlying policies").
275. To be sure, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court noted that
"[w]e have 'never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies' ... and we need not address
these questions today." 520 U.S. 564, 589 (1997) (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S.
186, 199 n.15 (1994)). Even so, the Court's full corpus of precedents-including New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988), and C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)-
lend strong support to the tax-break/subsidy distinction. See Coenen, supra note 269, at 977-78
(detailing this argument). Indeed in Camps NewfoundlOwatonna itself, the Court went on to
acknowledge that "[t]his distinction is supported by ... precedent" and added that "we see no reason to
depart from it." 520 U.S. at 591.
276. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
277. Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-00)).
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that this sentence enhancement provision violated the defendant's jury trial
and burden of proof rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
278
The controlling principle, according to the Court, is that an adjudicative
finding that supports a sentence greater than the maximum punishment
specified for the underlying crime (in this case, second-degree firearm
possession for an unlawful purpose, which carried a prison term of five to
ten years) must be made by a jury (rather than a judge) subject to a "beyond
a reasonable doubt" (rather than a "preponderance of the evidence")
standard of proof.279 Because the New Jersey hate crime enhancement law
authorized an additional ten years of imprisonment-and actually resulted
in the imposition of a twelve-year term in Apprendi's own case-the
statute as applied offended this newly formulated constitutional rule.28°
Four dissenters, led by Justice O'Connor, excoriated the Court's
holding as based on "meaningless formalism."' 28' They argued that, under
the majority's reasoning, states could keep in place judge-made
preponderance of the evidence enhancements by simply expanding the
possible maximum punishment for each underlying offense.2 82 Thus:
First, New Jersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession statute
itself, a range of 5 to 20 years' imprisonment for one who commits that
criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that only those
defendants convicted under the statute who are found by a judge, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to have acted with a purpose to
intimidate an individual on the basis of race may receive a sentence
greater than 10 years' imprisonment. 283
Moreover, even if this approach fell victim to the principle of
Apprendi:
New Jersey could cure its sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the
same results, by drafting its weapons possession statute in the following
manner: First, New Jersey could prescribe, in the weapons possession
statute itself, a range of 5 to 20 years' imprisonment for one who
commits that criminal offense. Second, New Jersey could provide that
only those defendants convicted under the statute who are found by a
judge, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have acted with a purpose
to intimidate an individual on the basis of race may receive a sentence
greater than 10 years' imprisonment. 284
278. See id. at 476.
279. See id. at 469-70, 476.
280. See id. at 470-71.
281. Id. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. See id. at 540.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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According to the dissenters, a constitutional regime that tolerated such
a set of laws, while simultaneously invalidating the enhancement provision
at issue in Apprendi itself, reflected an intolerable glorification of
"approved phrasing" 285 and endorsement of "a meaningless ... difference
in drafting ... criminal statutes." 286
Responding to the dissent's substance over form argument, the
majority launched a celebration of precisely the sort of "structural
democratic constraints" that drive deliberation-enhancing semisubstantive
constitutional analysis.287 In particular, according to Justice Stevens, the
dissenters' proposed alternatives would require a state legislature "to revise
its entire criminal code" if it wished to render sentence enhancements as
broadly applicable as the blunderbuss state hate crimes law at issue in
Apprendi itself.288  Second, the dissenters' supposedly indistinguishable
statutory proposals would "expose every defendant convicted of, for
example, weapons possession, to a maximum sentence exceeding that
which is, in the legislature's judgment, generally proportional to the
crime." 289 According to the majority:
This is as it should be. Our rule ensures that a State is obliged "to make
its choices concerning the substantive content of its criminal laws with
full awareness of the consequences, unable to mask substantive policy
choices" of exposing all who are convicted to the maximum sentence it
provides. So exposed, "[t]he political check on potentially harsh
legislative action is then more likely to operate." 290
The essence of this reasoning is that statutory form matters. In a
setting where a legislative innovation threatened to extend the length of
many sentences based on fact-findings made neither by a jury nor beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Court insisted that lawmakers at least pay close
attention to the business at hand. As Justice O'Connor emphasized, the
underlying constitutional principle of the Court's decision suggests that the
New Jersey legislature remained able to expose defendants, like Mr.
Apprendi, to significant sentence enhancements pursuant to preponderance
of the evidence findings made by the sentencing judge.29 1 In the majority's
view, however, there was nothing wrong with that result. Instead, that
285. Id. at 543 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
286. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 490. n.16 (Stevens, J.).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228 n.13 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
291. Id. at 540.
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outcome properly showed judicial modesty while giving constitutional
values a needed boost. By design, the Court's ruling gave legislators room
to maneuver. Yet it simultaneously increased the odds that lawmakers
would focus on the precise consequences of their actions, including with
respect to the constitutional jury right and burden of proof values the Court
deemed deserving of protection. 292
In its practical effects, Apprendi is one of the most important decisions
of the Rehnquist Court era. The decision thus illustrates this Court's
willingness to use semisubstantive approaches in high-profile and high-
stakes cases, including (at least on occasion) to protect the rights of
criminal defendants. Apprendi also confirms that semisubstantive styles of
review, although pervasive, have generated mixed reactions within the
Rehnquist Court. The core of the dissenters' objections, after all, focused
squarely on the form-centered and provisional nature of the Court's
holding. It bears repeating, in this regard, that "form over substance" rules
are not necessarily formalistic. The majority in Apprendi zeroed in on this
very point, emphasizing that the rule it had formulated should serve to
discipline and enlighten legislative decisionmaking. According to the
292. The rule of Apprendi bears some relation to the extra-super-clear statement rule proposed in
the concurrences in Thompson and Kimel. See supra notes 151-83 and accompanying text. In
Apprendi, after all, the Court precluded one statute-the hate crimes law-from affecting the operation
of other statutes-namely, the underlying substantive criminal provisions-and thus required treatment
of the legislated-upon subject in one focused statute with respect to each crime. Put differently, in
Apprendi, just as in Kimel, the Court rejected an incorporation-by-reference statutory approach. There
are, however, important differences between the cases. Most important, in both Kimel and Thompson,
there was a genuine question over whether the legislature (or at least large numbers of its members)
really intended to affect the result the literal language of its statutes put in place. The cases thus bore a
close kinship to cases involving clear statement rules, which (like other interpretive rules) concern (at
least to some degree) effectuating legislative intent. On the other hand, Apprendi involved a case in
which legislative intent was clear. The legislature, after all, unmistakably had provided that hate-based
sentence enhancements for all crimes could and should be made by judges acting on a preponderance of
the evidence. The point of the Court in Apprendi was not to question whether the legislature really
intended this result; rather, it was to force more meticulous consideration about whether the
legislatively intended result was a good idea. Put another way, the clarity-based rules proposed in
Thompson and Kimel (like all clear statement rules of statutory interpretation) might be called "Is this
what you really mean?" rules, while the form-based decision in Apprendi involves what might be
described as an "Are you sure you really want to do this?" rule. Of course, the application of any "Is
this what you really mean?" rule will trigger reconsideration of both what the legislature meant and
what it wants. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1991) ("Clear statement
rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield important values from an
insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace them.") (emphasis in original)); Frickey, supra note 3,
at 720 n.130 (suggesting that Gregory's clear statement rule does not so much pursue "some
interpretive end in itself' as it creates a "procedural focus" on federalism values in the lawmaking
process). It is not true, however, that "Are you sure you really want to do this?" rules will trigger
inquiries into what the legislature meant. It is for this reason that the former sets of rules are clarity
rules, and the latter set of rules are form-based deliberation rules.
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majority, the important substantive values at stake in the case deserved at
least this measure of judicial protection.293
(b) Surrounding-Territory Rules
Some semisubstantive doctrines focus on whether legislative
authorities have treated the area of law that surrounds a constitutionally
troublesome subject in a way that reveals a willingness to grapple with the
hard issues it presents. In BMW of North America v. Gore,294 for example,
Justice Breyer wrote a critical concurring opinion that took this sort of
approach to the problems posed by jaw-dropping punitive damages
awards.295 The majority in the case concluded that a $2 million award for
the undisclosed presale repainting of a new car was constitutionally
"excessive." 296 While not questioning this characterization, Justice Breyer
chose to focus his sights not so much on the size of the award, but on the
lack of a careful treatment of punitive damages policy in state law. He
noted, for example, that "there are no... legislative enactments here that
classify awards and impose quantitative limits" '297  or that "contain a
standard that readily distinguishes between conduct warranting very small,
293. This treatment of Apprendi was written prior to the issuance of last term's decisions,
applying Apprendi, in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), and Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct.
2406 (2002). In Ring, the Court dealt with a specialized problem raised by the intersection of Apprendi
and the Court's death penalty jurisprudence-namely, whether states could permit judges (rather than
juries) to find the presence of aggravating factors needed to put a capital defendant to death. Ring, 122
S. Ct. at 2432. The Court said "no," and (reflecting some of the Court's internal tension about form-
based rules) reasoned that "labels," id. at 2439, and "form," id. at 2440, should not control whether a
particular judge-made finding concerns an impermissible "elevation of the maximum punishment" for
purposes ofApprendi. Id. at 2441. In Harris, however, the Court seemed to reinforce the analysis set
forth in the text concerning the form-based nature of Apprendi in noncapital cases. The issue in Harris
was whether Apprendi permitted a judge, rather than a jury, to make a determination (concerning, for
example, use of a weapon in committing a charged crime) that would result in imposition of a
mandatory-minimum sentence where that minimum fell within the legislatively established statutory
sentencing range. The dissenters in the case repeatedly emphasized that, unless the Constitution barred
such a mandatory-minimum sentencing methodology, "Apprendi can easily be avoided by clever
statutory drafting." Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court's plurality in effect
found this concern beside the point, emphasizing that the controlling principle was whether the
mandatory sentence imposed as a result of the judge's finding fell within the range previously stipulated
by the legislature for the underlying crime. See, e.g., id. at 2417. But cf id. at 2426 (dissenting
opinion) ("Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling, it is impossible to dispute that the
defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed."). The bottom line is that
Harris appears to permit legislatures to engage in just the sort of form-based-but focused-redrafting
on which the majority and dissenters exchanged views in Apprendi. Harris, however, strongly suggests
the Court's conflicting feelings about so-called "form over substance" rules as a general matter. In
particular, the sentencing scheme challenged in Harris was upheld in a 5-4 decision, with the critical
vote being cast by Justice Breyer solely because he continued to condemn Apprendi itself as
misbegotten.
294. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
295. See id. at 586-98 (Breyer, J., concurring).
296. See id. at 574 (majority opinion).
297. Id. at 595 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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and conduct warranting very large, punitive damages awards." 298  As
Professor Sunstein has observed, Justice Breyer's treatment of the case
"requires state officials to set out criteria on their own and in that way
forces democracy. Like the void for vagueness doctrine, it is intended to
catalyze and improve, rather than to preempt, democratic processes. 299 In
other words, Justice Breyer applied a constitutional "how" rule, rather than
a constitutional "what" rule, in finding a due process violation.
Surrounding territory rules can draw attention to aspects of
subconstitutional law that, at first blush, have only a tenuous nexus to the
rule under constitutional attack. The point is well-illustrated by the
Rehnquist Court's recent decision in Illinois v. McArthur,30 0  and
particularly that decision's treatment of the Court's earlier decision in
Welsh v. Wisconsin.
30 1
In McArthur, the Court confronted the question whether the Fourth
Amendment barred police officers from impeding a man's entrance into his
home while they awaited a warrant to search it for marijuana. 30 2 In arguing
298. Id. at 588.
299. Sunstein, supra note 208, at 82. Notably, the Court's rulings may have in fact had just this
effect. As the Court noted in Cooper Industries., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.: "A good many
States have enacted statutes that place limits on the permissible size of punitive damages awards," and
"[s]ince our decision in Gore, four additional States have added punitive damages caps." 532 U.S. 424,
433 & n.6. Of particular note, one of these four states is Alabama, whose punitive damages
methodology was at issue in Gore itself. See id. at 433 n.6. For the suggestion in Cooper Industries
that a Court majority might be willing to take an approach something like Justice Breyer's BMW
approach in a closely related context, see id. at 440 n.13, which suggests that the scope of appellate
review for the unconstitutionality of punitive damages awards might significantly narrow "if the State's
scheme constrained a jury to award only the exact amount of punitive damages it determined were
necessary to obtain economically optimal deterrence or if it defined punitive damages as a multiple of
compensatory damages". See also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 49 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that "roadblock seizures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment if they are
'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual
officers') (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
300. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
301. Id. at 333-36 (construing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)). Notably, McArthur
bears no small measure of resemblance to Apprendi (see supra notes 276-92 and accompanying text)
because the decision in each case pushed the legislature toward a crime-by-crime reassessment of the
operation of a particular rule of criminal procedure. Even so, it seems that McArthur involved a
surrounding territory, form-based approach, while Apprendi involved a form-over-substance, form-
based rule. This was the case because Apprendi identified two different statutory forms that would
generate the desired result of nonjury-generated sentence enhancements for unlawful possession of a
gun. The Court held that the legislature had to use one of these forms (the all-in-one-statute form)
rather than the other (the overarching-punishment-statute-supplements-the-underlying-crime-statute
form) in light of jury right and burden of proof concerns. In contrast, McArthur involved whether a
particular search was constitutional in light of the surrounding context created by subconstitutional
rules; thus the Court's approach in McArthur was like Justice Breyer's approach in BMW (which, one
may argue, focused on whether a particular punitive damage award was permissible against the
backdrop of the surrounding set of subconstitutional punitive damages rules). To be sure, this
distinction might seem to split hairs. But that fact merely evidences the often intimate connection
among the semisubstantive doctrines considered in this article.
302. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328.
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against this claim of police authority, the defendant in McArthur relied on
Welsh.3 3 In Welsh, the Court held that police officers could not invoke
exigent circumstances to go into a person's home without a warrant to
prevent the loss of evidence in the form of that person's blood alcohol
level.3°4 Reasoning that both cases involved misdemeanors under state
law, and that a warrantless exclusion from the home is "nearly as serious"
as the warrantless entry deemed unlawful in Welsh, the defendant in
McArthur argued for suppression of all evidence seized from the
premises. 30 5  The Court, however, distinguished Welsh on two grounds.
First, the Court noted that "[t]emporarily keeping a person from entering
his home ... is considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home
itself. '30 6  Second (and more important for our purposes), the Court
emphasized that the driving-while-intoxicated misdemeanor involved in
Welsh was "nonjailable" under state law, while the marijuana misdemeanor
involved in McArthur was potentially "jailable."3 °7 This latter difference
mattered, in the Court's view, because "the penalty that may attach to any
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent
indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense."30 8  Put more bluntly, the Court signaled that
Fourth Amendment rights may fluctuate with the permissible degrees of
punishment the state chooses to associate with particular crimes.
The Court's reliance on this factor is troublesome for several
reasons.30 9  For example, according to the Court's jailable/nonjailable
distinction, the level of constitutional protections one enjoys will diminish,
rather than rise, with the seriousness of the crime one has allegedly
303. Id. at 335-36.
304. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335; Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753-56.
305. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335-36.
306. Id. at 336.
307. Id.
308. Id. (quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 n.14).
309. Some problems with the jailable/nonjailable distinction-at least in the Fourth Amendment
area-concern the practical problems it may pose for law enforcement authorities. Indeed, just such
concerns helped drive the Court's ruling in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, in which the Court rejected an
argument founded on Welsh to forbid custodial arrests (absent compelling need) for nonjailable crimes.
532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001). The Court's five-Justice majority (in an opinion written by Justice
Souter joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) deemed this
approach inconsistent with the need for "readily administrable" Fourth Amendment rules because "an
officer on the street" frequently cannot know whether the wrongdoing she is investigating is jailable or
not. Id. at 348. In contrast, the four dissenters (in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor) drew
directly on Welsh in reasoning that: "If the State has decided that a fine, and not imprisonment, is the
appropriate punishment for an offense, the State's interest in taking a person suspected of committing
that offense into custody is limited at best." Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenters added
that, in their view, the unknowability concerns raised by the majority were overstated, likely to cause
few practical problems in light of the qualified immunity defense, and outweighed by the "severe
intrusion" on liberty and privacy effected by a full-scale custodial arrest. Id. at 365-66.
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committed. Yet for many it will seem unjust to say that persons subject to
the greatest punishments possess the smallest measure of constitutional
rights. Another problem with the Court's McArthur/Welsh analysis
concerns the incentives it creates for state legislatures. In particular, the
same defenders of liberty who challenged the legality of the state's actions
in Welsh are likely to worry that the case's reasoning may lead state
legislatures to reclassify any number of "nonjailable" misdemeanors as
"jailable." The incentive for making such reclassifications emerges from
the simple reality that, on the reasoning of McArthur, increased
punishments will broaden opportunities for government officials to engage
in searches and seizures free of the burdens imposed by the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. 310
It is this latter point that discloses the subtly dialogic, second-look
character of the ruling in Welsh as it has been refined in McArthur.311
Why? Because, under these authorities, the scope of constitutional search
and seizure rights seem to depend directly on the state legislature's choices
about how to formulate statutory rules. 312  In particular, to negate the
Fourth Amendment rights possessed by suspected drunk drivers under
Welsh, the state legislature may need only to increase the permissible
punishment for the drunk driving offense.
310. Justice Breyer made much the same point about the creation of perverse incentives recently
in a very different constitutional context. In United States v. United Foods, Inc., the majority ruled that
the First Amendment barred Congress from imposing assessments on mushroom growers to fund
advertisements that promoted mushroom sales. 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001). The Court distinguished its
validation of a comparable program for tree-fruit growers in Blackman v. Wileman, Brothers & Elliot,
Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997), on the ground that, unlike the mushroom program, the tree fruit "program
[wasI part of a far broader regulatory system that does not principally concern speech." United Foods.,
533 U.S. at 415 (internal citation omitted). As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, "the holding
here.., creates an incentive to increase the Government's involvement in any information-based
regulatory program, thereby unnecessarily increasing the degree of the program's restrictiveness." Id.
at 429 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46-47 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's limitation of Fourth Amendment prohibition to the warrantless
use of home-searching technologies "not in general public use" and noting that "this criterion is
somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the
use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available").
311. Of course, this statement holds true only if the jailable/nonjailable distinction of Welsh and
McArthur remains good law. See supra note 309 (discussing recent Atwater case and shadow it casts
over jailable/nonjailable distinction). See also McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336 (noting that Court "need not
decide" whether restriction placed on home occupant would have been permissible "were only a
'nonjailable' offense at issue"). The signals of concern about this surrounding-territory approach
dovetail, once again, with other expressions of ambivalence about semisubstantive constitutional rules.
312. See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 101-02 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that subconstitutional rules-including physician-patient privilege and duties to report law
violations-shape Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy of patients with respect to drug urine
tests). Nor is this phenomenon tied uniquely to the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 3 10 (discussing
First Amendment ruling in United Foods case).
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One might quibble over whether this aspect of the McArthur/Welsh
approach embodies a pure semisubstantive constitutional "how" rule.313
Nonetheless, the democracy-forcing, remand-to-the-legislature character of
the rule suggested by Welsh and McArthur rule is undeniable. In effect,
under that rule, state legislatures may render inoperative a Fourth
Amendment prohibition in exactly the same on-the-ground circumstances
to which the Supreme Court had applied it. In addition, those legislatures
are pushed toward thoughtfully considering, on a careful crime by crime
basis, whether lengthening sentences is justified to displace court imposed
restrictions on the state's investigatory powers in particular contexts.314 In
short, surrounding territory doctrines work just like semisubstantive rules
are supposed to operate. They facilitate legislative second looks; they
induce legislative focus; they reward legislative care and particularity; and
they directly engage nonjudicial officials in a collaborative elaboration of
constitutional rights.
4. Constitutional Common Law and Common-Law-Like Rules
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,3 15 the Supreme Court held that
there is no such thing as a "federal general common law." 316 In the days
since Erie, however, the Court has crafted many specialized federal
common law rules.317 The Rehnquist Court has persisted in this practice,318
even while emphasizing a reluctance to carry the tendency too far.3 19 Most
313. The McArthur/Welsh approach, after all, requires the legislature to alter the content of
surrounding sentencing law if it wishes to put back in place the provisionally invalidated practice of
conducting certain searches without warrants. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
314. Not surprisingly, the "nature of the penalty" approach to rights identification taken in Welsh
and McArthur holds the potential for extension in other fields. For example, on the logic of these cases,
it would be possible for the Court to limit the operation of the antibalancing, hands-off, free exercise
rule of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith solely to the application of
"generally applicable criminal laws." 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (emphasis added). On this view, if the
state elects to associate only civil disadvantages with a particular form of conduct, then courts should
feel free (in light of the lesser expression of state concern) to engage in constitutional balancing when a
person suffers those disadvantages because she has engaged in that conduct for religious reasons.
Consistent with second-look theory, however, the state might escape resulting free exercise limitations
by making the regulated form of conduct subject to criminal penalties. This line of analysis once again
reveals the rich opportunities for analogistic arguments created by the Court's array of structural
doctrines. See supra text following note 183.
315. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
316. /d. at 78.
317. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). See also TRIBE,
supra note 149, § 3-23, at 466-501; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (5th ed.
1994) (collecting some noteworthy treatments of the subject).
318. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-06 (1988); West Virginia v.
United States, 479 U.S. 305, 308-10 (1987). See also TRIBE, supra note 149, § 3-23 at 473 (collecting
additional cases).
319. See, e.g, Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (finding that proper applications of
"substantive" federal common law are "few and restricted") (quoting O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
2002] 1339
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339 2001-2002
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
important, the Rehnquist Court has drawn upon constitutional values in
recognizing rules with legislatively modifiable features. 320 The Court, for
example, has embraced a "federal common law" doctrine that requires
courts to accord the same "claim preclusive effect of a dismissal by a
federal court sitting in diversity" that would be accorded to such a
dismissal under the law of the state in which the court rendering judgment
sits.321  According to the Court, this rule was promulgated to avert the
"'inequitable administration of the laws' that Erie seeks to avoid" by
facilitating like treatment of similarly situated litigants in state and federal
courts.3 2 2  The Court's rule-although congressionally reversible-thus
comports with constitutional assurances that citizens will receive "the equal
protection of the laws." 323
Because common law rules, by definition, are subject to legislative
override, they have an obvious "remand to the legislature" quality. 324  In
addition, constitutional common law rules protect substantive constitutional
values in a process-centered, democracy-forcing way. This is so for two
reasons. First, the practical effect of adopting a principle of constitutional
common law (at least in many instances) is to establish a default rule that
512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheelding v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). See also Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action
to enforce federal law must be created by Congress .... 'Raising up causes of action where a statute
has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals."')
(quoting Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
320. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that federal common law "implements the Federal Constitution"); Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 890 (1986) (suggesting that federal
common law may derive from "federal enactments," whether "constitutional or statutory"). See also
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2 n.7 (1975).
321. Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001).
322. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 497, 508 (1965)).
323. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2
(1975) (noting that generally "Fifth Amendment equal protection claims" applicable to the federal
government are "precisely the same as ... equal protection under the 14th Amendment" assertable
against states). Another supervisory decision founded on equal protection concerns is Frazier v. Heebe.
See 482 U.S. 641, 649 (1987) (invalidating a local rule of the Louisiana federal district court that
excluded from practice before it a member of the Louisiana bar whose home and office were in
Missouri because it "unnecessar[il]y and arbitrarily discriminates against out-of-state attorneys").
Notably, Frazier was a decision of the very early Rehnquist Court; the only current Court member who
voted with the majority was Justice Stevens. All other then-sitting Justices who remain on the Court
(namely, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia) dissented from the Court's ruling.
See id. at 651-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that supervisory power authorizes Supreme
Court review of lower court judgments, but not lower court rules).
324. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335,
1366-67 (2001) (noting that "as Professor Monaghan's excellent description of 'constitutional common
law' reveals, many of the Court's constitutional pronouncements are already modifiable by Congress";
also noting Monaghan's view "that the practice of constitutional common law is justified because it
'opens a dialogue with Congress"').
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nonjudicial authorities can override only by legislating in clear terms.325
To the extent that constitutional common law rules work this way, they
promote thoughtful and clear-headed lawmaking in exactly the same
manner as do other clarity-mandating "how" rules. 326 Second, whether or
not constitutional common law rules incorporate a clear statement feature,
they place the weight of legislative inertia on the side of constitutional
rights. The key point is that constitutional common law rules stand until
legislatures override them. And securing such an override is seldom an
easy task. It requires building interest group pressures, generating
supportive coalitions, securing enactment of a bill in both houses of the
legislature, overriding any veto, and the like.327 No less important, many
constitutional common law doctrines are not susceptible to outright repeal.
Rather they may be jettisoned only if the legislature simultaneously adopts
some other rule that implements in an alternative way the constitutional
values the constitutional common law rule was meant to protect. 328  In
short, regardless of the precise features that mark any particular rule of
constitutional common law, these rules always place deliberation-
heightening obstacles in the way of legislators who would prefer that those
rules not operate. Put another way, these rules inevitably focus the mind of
legislators who are contemplating their negation on the important
constitutional values they serve.
The following section deals with the operation of constitutional
common law and common-law-like rules in the Rehnquist Court. It first
examines the straightforward, though often controversial, set of doctrines
the Court has put in place pursuant to the so-called "supervisory power."
329
Next, it examines those more ambitious, though still provisional,
constitutional common law rules that govern not only the proceedings of
federal tribunals, but also the actions of state legislative, executive, and
judicial officials.
(a) Supervisory Rules
Some semisubstantive doctrines derived from the Constitution
emanate out of the federal courts' ability to develop default rules that apply
325. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 37-119 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Construction from the Constitution,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1650-51 (2001) (reflecting on structural advantages given to minorities by
systems of bicameralism and presentment).
328. See, e.g., infra notes 377-83 and accompanying text (discussing this feature of the Miranda
decision).
329. For a general treatment and a useful collection of authorities, see TRIBE, supra note 149, § 3-
23 at 466 n.2. See also Coenen, supra note 3, at 1737-42.
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to the federal courts' own operations and proceedings. Although the
Supreme Court has long laid claim to this so-called "supervisory"
authority,310 few supervisory power cases have made their way to the
Rehnquist Court. In one important ruling, however, a razor-thin majority
of the Court signaled its strong reluctance to wield this power in the
important context of overseeing federal grand jury proceedings.
In United States v. Williams,331 the defendant asked the Court to
uphold dismissal of a federal indictment on the ground that federal
prosecutors had obtained it without disclosing to grand jurors "substantial
exculpatory evidence." 332 Faced with these circumstances, the defendant
advocated adoption of a supervisory rule that "can be justified as a sort of
Fifth Amendment 'common law,' a necessary means of assuring the
constitutional right to the judgment 'of an independent and informed grand
jury."' 333 The Court, however, eschewed this approach, citing authorities
going back to Blackstone for the proposition that "it has always been
thought sufficient to hear only the prosecutor's side" in grand jury
proceedings. 334  Even more significantly, the Court's majority hinted that
federal judges lack any measure of supervisory power over grand jury
activities and stated expressly that they lack such authority "as a general
matter at least. 33  The majority reached this conclusion--even while
acknowledging that "the grand jury normally operates ... under judicial
auspices" 336-because it is "an institution separate from the courts, over
whose functioning the courts do not preside." 337
The majority's endorsement of a broad abandonment of supervisory
authority over grand jury activities triggered a vigorous dissent by an
330. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
331. 504 U.S. 36(1992).
332. Id. at 39.
333. Id. at 51.
334. Id. The Court also reasoned that the proposed rule would lead to "absurd" results by
encouraging investigatory targets to end run their recognized inability to submit evidence directly to the
grand jury by supplying that evidence to the prosecutor. See id. at 52.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. The Court in Williams did not reach as far as some Justices had invited it to go during the
previous term-namely, by holding that supervisory authority in all matters embraces only those
powers "necessary to preserve the authority of the court," or perhaps only those powers "necessary to
permit the courts to function." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 64 (1991) (dissenting opinion
of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Souter, J.). See also id. at 58 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that power authorizes federal courts "to do what courts have traditionally done to
accomplish their assigned tasks"). In Chambers itself the Court's majority eschewed this formulation.
Id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court "brushes aside" the "necessity limitation"). It
also held that a federal court's supervisory power sometimes authorizes the sanctioning of litigant
behavior that occurs "beyond the court's confines" and does not "interfere with the conduct of trial."
Id. at44.
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uncommon alliance of Justices, with Justice Stevens writing for himself,
Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas.338 In the eyes of
the four dissenters, the limited role of the federal judiciary in overseeing
federal grand jury proceedings cut against, rather than for, the majority's
decision. As Justice Stevens observed, "the prosecutor's duty to protect the
fundamental fairness of judicial proceedings assumes special importance
when he is presenting evidence to a grand jury"339 because "the prosecutor
operates without the check of a judge." 340  It chilled the bones of these
Justices to think that the majority would "hold that countless forms of
prosecutorial misconduct must be tolerated-no matter how prejudicial
they may be, or how seriously they may distort the legitimate function of
the grand jury."341 In the dissenters' view, the governing rule should have
been that whenever "the withheld evidence would plainly preclude a
finding of probable cause," the prosecutor must disclose it or face dismissal
of the resulting indictment through the federal courts' invocation of their
supervisory authority.
34 2
Williams illustrates the sort of debate likely to arise when courts are
asked to wield the ill-defined supervisory power. It also corresponds with
each of the themes we have encountered already in our examination of
semisubstantive constitutional law. On the one hand, the Court in Williams
did not block the recognition of supervisory rules, including in the grand
jury area; in this regard, the decision jibes with the Rehnquist Court's oft-
evidenced willingness to deploy semisubstantive constitutional rules in a
variety of contexts. 343 On the other hand, Williams evidences a hesitance to
apply supervisory rules in a willy nilly fashion. More particularly (and in
noteworthy keeping with the discretion-countering tendencies of the
opinion's author, Justice Scalia344), Williams reflects an effort to block
claims of supervisory power over grand jury matters with a wooden per se
rule or at least a powerful presumption. In these regards, the starkly
contrasting opinions in Williams correspond with other expressions of
338. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 55-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 62.
340. Id. (citation omitted).
341. Id. at 68.
342. Id. at 70. See id. at 70 n. 13.
343. For a contrasting decision, in which the Court did issue a constitutionally connected
supervisory ruling, see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 808 & n.19
(1987) (overturning on supervisory power grounds criminal contempt conviction based on violation of
injunction that was prosecuted by lawyer of defendant's adversary in civil action; relying on "basic
notions of fairness" and citing circuit court authority that viewed "appointment of interested prosecutor
[as a] due process violation"). See also Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (indicating
existence of supervisory power over jury voir dire in federal courts).
344. See Antonin J. Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1175, 1176-77
(1989).
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ambivalence about the advisability of embracing semisubstantive
constitutional doctrines.
Whatever the scope of the Court's supervisory power, rulings based
on that power can stand "only in the absence of a relevant act of
Congress." 345 For this reason, supervisory rulings always have a remand-
to-the-legislature quality. 346  Moreover, Congress may overturn a
supervisory rule (at least if the rule has "long gone unquestioned") only by
way of a "clear[] expression" of intent.347 It is important to recognize that
supervisory authority "how" rules differ from clear statement "how" rules
because the latter, but not the former, focus solely on judicial interpretation
of previously enacted federal statutes. At the same time, supervisory rules
operate in a fashion that parallels clarity-based rules of statutory
construction. In effect, each set of rules forces Congress to go back to the
drawing board if it genuinely wishes to override constitutional values the
Court has provisionally protected. In addition, because in each instance the
renewed legislative drafting effort must clearly override the Court's
preferred position, there is strong reason to believe that such proposals will
receive a particularly close and well-informed review. Through the use of
both sets of rules, the Court holds Congress' feet to the fire when it senses
that, unless it acts, important constitutional values will receive too little
attention from lawmaking authorities.
(b) Non-Supervisory Common-Law-Like Rules
In Dickerson v. United States,348 critics of Miranda v. Arizona349
sought to capitalize on the provisional and dialogic nature of supervisory
rules by arguing that a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, had overturned the
Court's holding that custodial interrogations must be preceded by Court-
specified warnings about the privilege against self-incrimination. 350  The
Court, however, rebuffed this attempt. It reasoned (with persuasiveness)
345. See, e.g, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (quoting Palmero v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.l I (1959)). Accord, e.g., Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428
(1996) (rejecting federal courts' "'inherent power' to act in contravention of applicable Rules"); Vance
v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980) (upholding statute that overturned evidentiary standard for
expatriation established by Supreme Court because not constitutionally mandated); Palermo, 360 U.S.
at 345-48, 353 n. II (upholding statute that recognized narrower duties of prosecutorial disclosure than
dictated by previous Supreme Court decision).
346. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1737-38, 1753-55.
347. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631-32 (1962). Accord Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991)), for proposition that "we would not lightly
assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles such as the scope of a court's
inherent power" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
348. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
349. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
350. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32.
1344 [Vol. 75:1281
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1344 2001-2002
SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
that supervisory rulings can target only federal proceedings.351  Thus
Miranda could not have embodied a supervisory ruling because it set forth
an evidentiary rule that from its inception operated in state, as well as
federal, courts.352
This "either it is a supervisory rule or it is not" line of reasoning raises
an important question not pursued in the Dickerson opinion: Are there
some forms of constitutional common law or common-law-like rules that
do apply to the states? How this question is answered is a matter of no
small importance. Indeed, in the wake of the criminal justice revolution
worked by the Warren Court, theorists suggested that some of that Court's
most significant rulings rested on "constitutional common law."3 53 On this
view, key doctrines-perhaps even including the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule-were not required, so much as inspired, by the
Constitution and, as a result, were modifiable (at least to some degree) by
legislative authorities. 354  In fact, just such an approach was taken in
Miranda itself when the Court observed that states might displace the
requirement of judicially specified warnings if they formulated a "fully
effective equivalent." 355 By thus recognizing the modifiable nature of the
Miranda warnings, the Court openly invited state legislatures to participate
in the definition of constitutional protections. This endorsement of
interbranch dialogue did not help Miranda's detractors in Dickerson,
however, because they had sought to defend not a legislatively promulgated
replacement for the Miranda warnings, but instead their outright repeal.
3 56
Smith v. Robbins,357 another case in which the Rehnquist Court was
asked-this time successfully-to cut down a landmark decision of the
351. See id. at 436-38.
352. See id. at 438-39.
353. Monaghan, supra note 320, at 3.
354. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 314-15 (1984). For
recent authority along these lines, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991)
(requiring prompt determinations of probable cause but adding that "[s]tates may choose to comply in
different ways" with this constitutional mandate). See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001)
(citing Henry Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1395-97 (1953) (proposing that Constitution may sometimes
condition congressional authority to withdraw jurisdiction from federal judges on providing an
"adequate substitute for its exercise")); St Cyr., 533 U.S. at 314 n.38 (quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430
U.S. 372, 381 (1977) (proposing that the "substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither
inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not violate the Suspension
Clause")).
355. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). See also Monaghan, supra note 320, at 33-
34 (suggesting that assuring presence of counsel at interrogation might well satisfy this equivalency
test).
356. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442. See also Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule"
Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 927-28 (2000).
357. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
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Warren Court provides an interesting contrast to Dickerson. Robbins
concerned the present-day robustness of Anders v. California,358 in which
the Warren Court held that the Constitution requires states to take
meaningful steps to protect the appeal rights of convicted defendants
represented by appointed counsel. 359 The Court in Anders ruled that it was
not enough for the state to show only that "court-appointed counsel...
filed a no-merit letter [declaring counsel's withdrawal] whereupon the
[appellate] court examined the record itself and affirmed the judgment. ' 360
Instead the Court required that counsel's request to withdraw "be
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal" in light of pertinent authorities. 361  In
addition, the appellate court had to determine "after a full examination of
all the proceedings [that] the case is wholly frivolous." 362 The majority in
Anders described compliance with these measures as a "requirement" that
would appropriately "induce the court to pursue all the more vigorously its
own review because of the ready references not only to the record, but also
to the legal authorities cited to it by counsel. '363 The dissenters likewise
described the Anders ruling as imposing a "procedure that the Court
commands is constitutionally superior to the system... followed in
California." 364 Indeed, according to the dissenters: "The fundamental error
in the Court's opinion .. . is its implicit assertion that there can be but a
single inflexible answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal
protection to indigent appellants in each of the 50 states."365
In Robbins, the question was whether states could comply with Anders
by adopting procedures different from the procedures spelled out in Anders,
including when those substitute procedures were not founded on the view
that Anders establishes "a mandatory minimum" of constitutional
protections.366 Opting for the answer most protective of local autonomy,
the Court upheld a state scheme that required of defense counsel only a
"summary of the case's procedural and factual history, with citations [to]
the record. '367  Arguably, the full body of rules at issue in Robbins
358. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
359. See id. at 743-45.
360. Id. at 743.
361. Id. at 744.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 745.
364. Id. at 747 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accord id. at 746 & n.* (describing Anders procedure as a
"requirement").
365. Id. at 747.
366. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 265, 272 (2000).
367. Id. at 281. In Anders, as previously noted, the Court had required a "brief' focusing on legal
points. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
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demanded a more searching inquiry by the state appellate court than the
Warren Court had mandated in Anders; thus it is subject to debate whether
these procedural protections were (all things considered) more protective of
defendants' appeal rights than the methodology laid down in Anders itself.
The important point, however, is that none of this mattered to the Court's
majority. Instead, the critical question, according to the Court in Robbins,
was whether the State's procedure "reasonably ensures that an indigent's
appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that
appeal.-368 By embracing this government-friendly standard of review,
Robbins in effect recast a longstanding criminal procedure precedent in the
guise of a common-law-like rule that invited states to meet their
constitutional responsibilities in a much broadened set of new ways.
Robbins confirms the Rehnquist Court's willingness to invoke
semisubstantive techniques in a wide array of constitutional settings. It
also suggests that in the field of criminal procedure, this Court may look to
recast past decisions in constitutional common law terms so as to vindicate
the same value of state autonomy it has protected with other
semisubstantive approaches. 369 In fact, Justice Thomas closed his Robbins
opinion with the telling observation that:
[I]t is more in keeping with our status as a court, and particularly with
our status as a court in a federal system, to avoid imposing a single
solution on the States, from the top down. We should, and do, evaluate
state procedures one at a time, as they come before us while leaving "the
more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures ... to the
laboratory of the States in the first instance .... 370
This way of thinking about past decisions of the Warren Court has
potentially profound implications. For example, in justifying the result in
Robbins, the Court emphasized that in Pennsylvania v. Finley,3 7 1 it had
"explained that the Anders procedure is not 'an independent constitutional
command,' but rather is just 'a prophylactic framework' that we established
to vindicate the constitutional right to appellate counsel. 372 The Court
continued: "We did not say that our Anders procedure was the only
prophylactic framework that could adequately vindicate this right; instead,
368. Id. at 276-77 (emphasis added). See id. at 296 (Souter, J., dissenting) (challenging this
standard as substantially diluting protections provided in Anders); id. at 289 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(same).
369. See, e.g., supra notes 217-63 and accompanying text (discussing Garrett and Morrison,
among other cases ).
370. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 275 (citation omitted) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)).
371. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
372. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 273.
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by making clear that the Constitution itself does not compel the Anders
procedure, we suggested otherwise." '373 In light of this rhetoric, might the
Rehnquist Court declare in the not so distant future that states may reshape
Fourth Amendment rights by adopting programs that abandon or
circumscribe the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio374 while centering legal
restrictions on such matters as police officer education, police officer
discipline, money damage awards, and the like? It is noteworthy in this
regard that the same Rehnquist Court majority that reined in Anders in
Robbins declared not long ago that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule "is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated.'3 75 In light of
Robbins' treatment of similar passages from Finley, perhaps the Court now
stands ready to let "'the laboratory of the States"' develop alternative
methods of countering Fourth Amendment violations. 376
And what about Miranda itself? Although Dickerson, at first blush,
suggests a strong recommitment by the current Court to the Miranda
ruling, a close reading of the opinion suggests the possibility that this Court
might permit states to reshape rules in this area in much the same way that
Robbins allowed states to tinker with Anders. Along these lines, the most
important thing about Dickerson may be not what it says, but what it fails
to say. In particular, Miranda held that states could abandon the Court-
specified warnings only if they came up with a 'fully effective
equivalent" 377 and "safeguards for the privilege [that] are fully as effective
as those described above." 378 Equally insistent pro-defendant flourishes,
however, do not appear in the Dickerson opinion. Instead the Court in
Dickerson-mouthing much the same rhetoric that marked Robbins379 -
spoke of requiring "an adequate substitute for the warnings required by
Miranda,''380 "a procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment
rights,"38' and protections that operate "sufficiently to meet the
constitutional minimum." 382 These passages leave room for the Court to
water down Miranda's "fully effective equivalent" standard in the future,
373. Id.
374. 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).
375. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1988) (emphasis added).
376. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 275 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292
(1992)).
377. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (emphasis added).
378. Id. at 490.
379. See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
380. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (emphasis added).
381. Id. at 441 n.6 (emphasis added).
382. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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thus augmenting state power (A la Robbins) to develop police-warning
substitutes.
383
This is not to say that Dickerson now stands as a precedential Trojan
Horse cleverly constructed by Chief Justice Rehnquist as a launching point
for a future all-out assault on Miranda. In particular, the Court's opinion in
Dickerson was blunt in insisting that "Miranda requires procedures that
will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent and which will
assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored. 384 This
passage indicates-contrary to the arguments made by Miranda's
opponents in Dickerson itself-that the delivery of some form of a warning
about the self-incrimination privilege is a minimum constitutional
requirement. But what if, for example, a state adopted a program that
mandated delivery of only Miranda's non-counsel-related warnings: "You
have a right to remain silent, and anything you say may be used against
you," and further specified that courts could admit into evidence only those
confessions that were made with knowledge of their being videotaped?
Would the Court uphold this sort of Miranda substitute on the theory that
taping is likely to instill caution on the part of the suspect and facilitate a
meaningful, after the fact, judicial check for voluntariness?
It is doubtful that such an approach would have passed muster with
the Warren Court, given its ardent celebration of the importance of a
criminal suspect's access to counsel.3 85 But the Warren Court was not-
like the present-day Court-avowedly committed to a "federal system" that
safeguards "the laboratory of the States" in the field of criminal
383. In Dickerson, the closest pass the Court made to the "fully equivalent" rhetoric of Miranda
came in the following sentence: "As an alternative argument for sustaining the Court of Appeals'
decision, the court-invited amicus curiae contends that [section 3501] complies with the requirement
that a legislative alternative to Miranda be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions." Id.
at 441 (emphasis added). Perhaps this language signals a full-scale reaffirmation of Miranda's full-
equivalency standard. Particularly in light of the more tepid language used elsewhere in the opinion,
however (see supra notes 380-82 and accompanying text), there is reason to doubt this conclusion.
Also, this "equally as effective" language comes not in a freestanding discussion of Miranda by the
Court itself, but in a passage that simply summarizes an advocate's argument. See id. Finally, the
quoted sentence speaks not of protections equivalent to the Miranda warnings, but of safeguards
"equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions." Id. As Justice Scalia argued in his dissent,
the Miranda rule may be seen as significantly overinclusive if the Court's sole purpose is merely "the
elimination of compulsion." Id. at 448-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This "equally as effective" passage,
especially when read in light of this observation, thus may invite states to come up with alternative
protections that are not as expansive as the Miranda warnings, but that are (even though significantly
more meaningful than the voluntariness requirement standing alone) more carefully and narrowly
tailored to the exclusion of evidence based on genuinely coerced confessions.
384. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
385. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480-81 (noting that the "attorney plays a vital role" in
"protect[ing] to the extent of his ability the rights of his client").
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procedure. 386 In light of this transformation in outlook, no less an authority
than Professor Yale Kamisar has indicated that the present-day Court
would uphold a legislature's adoption of this lesser-warning-plus-taping
substitute for the procedures spelled out in Miranda itself.
387
It is the potential for just such joint legislative-judicial retrenchments
that have caused thoughtful observers to note that the Supreme Court's
embrace of constitutional common law rules might on balance reduce,
rather than expand, individual liberty.388 There is rich debate to be had on
this subject. 389  Whatever position one takes in that debate, however,
Robbins signals that the Rehnquist Court stands ready to engage in an open
give and take with nonjudicial authorities about the proper contours of
important "constitutional" rules of criminal procedure. It also suggests-in
keeping with what we have seen elsewhere-that this Court's fashioning of
constitutional common law approaches is likely to take forms that
emphasize and protect state autonomy and experimentation.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL "WHY" RULES
The preceding discussion shows that the Rehnquist Court often
protects constitutional values by applying provisional, process-centered
constitutional "how" rules. Another important set of semisubstantive
constitutional doctrines focuses not on how nonjudicial authorities
proceeded in adopting rules, but on why those authorities acted as they did.
Applying these doctrines, courts often invalidate rules adopted with a
wrongful lawmaker "intent," "motive" or "purpose." 390  These
386. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 275 (2000). See also supra note 339 and accompanying
text for full text of the quote.
387. See Miranda in Light of Dickerson, 44 LAW QUAD. NOTES 3-4 (U. Mich. Law School,
Spring 2001) (reporting Kamisar's view that videotaping, subject to certain restrictions, "would justify a
shortening of the Miranda warnings" and that "such legislation would be upheld by the Supreme
Court").
388. See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1158-59 (1978).
389. Compare Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 329-32 (1995) (expressing concern that constitutional common law may dampen acceptance
of nontextual substantive rights), Thomas W. Merrill, The Common-Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48-59 (1989) (marshaling arguments against constitutional common law except
when used to permit Congress to formulate no-less-adequate substitutes for judicial protections of
constitutional rights), and Schrock & Welsh, supra note 388, 1117-18 (questioning both the authority
for and the utility of constitutional common law), with Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23-39 (1994) (arguing that constitutional common law
is supported by values of restraint and judiciary's distinctive expertise in formulating remedies).
390. See generally Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate
Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 99-156
(1977); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J.
1205 (1970); Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978). While purpose-
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constitutional "why" rules are semisubstantive in nature for the simple
reason that, under each of them, the Court does not reject the outcome of
the lawmaking process because of its objectionable content.39 1 Instead, the
invalidated law fails because a tainted process-in particular, a tainted
mental process-led to its adoption. As a result, nonjudicial authorities can
reinstate exactly the same rule that judicial authorities have repudiated. To
do so, however, they must act free of the wrongful reasoning processes that
attended the rule's initial adoption.
Constitutional "why" rules are nothing new. 392 Indeed, in large part
because these rules have been around so long, there already exists an
extensive literature on their merits and their operation. 393 That literature,
however, does not focus on two distinctive and important features of the
Rehnquist Court's work with "why" rules. First, the current Court's
decisions in this area present a particularly striking example of its
ambivalence about semistructural decisionmaking. Second, recent rulings
of this Court highlight the practical challenges that lawgivers face when
they seek to respond to "why" rule invalidations with new laws purportedly
purged of a preexisting wrongful purpose. We now turn to these two
important matters.
1. The Rehnquist Court's "Why" Rule Schizophrenia
As will soon become evident, the Rehnquist Court's use of
semisubstantive "why" rules has been and remains extensive. Yet the
Justices of this Court have often sent out mixed signals about the
legitimacy of motive-based review.
The tension begins with the work of Chief Justice Rehnquist himself.
In Washington v. Davis, for example, then-Justice Rehnquist joined an
opinion that firmly strapped the Court's race-related equal protection
jurisprudence to the mast of legislative motive. 394 In that case, the Court
based doctrines have long generated controversy, the philosophical and practical debate about them is
beyond the scope of this article. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1757-58 (providing a quick summary of
the critiques of purpose-centered rules). See also, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 55
(2001) (Rehnquist, C., dissenting) (criticizing primary-purpose standard applied to drug checkpoint,
car stop program because it is "bound to produce wide-ranging litigation over the 'purpose' of any
given seizure").
391. See Brest, supra note 390, at 115 (noting that purpose-based doctrines permit reenactment of
law "in identical form"); J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in
Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 1033 (1978) (same).
392. Illustrative of important pre-Rehnquist Court "why" rule precedents is the Burger Court's
important equal protection decision in Washington v. Davis, noted infra note 394.
393. See supra note 390 (collecting some, but far from all, authorities).
394. 426 U.S. 229, 229, 241-42 (1976) (holding that strict scrutiny of laws that disadvantage
protected groups is triggered by discriminatory purpose and not merely discriminatory effect).
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rebuffed earlier authority that "warned against grounding decision on
legislative purpose or motivation," 395 relying in part on the Court's earlier
endorsement of a purpose-based test under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause.396  In ensuing decisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist
repeatedly has written or joined opinions built on motive-based
doctrines. 397 During the same period, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist
also wrote or joined opinions that take constitutional "why" rules to task.
In the dormant Commerce Clause context, for example, he has
characterized "[s]triking down legislation on the basis of asserted
legislative motives" as "dubious, '398 in part because that approach
"assumes that individual legislators are motivated by one discernible
'actual' purpose, and ignores the fact that different legislators may vote for
a single piece of legislation for widely different reasons." 399 He has also
joined opinions that level similar criticisms at the same purpose-based
Establishment Clause jurisprudence the Court relied on in Davis.400
Chief Justice Rehnquist does not stand alone in displaying cross-
cutting feelings about constitutional "why" rules. In City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 40 1 for example, a four-Justice plurality (in an opinion authored by
Justice O'Connor, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer) claimed that "this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit motive."402
But neither the Court as a whole nor any one of these Justices has given
this principle a reading that even remotely resembles what its language
suggests. Rather, in a long and strong body of decisions, the Rehnquist
Court has applied many constitutional doctrines that give determinative
effect to the lawmaker's purpose.40 3
395. Id. at 243.
396. See id. at 244 n. 11.
397. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985) (opinion by Rehnquist, J.)
(invoking Davis to invalidate facially neutral Alabama constitutional provision, adopted in 1901, that
disenfranchised persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude because evidence showed it was put in
place as part of state's effort "to establish white supremacy").
398. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 705 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
399. Id. at 702-03. See also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(advancing similar views in First Amendment context).
400. See infra note 583 and accompanying text.
401. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
402. Id. at 292.
403. See generally infra notes 404-69 and accompanying text. This disharmony is also pointedly
reflected in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion (joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy) in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 U.S. 32, 49 (2000). In that opinion, he quoted Scott v. United
States, for the proposition that "[s]ubjective intent alone.., does not make otherwise lawful conduct
illegal or unconstitutional." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136
(1978)). In a footnote within the very same paragraph, however, he went on to acknowledge that "we
have looked [at] the purpose of the program in analyzing the constitutionality of certain suspicionless
searches." Id. at 52 n.4.
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In some of these cases, the Court has applied doctrines laid down in
decisions that predate the Rehnquist Court. Like its predecessors, for
example, this Court has invoked the "Lemon test" rule40 4 that laws offend
the Establishment Clause unless they were adopted with "a secular
legislative purpose."405  Rehnquist Court decisions have reaffirmed the
principle that the constitutionality of laws that discriminate on the basis of
gender will depend on the legislature's "genuine" purposes in acting, and
not on "hypothesized" objectives "invented post hoc in response to
litigation." 40 6  Following earlier authority, the Rehnquist Court also has
held that ostensibly neutral time, place and manner restrictions trigger strict
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause if (and only if) the "government's
purpose" is not "unrelated to the content of expression." 40 7
More noteworthy than the Rehnquist Court's adherence to previously
promulgated "why" rules has been its recognition of purpose-based rules
not recognized or emphasized by Courts that came before it. Departing
from a prior effect-centered jurisprudence,408 for example, the Rehnquist
Court has held that a facially neutral criminal law can violate the Free
Exercise Clause only "if the object of [the] law is to infringe upon or
404. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth three-part Establishment
Clause inquiry).
405. Id. at 612. Accord, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590 (1987) (relying on
"legislature's preeminent religious purpose" in striking down creation-science law). See also infra
notes 434-445 and accompanying text (discussing Court's recent Santa Fe decision).
406. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Accord, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.
53, 75 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting equal protection heightened scrutiny's focus on "actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme," in contrast to rational basis review under which it is
"'constitutionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision"') (quoting
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) and R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980) (quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)) (alteration in original)). However, in
Michael M. v. Superior Ct., the plurality stated that:
Even if the preservation of female chastity were one of the motives of the statute, and even if
that motive be impermissible, petitioner's argument must fail because 'it is a familiar practice
of constitutional law that this court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the bases of an alleged illicit legislative motive.
450 U.S. 454, 472 n.7 (1981) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 383 (1968)). See also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 (2002)
(applying a similar approach in the First Amendment commercial speech context).
407. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 526 (2001) ("In determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look
to the purpose behind the regulation .... "); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (following
Ward in declining to invalidate state medical buffer-zone law that "was not adopted 'because of
disagreement with the message it conveys') (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 (1994) (stating that "even a regulation neutral on its face may be content
based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys"). See also Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that "notwithstanding the Court's protestations
in [early authority,] First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several
decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives").
408. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990).
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restrict practices because of their religious motivation." 40 9 It is a decision
of the Rehnquist Court that held that government restrictions violate so-
called substantive due process if their "purpose ... is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion., 410  And it has said
repeatedly that a critical inquiry under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post
Facto Clauses is "whether the legislature intended the statute to establish
civil proceedings." '41  Most important, in all these settings, the Justices
have signaled the dialogic character of constitutional "why" rules by
focusing attention not on objective indicators of purpose that lurk in the
law's substance, but on the particular legislative history and context of
enactment of the challenged law.4 12
409. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). See
also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 122 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating
that the Free Exercise Clause would invalidate a rule that excluded speech from public forums "because
it's religious").
410. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (emphasis added). See also
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reiterating and applying
Casey's "purpose or effect" standard); id. at 1008 n. 19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reading Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence "to suggest that even if the Nebraska statute does not impose an undue burden
on women seeking abortions, the statute is unconstitutional because it has the purpose of imposing an
undue burden").
411. E.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001). See also, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
506 (1999) (declaring "unequivocally impermissible," under Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, "a purpose to deter welfare applicants from migrating" to law-enacting state). Cf.
McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2028 (2002) (in upholding prison's sexual abuse treatment program,
Court reasons in part that "[t]here is no indication that [it] is an elaborate attempt to avoid the
protections offered by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination"); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S.
510, 525-26 (2001) (invalidating state's ballot-disclosure law because "intended effect" is to handicap
particular congressional candidates, rather than "regulating the procedural mechanisms of elections," in
violation of Elections Clause).
412. See, e.g., Seling, 531 U.S. at 262 (for purposes of Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses, "determining the civil or punitive nature of an Act must begin with reference to its text and
legislative history"); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (noting that a "facially neutral law"
is subject to strict scrutiny "if it can be proved that the law was 'motivated by a racial purpose or
object"' and that such determination requires "a 'sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available') (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) and
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). See also Hunt v. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234, 266-67 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district court "could have
accorded great weight to [an] e-mail as direct evidence of a racial motive" and also deem relevant State
Senator's statement "that the legislature was going to be able to avoid Shaw's majority-minority trigger
by ending just short of the majority"); id. at 253-54 (majority opinion) (agreeing that such evidence
supported finding of wrongful purpose, but deeming it insufficient in context). In Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001), the Court reiterated that, in a sex-discrimination equal protection case, "[sitatements
from the government's brief are not conclusive as to the objects of the statute ... as we are concerned
with the objectives of Congress, not those of the INS." Id. at 67. The Court then (and without citation
to authority) cryptically added: "We ascertain the purpose of a statute by drawing logical conclusions
from its text, structure, and operation." Id. at 67-68. One might wonder whether this passing comment
was meant to exclude derivations from other sources, particularly legislative history, lawmaker
testimony, and the background against which the statute was enacted. See infra notes 434-45 and
accompanying text (discussing Santa Fe case). More likely, the Court pointed to its ability to
extrapolate legislative purposes from "structure" and "operation" as an appropriate additional route to
discovering relevant purposes. This is so because in Nguyen, the dissenters' close review of the actual
legislative materials in isolation indicated that the legislative purposes relied on by the majority were in
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The Rehnquist Court's work with semisubstantive "why" rules reveals
an abiding ambivalence about their legitimacy. For example, Justice
O'Connor-who spoke of eschewing purpose-centered inquiries in City of
Erie413-has signed on to each of the purpose-centered doctrines endorsed
by the Court in the free exercise, abortion, and double jeopardy/ex post
facto law contexts.414 No less notably, it was Justice O'Connor who led the
charge in promulgating two new constitutional "why" rules that may well
constitute the most significant contributions to this field of law by the
Rehnquist Court. First, in a line of cases initiated by Shaw v. Reno4 15 (in
which Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court), a five-Justice majority built
on Washington v. Davis4 16 to hold that voting districts created by the state
are unconstitutional if race is "the predominant factor motivating the
legislature's [redistricting] decision.'417  The potency of this principle
ebbed in the Court's most recent voting district ruling-Hunt v.
Cromartie4 18-- due to Justice O'Connor's vote to uphold the district with
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, rather than (as in past
cases) to invalidate the district with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Yet Hunt did not mark a departure from the
underlying principle of the predominant-purpose test. Rather, the Court
applied that principle, carefully sifting the legislative record before
deciding that a wrongful race-based purpose did not infect the challenged
districting plan. 419
A second purpose-centered doctrine endorsed by the present-day
Court concerns the Fourth Amendment. In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
the issue was whether a vehicle checkpoint program, adopted by local
officials to impede trafficking in unlawful drugs, offended the general rule
that government seizures generally must rest on some measure of
individualized suspicion. 420  Distinguishing earlier checkpoint programs
designed to rid the roads of drunk drivers or illegal aliens recently
transported across national borders,421 the Court (again in an opinion
fact "hypothesized" rather than "actual." Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 79, 93. The majority thus had little choice but to suggest that the purposes on which it relied
underlay the statute as a matter of common sense inference from the objective characteristics of the
statutory scheme.
413. See supra notes 401-02 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 408-11 and accompanying text.
415. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
416. See supra note 394.
417. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916
(1995)) (emphasis omitted, alteration in original).
418. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
419. See idat 253-58.
420. 531 U.S. 32, 34-36 (2000).
421. Id. at 34, 38-40.
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written by Justice O'Connor) deemed the challenged scheme
unconstitutional because its "primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing. '4 22  Moreover, in characterizing the
program's purpose as involving crime detection, rather than road safety
enhancement, the Court focused not so much on the program's objective
characteristics 423 as on the city's manner of drafting the particular policy
and its concession that that policy's "primary purpose" was "interdicting
illegal narcotics. '"424 Edmond was followed less than four months later by
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,425 another Fourth Amendment decision
that applied a constitutional "why" rule to strike down warrantless drug
tests administered by a state hospital to pregnant patients.
These cases reflect a pattern suggesting that-notwithstanding
occasional hand-wringing about purpose-centered doctrines-the
Rehnquist Court has not hesitated to use them to strike down state
programs in a way that spurs dialogues with nonjudicial authorities. There
is, however, a fly in the ointment: The extent to which motive-centered
invalidations actually share power in the real world depends in the end on
how courts respond to lawmaker reprises undertaken in the wake of the
initial judicial intervention. Can state and local authorities, following a
motive-based remand to the legislature, really succeed in reinstating
exactly the same law a court has just declared unconstitutional under the
banner of a constitutional "why" rule? We turn now to what the Rehnquist
Court has said and done with respect to this important question.
2. "Why" Rules and Legislative Reprises
Several Rehnquist Court decisions cast light on the nature of
legislative prerogatives in the wake of rulings based on semisubstantive
"why" rules. For example, the Court in Edmond invalidated an
Indianapolis car checkpoint program on the ground that its purpose was to
nab drug pushers and drug users for prosecution. What if the Indianapolis
City Council subsequently reinstated much (or even exactly) the same
system of car stops, while making clear in the process that it "was designed
primarily to serve purposes ... of ensuring roadway safety" 426 by getting
422. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court cited a string of earlier Rehnquist Court
decisions as supporting its view that "intrusions that occur pursuant to a general scheme absent
individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level." Id. at
46. See also id. at 45 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S 806 (1996); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. I
(1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)).
423. See id. at 44 n.l.
424. Id. at 40.
425. 532 U.S. 67,69-70(2001). For a further discussion of the case, see infra note 428.
426. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
[Vol. 75:12811356
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1356 2001-2002
SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
dangerous drug-intoxicated drivers off local streets? Libertarians would be
sure to greet this Lazarus-like resurrection of the Indianapolis program with
a "substance must trump" form argument for judicial invalidation. 427  A
court sensitive to the dialogic character of semisubstantive decisionmaking,
however, might well find that argument unavailing. In particular, the court
might note that the opinion in Edmond itself lends support to permitting
just this sort of legislative reprise. As the Court took pains to explain in
that case:
While we recognize the challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry, courts
routinely engage in this enterprise in many areas of constitutional
jurisprudence as a means of sifting abusive governmental conduct from
that which is lawful .... As a result, a program driven by an
impermissible purpose may be proscribed while a program impelled by
licit purposes is permitted, even though the challenged conduct may be
outwardly similar.
428
Our hypothetical resurrected-checkpoint-program case raises
fundamental questions about purpose-centered rules and second-look
theory. It is noteworthy, for example, that Professor Alexander Bickel,
who was strongly drawn to second-look approaches as a general matter,
denigrated purpose-centered doctrines. He argued that these doctrines
427. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text (noting role of substance over form
arguments with regard to form-based rules).
428. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The dissenters in Edmond
were even more explicit. In their view, "if the Indianapolis police had assigned a different purpose to
their activity here, but in no way changed what was done on the ground to individual motorists, it might
well be valid." Id. at 55-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Notably, in Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the same six-Justice majority that coalesced in Edmund relied
on "improper purpose" reasoning once again to invalidate a hospital-based program of urine testing
pregnant women for cocaine use. See id. at 85-88. The Court noted that "[i]n looking to the
programmatic purpose, we consider all the available evidence." Id. at 81. Here it mattered that the
program was laid down in a document that reflected such law enforcement concerns as "the chain of
custody ... and the logistics of police notification"; that the same document did not "discuss different
courses of medical treatment for either mother or infant"; and that "prosecutors and police were
extensively involved" in "the development and application of the policy." Id. at 82. Justice Kennedy,
in a concurring opinion, highlighted the second-look nature of the Court's ruling and rationale. As he
stated:
[W]e must accept the premise that the medical profession can adopt acceptable
criteria for testing expectant mothers for cocaine use in order to provide prompt
and effective counseling to the mother and to take proper medical steps to protect
the child. If prosecuting authorities then adopt legitimate procedures to discover
this information and prosecution follows, that ought not to invalidate the testing.
One of the ironies of the case, then, may be that the program now under review,
which gives the cocaine user a second and third chance, might be replaced by
some more rigorous system. We must, however, take the case as it comes to
US ....
Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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encourage "less candor in debate ' 429 and permit "no effective legislative
reprise" 430 because judges can manipulate analysis to find illicit purposes
whenever they object to a challenged program's substantive content. One
response to these criticisms would be to abandon all purpose-centered
doctrines. This result seems improbable, however, given their wide and
growing recognition by the Rehnquist Court.431 Another possible response
to Bickel's critique would be to make purpose-based invalidations
nonreversible by legislative authorities. Such a cure for the problems
presented by motive-based invalidations, however, would be worse than the
disease that Bickel diagnosed. In particular, this approach would visit the
sins of the "parent" lawmaker on the innocent "children" of later
generations. It also might well bar the enactment of a substantively
beneficial law (perhaps a greatly beneficial law) solely because a purely
procedural flaw marred an earlier incarnation of that law.432 Responsive to
these concerns, the Supreme Court has signaled that improperly motivated
laws may be reinstated if cleansed of an originally improper purpose.433
But just how can such a cleansing occur? The Rehnquist Court grappled
with this question in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.434
The Santa Fe case arose out of a dispute that involved a school
district's promulgation of a series of policies with respect to pre-football-
game prayers. 435 Prior to 1995, the elected student council "chaplain" of
Santa Fe High School delivered a prayer before each home game. 436 After
a suit was brought to challenge this practice and a court order against its
continuation was issued, the school district adopted one, and then another,
new policy.4 37  In August 1995, the school district adopted a policy that
authorized two student elections-one to determine whether "invocations"
would occur at games at all and a second one (if necessary) to elect the
student who would deliver them.438 In October 1995, the school district
revised its rules once again, this time carrying forward the two-vote
429. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 216. See also Kagan, supra note 407, at 4134 (noting "the ease of
legislatures' offering pretextual motives and the difficulty of courts' discovering the real ones").
430. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 221.
431. See supra notes 415-25 and accompanying text.
432. See Clark, supra note 391, at 974-75 (noting that invalidation of "useful laws passed for
putatively bad purposes ... would be dysfunctional because it would serve only to chasten legislative
immorality rather than to advance the public good").
433. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961)
(explaining, in upholding Sunday closing laws, that their original purpose of advancing religion had
been superceded by goal of securing a uniform day of rest).
434. 530 U.S. 290, 313-17 (2000).
435. Id. at 294.
436. id.
437. id. at 295-98.
438. Id. at 297-98
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approach of the August policy, 439 but specifying that the elected student's
pregame remarks could embody "a brief invocation and/or message."440
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, struck down this
revised policy in light of the purpose that had propelled its adoption. The
Court's rationale was wide-ranging.441 It focused largely, however, on the
school district's claim that its late-in-the-game authorization of a nonprayer
"message" negated the conclusion that its now-operative October policy
was motivated by the same wrongful religious purpose that had infected the
earlier rules.4 42 In rejecting this argument, Justice Stevens focused on the
historical context in which the October policy had been adopted. As he
explained:
This case comes to us as the latest step in developing litigation brought
as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably violated the
Establishment Clause. One of those practices was the District's long-
established tradition of sanctioning student-led prayer at varsity football
games. The narrow question before us is whether implementation of the
October policy insulates the continuation of such prayers from
constitutional scrutiny. It does not. Our inquiry into this question not
only can, but must, include an examination of the circumstances
surrounding its enactment.443
The majority concluded that it could not "turn a blind eye to the context in
which this policy arose." 444  In light of the school district's earlier
constitutional wrongs, the Court reasoned, the October policy was
"implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer."
445
In a sharply worded dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas) responded to this line of analysis with an
unabashed appeal to semisubstantive, second-look logic. The Chief Justice
initiated his attack by characterizing the October policy as calling for
nothing more than a "vote... on whether to have a student speaker before
football games" and "if the students vote to have such a speaker, on who
that speaker will be."446 He then asserted that this policy had permissible
439. Id. at 298.
440. Id. at 298 n.6 (emphasis added).
441. Id. at 309-09.
442. Id. at 314-17.
443. Id. at 315.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 320 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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nonpretextual purposes, including the purpose of "solemnizing public
occasions. '447 He continued:
The Court bases its conclusion that the true purpose of the policy is to
endorse student prayer on its view of the school district's history of
Establishment Clause violations and the context in which the policy was
written, that is, as "the latest step in developing litigation [to] challenge
practices that unquestionably violated the Establishment Clause." But
the context-attempted compliance with a District Court order-
actually demonstrates that the school district was acting diligently to
come within the governing constitutional law. [The] school district went
further than required by the District Court order [when it] eventually
settled on a policy that gave the student speaker a choice to deliver either
an invocation or a message. In doing so, the school district exhibited a
willingness to comply with, and exceed, Establishment Clause
restrictions. Thus, the policy cannot be viewed as having a sectarian
purpose.
448
This exchange between thoughtful jurists highlights the complexity of
applying semisubstantive analysis when a new rule takes the place of
another rule first adopted for constitutionally impermissible reasons. On
one side of the ledger, there exists a deep "reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States" 449-a reluctance driven by the
presumptive regularity of legislative proceedings and the presumptive
constitutionality of legislative enactments. 45 °  On the other side of the
ledger lie no less weighty considerations. In particular, courts cannot
minimize constitutional violations and are duty-bound to place all victims
of unconstitutional conduct in "the position they would have occupied in
the absence of such conduct.",45' There can be little doubt, in this regard,
that the allegedly unlawful "message and/or invocation" policy adopted in
October was in some degree causally connected to the unconstitutional
"prayer-only" policies that had immediately preceded it. In these
circumstances, it seems plausible to say that the challenged policy-even if
it would have been constitutional had it stood on its own-was (as the
majority concluded) the infected fruit of an unconstitutionally poisonous
tree.452
447. Id. at 322 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
448. Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 315 (majority opinion)).
449. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983).
450. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810).
451. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
746 (1974)).
452. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (detailing the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine in Fourth Amendment context).
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But just how far does this reasoning go? A fascinating contrast to the
Santa Fe case is provided by the Court's recent decision in Hunt v.
Cromartie,45 3 which concerned the constitutionality of North Carolina's
"majority minority" twelfth congressional district. Invoking the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court had twice struck down North
Carolina's earlier configurations of this district on the ground that they
were predominantly motivated by race-based considerations.454 The North
Carolina legislature then went back to the drawing board and once again
configured the twelfth district to contain a preponderance of African-
American voters. On these facts, it would have been easy for the Court to
reason that "the context" of the legislature's action455 revealed that it
continued to be driven by impermissible race-centered motivations, rather
than the permissible objective of favoring Democratic Party candidates.456
This outcome was all the more invited because (as even the majority
conceded) some evidence at trial did support the inference that state leaders
had acted with the predominant intent of simply reinstating a majority-
black district.4 57  Nonetheless, five Justices who had pointed to the
troublesome historical context in voting to invalidate the Santa Fe prayer
policy (namely, Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
voted in Hunt to uphold this latest version of District 12 in the face of just
such a continuing wrongful purpose argument. On the other hand, each of
the three defenders of the legislature's good faith in Santa Fe (namely,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) dissented in Hunt,
now finding that past unlawful motives continued to lurk in the legislative
redistricting process. 458
One is left with the suspicion that the contrasting approaches of eight
Justices in these two cases resulted not so much from different levels of
evidence about the persisting influence of unlawful lawgiver purposes, as
from differing levels of loyalty to the underlying substantive constitutional
values at play in the cases. Thus, it was Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas-the very same Justices who consistently have
taken the narrowest view of the substantive reach of the Establishment
453. 532 U.S. 234, 241-42 (2001).
454. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-41 (1993).
455. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 315.
456. See Hunt, 532 U.S. at 265 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting potential relevance of fact
"that District 12 has never been constitutionally drawn").
457. See id. at 253-59 (acknowledging existence of some evidence to this effect).
458. Only Justice Kennedy supported the finding of continuing unconstitutionality in each
context.
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Clause459 -who also took the most forgiving view of the school district's
purpose in the Santa Fe case. Likewise, it was Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-the same four Justices who repeatedly have
advocated a hands-off judicial approach to majority-minority
districting 460 -who joined with Justice O'Connor to take a forgiving view
of the legislature's purpose in Hunt.
For some, these curious parallels and disconnections will come as no
surprise. Patrons of principle, however, might recoil at the thought that
Justices could resolve in dissimilar ways quite similar "poisoned purpose"
inquiries because of underlying substantive policy agendas. To identify
this concern, however, merely pushes into view another, and a very
difficult, question: If substantive policy allegiances should not drive
decisions in "poisoned purpose" cases, what considerations should matter?
The Santa Fe opinion, at least between the lines, suggested a number of
factors that logically lent support to the majority's still-tainted-purpose
ruling. Thus: (1) the purportedly neutral school board policy was enacted
close in time to the invalidation of its unconstitutional predecessor, thus
giving local lawmaking authorities little opportunity for dispassionate
reflection and deliberation; 461 (2) the new school district policy was, from
all appearances, enacted by exactly the same body of officials (unaltered,
for example, by an intervening election) that had adopted the earlier,
improperly motivated rule;462 (3) the purportedly curative rule was in fact a
verbatim copy of the rule that went before, altered only by the addition of
three words (namely, "and/or message"); 463 and (4) the new policy, even on
its face, skated at least right to the edge of constitutionality under settled
Supreme Court precedent.464 Other potentially relevant matters also come
to mind. It might be significant, for example, that lawmakers have a
particularly long history of constitutional wrongdoing or have displayed a
pattern of evading prior court orders; that the legislative record hints at a
deep hostility to judicial concerns; or that the impact of the reenacted rule
(although itself not justifying a determination of unconstitutionality)
459. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793. 829-37 (2000). See also infra note 583 and
accompanying text (noting Justice Scalia's expressed scruples about the Lemon test's purpose prong).
460. Each of these Justices dissented, for example, in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995); and Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1003 (1996).
461. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000).
462. See id. at 305-07.
463. See id.
464. See id. at 315. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985) (distinguishing facially
neutral moment-of-silence law from law amended to specify that silence could involve "meditation or
voluntary prayer"); id. at 70-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (developing this distinction at length).
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plainly trenches on constitutional concerns as a practical matter.465 Finally,
even for those who generally would eschew a "result oriented" approach to
purpose determinations, the nature of the substantive right in issue might
properly matter in some cases. 466  Analysts inclined toward a
representation-reinforcing approach to constitutional decisionmaking, for
example, might well draw a distinction between Santa Fe and Hunt.
According to these observers, it is one thing for a predominantly Christian
school district to reinstate a policy with a practical effect that is likely to be
unwelcome to only a small number of atheists and other religious
"outsiders." It is quite another thing, however, for an overwhelmingly
white state legislature to attempt to construct-for the third time and in the
face of repeated judicial resistance-a congressional district that has the
practical effect of sending an African American to Congress.467
In the end, the Court's treatments of semisubstantive "why" rules
correspond with the themes that mark other features of its semisubstantive
work. To begin with, the Court's use of "why" rules reaches across many
varying areas of constitutional law. Even standing alone (and they do not
stand alone) the Court's decisions in Edmond, Santa Fe, and Hunt illustrate
this point well, for they show the Court wielding purpose-centered
doctrines to protect reasonable-search-and-seizure, antiestablishment, and
race-neutral-election values. Similarly, these decisions-and Santa Fe and
Hunt in particular-confirm that the use of process-based doctrines are
likely to reflect the substantive values the Justices hold. Moreover, at least
sometimes the Rehnquist Court's work with purpose-centered doctrine has
supported the value of protecting state autonomy from federal interference.
The Rehnquist Court's seminal free exercise ruling in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,4 68 for example,
expanded local legislative prerogatives by replacing a more judicially
intrusive effect-centered doctrine with a far narrower prohibition that
focuses on the lawgiver's intent.
465. Cf Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 614-16 (1982) (upholding lower court's inference of
wrongful purpose in retaining a facially constitutional at-large voting system based in part on
powerfully disparate impact).
466. It might be, for example, that the Court in Rogers was particularly open to finding that a
facially neutral law had a discriminatory purpose in light of the long history of discrimination against
African Americans with regard to voting rights. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-
58 (1966). Another factor might be the deeply held sense that "the political franchise of voting [is]
fundamental ... because [it is] preservative of all rights." Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
667 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
467. See ELY, supra note 14, at 170-71.
468. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Finally, the Court's precedents paint a telling picture of ambivalence
about whether and when purpose-centered doctrines should take hold. The
Court's repeated suggestions that purpose should not matter-in the face of
many holdings that it does-best reflect the Court's conflicting feelings
about these doctrines. 469 There are more subtle signals of ambivalence as
well. The sharp divisions over whether to accept a legislative second look
in Santa Fe and Hunt, for example, may reveal a lurking reluctance to use
motive-based doctrines for genuinely dialogic purposes. At the very least,
those cases reflect a half-heartedness among most of the Justices about
pushing semisubstantive "why" rules as far as they might be taken by the
strongest forms of their underlying remand-to-the-legislature logic.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL "WHEN" RULES
1. The Nature of "When" Rules
In a famous passage in a famous book, Professor John Hart Ely argued
that the Court's equal-protection sex-discrimination rulings should turn on
considerations of timing.470  In particular, Professor Ely theorized that
courts should strike down old laws that discriminate on the basis of sex
because in former times women were systematically excluded from
participation in the political process.4 7' If an invalidated old law were to be
reenacted by a contemporary legislature, however, a court should sustain
the new law because it "can't responsibly be said" that women's access to
the lawmaking process remains "blocked" in the present day.472  As
Professor Ely put the point: "The fact that due process of lawmaking was
denied in 1908 or even in 1939 needn't imply that it was in 1982 as
well .. .
There are some indications that Professor Ely's "'second-look'
approach'474 to sex-discrimination cases has found favor in the Rehnquist
Court.4 75 This fact raises an intriguing question: Are there other areas of
law in which the Court should and does gravitate toward the same sort of
469. See supra notes 401-25 and accompanying text.
470. ELY, supra note 14, at 169. Professor Ely's work focused on what he perceived as the
Warren Court's guiding principle of representation-reinforcement, which in turn emanated from the
Stone Court's seminal footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938).
471. ELY, supra note 14, at 169.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1691-93.
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time-driven "referral back" approach?47 6  Commentators have urged the
Court to invalidate, on a provisional basis, enactments that smack of
outdatedness due to intervening changes in social circumstances and
values,477 and the Rehnquist Court has shown, albeit in a backhanded way,
a possible openness to employing such a "when" rule methodology. The
most suggestive signals along these lines came in the Court's substantive
due process ruling in Washington v. Glucksberg.478
Glucksberg involved a challenge to the State of Washington's criminal
prohibition of assisted suicide. In another case, which involved a challenge
to New York's assisted-suicide law, a distinguished circuit court judge had
written an ambitiously semisubstantive opinion that essentially advocated
an outdatedness-based legislative reconsideration. 479  The gist of that
opinion was that a remand for a fresh look by state authorities made good
sense because of the antiquity of the state's laws and modern developments
in medicine, technology, and moral outlooks. The Court in Glucksberg did
not embrace this analysis. Instead, it unanimously upheld the Washington
statute.
In doing so, however, the Court issued an opinion laced with
suggestions that matters of timing might sometimes prove important. The
Court began along this path by noting that: "Though deeply rooted, the
States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and,
generally, reaffirmed. 48 ° In Washington itself, the Court observed, the
current assisted suicide ban had been enacted in 1975, and four years later
the state had passed its Natural Death Act,481 which specifically declined
"to condone, authorize or approve mercy killing." 482 No less important, in
1991 "Washington voters rejected a ballot initiative which, had it passed,
would have permitted a form of physician-assisted suicide," 483 and in 1992
"Washington... added a provision to the Natural Death Act expressly
476. See Jackson, supra note 210, at 2240.
477. See Calabresi, supra note 15 (advancing this view, with special focus on substantive due
process limitations). See also BICKEL, supra note 24, at 143-56 (discussing possible applications of the
concept of desuetude to generate legislative reconsideration of statutes that were enacted during another
climate of opinion); Sunstein, supra note 208, at 95 (asserting, with regard to the right to die, that "[a]
court might decide not to invalidate any and all legislative efforts to interfere with private choice, but to
say more modestly that a state invoking old laws has not demonstrated an adequate reason to interfere
with a private choice of this kind-unless and until a recent legislature is able to show that there is a
sufficiently recent commitment to this effect to support fresh legislation").
478. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
479. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732-35 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 521
U.S. 793 (1997).
480. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added).
481. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010-70.122.920 (2002).
482. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 717.
483. Id.
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excluding physician-assisted suicide."4 84  In light of these developments
and comparable developments elsewhere, the Court concluded that "the
States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of
physician-assisted suicide."48 5  Put differently, the Court confronted "a
consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted
right, and continues.., to reject it today.' 486 It was against this backdrop
that the Court expressed its unwillingness to "strike down the considered
policy choice of almost every State." 487
Running through Glucksberg are three separate strands of
semisubstantive, time-tied analysis. First, the Court deemed it important
that an "overwhelming majority of states explicitly prohibit[ ] assisted
suicide., 488  This linking of rights-recognition to the actions of state
legislative bodies entails an obvious form of interbranch Constitution-
reading. After all, whenever the Court defines rights based on legislative
choices, it obviously and openly involves nonjudicial authorities in the
formulation of constitutional doctrine. 489 It is also important to recognize
that this technique reflects a time-tied approach to constitutional
decisionmaking. Why? Because legislative prohibitions inevitably change
in number and shape with the passage of years. 490 Thus, under this style of
analysis, a law that was constitutional in the past may well be found
unconstitutional today and again held constitutional in the future-all
depending on the ebb and flow of choices made by fifty elected state
legislatures.491
This mode of constitutional reasoning, which tethers the judicial
identification of fundamental rights to a "head count" of legislative
decisions,492 is no recent innovation. It pervaded the work of the Warren493
484. Id.
485. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
486. Id. at 723 (emphasis added).
487. Id. (emphasis added).
488. Id. at 718.
489. See Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 679, 684-85 (1986) (arguing that "if the Court is engaged in the
explication of values, it makes very good sense to refer to and be guided by the value judgment of other
societal decision makers"). See also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 643-48 (1993) (discussing in detail this decisional approach).
490. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 15, at 122 n.136 (1991) (noting shift in nation's contraceptive
laws over time, which purportedly helped justify Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)).
491. See, e.g., infra notes 500-01 and accompanying text (noting constitutional history of death
penalty laws).
492. See Friedman, supra note 489, at 597 & 602 nn. 119-120.
493. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
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and Burger494 Courts. More importantly for present purposes, it marks the
work of the Rehnquist Court as well.495 In particular, in one of the highest-
profile cases of its most recent term, the Court found that capital
punishment of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment-in
light of eighteen states' adoption of legislative restrictions on this practice
during the past decade. 496  Citing this surge of reform by nonjudicial
authorities, the Court invalidated a practice it had refused to outlaw just
thirteen years earlier, because of a "dramatic shift in the state legislative
landscape." 497
494. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 16 (1985); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594
(1977).
495. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 (2001) (relying on "two centuries
of uninterrupted ... state and federal practice permitting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors" in
rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to that practice; distinguishing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980), in which the court constitutionalized a search-and-seizure limitation in part because "a
clear consensus among the States" has adhered to it); Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346 n.14 (approving view
that "courts must be 'reluctant ... to conclude that the Fourth Amendment proscribes a practice that
was accepted at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights and has continued to receive the support of
many state legislatures') (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 26 (1985)) (emphasis added);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000) (plurality opinion) (finding substantive due process
violation in part based on state's departure from rule of "many other States .. . that courts may not
award visitation unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to the concerned third
party"); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 467 (2000) (invalidating under Due
Process and Commerce Clauses state law limitation on deductibility of interest expenses through
unallocated attribution to nonunitary-and thus nontaxable-corporate income; noting that "[n]o other
taxing jurisdiction, whether federal or state, has taken so absolute an approach..."); Lilly v. Virginia,
527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (plurality opinion) (tying firmly-rooted-hearsay-exception principle that is
key for Confrontation Clause purposes to "[e]stablished practice"); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 330 (1999) (explaining that "[pirinciples once unsettled can find general and wide acceptance in
the legal culture, and there can be little doubt that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a
defendant's rightful silence has become an essential feature of our legal tradition"; relying in part on
adoption of no-inference principle by "some 44 states" prior to its incorporation into Fourteenth
Amendment in 1965); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 375 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("A governmental practice that has become general throughout the United States, and
particularly one that has the validation of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of
constitutionality."); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (relying in part on "widespread and
time tested consensus" with regard to speech-restricted areas around polling places to uphold
prohibition on campaigning within one hundred feet of voting locations); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 355-56 n.8 (1992) (holding that spontaneous utterance rule constitutes a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception, thus avoiding Confrontation Clause problems, in part because it has been accepted "in
nearly-four-fifths of the States"); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (noting that "a
significant majority of States have enacted [similar] statutes" in rejecting absolute Sixth Amendment
right to face-to-face confrontation); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57-58 & 60 n. 19 (1987) (relying in
part on state practices regarding hypnotically refreshed testimony in finding violation of defendants'
right to testify on their own behalf).
496. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
497. Id. at 2246. See also id. at 2244 (noting that "the American public, legislators, scholars and
judges have deliberated over this question" and that the "consensus reflected in those deliberations
informs our answer to the question presented"); id. at 2247-50 (collecting past authority on relevance of
legislative reforms; documenting such reforms with regard to execution of the mentally retarded;
emphasizing the "consistency and direction of the change" that had made the practice "truly unusual";
and thus concluding that "it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it"). The
earlier decision the Court overruled in Atkins was Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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A second element of time-tied reasoning pushed into view by
Glucksberg emerges from its observation that "[t]he history of the law's
treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be
one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it."'498 This rhetoric
suggests that it is important not only that there are large numbers of
assisted suicide laws, but also--in keeping with when-centered thinking-
that these laws have been "currently" given "serious, thoughtful
examinations. '499 In this dimension the opinion in Glucksberg harkens
back to the Court's landmark death penalty decision in Furman v.
Georgia.5
00
In Furman, the Court said, in so many words: "We are now going to
invalidate all death penalty laws in the United States and will hereafter
uphold death penalty laws only if we perceive a widespread, modern-day
reassessment of and resulting recommitment to capital punishment."
When, following Furman, just such a recommitment took place, the Court
made good on its implicit assurance by upholding newly minted death-
penalty statutes beginning in Gregg v. Georgia.50 1 In the view of the Court
in Glucksberg, the same sort of contemporary nationwide re-endorsement
that occurred with respect to capital punishment after Furman had already
occurred with respect to the issue of physician-assisted suicide before the
case in Washington State arose.5 °2 For all practical purposes, state
legislatures had remanded the assisted suicide issue to themselves. Thus, a
judicial remand, like the one in Furman, was no longer a proper move.
The final element of "when" rule analysis brought to the fore in
Glucksberg emanates from the Court's treatment of recent actions taken by
political authorities in the State of Washington itself. What if the facts had
shown that, even though the assisted suicide issue had generated
widespread political attention in other jurisdictions, it had stirred no similar
interest in the legislative chambers of Olympia? It seems doubtful that
these circumstances, standing alone, would have led the Court to issue a
semisubstantive invalidation of Washington's assisted suicide prohibition.
The Court's reasoning in Glucksberg, after all, focuses mainly on "[o]ur
Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." 50 3  Even more
498. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (emphasis added).
499. Id. at 719.
500. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
501. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
502. See supra notes 486-87 and accompanying text.
503. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added). This statement is properly subject to one
qualification: Perhaps the Court would have stepped in and commanded a legislative reconsideration if
the statute had so long gone unenforced as to become marked by desuetude. See generally BICKEL,
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importantly, any argument for a wrist-slapping of the Washington
legislature with a fresh-look remand would be complicated by a nagging
doctrinal reality: Neither the Rehnquist Court nor any of its predecessors
has articulated a constitutional rule that authorizes the provisional
invalidation of a statute simply because it has long escaped the enacting
legislature's active reconsideration.5" 4 To be sure, Judge Calabresi has
filled the pages of the Harvard Law Review with an argument for
recognizing such a doctrine. 50 5 So far, however, the Supreme Court has not
taken the bait.506
Having said all this, it is worth noting that the Court in Glucksberg did
choose to emphasize that nonjudicial decisionmakers in Washington State
itself grappled with the assisted suicide issue repeatedly in the not-distant
past.507 Has this aspect of the Court's opinion opened the door for judicial
recognition of a new time-sensitive rule tied to the recent inaction of a
single state legislature? Only time can tell.
2. Some Observations on Constitutional "When" Rules
The status of semisubstantive "when" rules remains, for the most part,
fluid and ill-defined. For example, wholly apart from Glucksberg,
Rehnquist Court precedents lend some support to "constitutional sunset
rules" that link judicial determinations of validity (most notably, in the
enforcement power and the affirmative action contexts) to a challenged
statute's limited duration.50 8  In keeping with second-look theory, such
doctrines shift the burden of inertia in favor of constitutional values by
periodically requiring a focused recommitment by political authorities to
the constitutionally controversial rule of law.50 9 It is fair to say, however,
that the notion of semisubstantive constitutional "sunset" rules-or at least
the founding of such rules on a democracy-forcing, dialogic rationale-is
entirely the product of extrapolation. Such a notion has never been
endorsed in terms by the Rehnquist Court. 510
supra note 24, at 143-56 (discussing rule of desuetude); Coenen, supra note 3, at 1704-08
(summarizing and expanding on Bickel's observations).
504. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1699-1700.
505. See Calabresi, supra note 15.
506. Cf supra note 505 and accompanying text (noting Judge Calabresi's failure in floating this
approach for invalidating assisted suicide laws).
507. See supra notes 481-84 and accompanying text.
508. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1725-26.
509. Id. at 1721-24.
510. Cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting, in upholding
minority business enterprise program, that it "may be viewed as a pilot project, appropriately limited in
extent and duration, and subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress prior to any
extension or re-enactment").
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To say these things, however, is not to say that constitutional "when"
rules are merely a figment of legal scholars' imaginations. For example,
constitutional head-count rules-perhaps more accurately denominated
current-head-count rules-have pervaded the Supreme Court's
constitutional work, even in recent years. Beyond this, the Rehnquist
Court's rhetoric in Glucksberg reveals a telling willingness at least to speak
about human rights in time-tied, democracy-prompting, hard-look-oriented
ways. Whatever the fate of particular proposed "when" rules, this aspect of
the Court's substantive-due-process ruling in Glucksberg suggests the
Rehnquist Court's openness to linking assessments of fundamental values
to process-centered doctrines across the full range of constitutional law.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL "WHO" RULES
There is a final type of semisubstantive doctrine that courts sometimes
use to foster attentiveness to constitutional values when political authorities
take action. Through the use of so-called constitutional "who" rules, courts
can steer policy choices away from one decisionmaker to another, on
account of institutional capacities with regard to particular constitutional
choices.
The leading constitutional "who" rule case is Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong.5 11 There the pre-Rehnquist Court considered whether the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment rendered invalid a
prohibition on government employment of resident aliens promulgated by
the Federal Civil Service Commission. In striking down the ban, the Court
held neither that the Commission had exceeded its delegated authority nor
that such a rule was ipso facto invalid under equal protection principles. 512
Instead, the Court ruled that-as a matter of constitutional due process-
the Commission was not a proper promulgator of the rule in light of the
government interests invoked in its support. Those interests included: (1)
giving the President a bargaining chip in treaty negotiations by enabling
him selectively to waive the alien-employment prohibition, and (2)
encouraging aliens to become citizens and thereby participate more fully in
American life.51 3 According to the Court, these interests might have
supported the rule if it had been adopted by Congress or promulgated by
the President. 514 In the Court's eyes, however, the pursuit of these goals
511. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
512. See TRIBE, CON. LAW, supra note 5, § 17-2, at 1679; Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism,
Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 817 (1983).
513. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 104.
514. Id. at 105.
[Vol. 75:12811370
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1370 2001-2002
SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
was too "far removed from [the] normal responsibilities" 515 of the Civil
Service Commission, which has "no responsibility for foreign affairs... or
for naturalization policies." 516  In short, given the important substantive
equal protection values at stake, the Commission was not a proper "who,"
and its hiring prohibition could not stand.517
Commentators sometimes suggest that few cases apart from Mow Sun
Wong involve constitutional "who" rules.5 18  In reality, however, "who"
rule reasoning has surfaced with frequency, including in the work of the
Rehnquist Court. In the Court's two Turner Broadcasting decisions, 519 for
example, five-Justice majorities endorsed the proposition that judges
should give "substantial deference to the predictive judgments of
Congress '520 and added that "substantiality is to be measured in this
context by a standard more deferential than we accord to judgments of an
administrative agency." 521 The implication of these passages is that some
rules promulgated by agencies, pursuant to delegations of power that are
not problematic under the nondelegation doctrine itself, will violate the
First Amendment even though exactly the same rules would pass muster if
enacted by Congress. 52
2
The parallels of this approach to that of Mow Sun Wong are apparent.
In each setting, the Court has set the stage for a nonjudicial reconsideration
of constitutionally troublesome decisions in light of the varying capabilities
and interests different government decisionmakers bring to bear.
According to Mow Sun Wong, a proper protection of equal protection
515. Id.
516. Id. at 114.
517. Professor Lawrence Gene Sager, for example, has stated that:
Mow Sun Wong posits a right to procedural due process which requires that some legislative
actions be undertaken only by a governmental entity which is so structured and so charged as
to make possible a reflective determination that the action contemplated is fair, reasonable,
and not at odds with specific prohibitions in the Constitution.
Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (1978). In keeping with the "who"-rule logic of
Mow Sun Wong, President Ford reissued the policy by way of executive order, and courts later held the
reissued prohibition constitutional. See, e.g., Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 746 (9th Cir.
1980); Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978). See also TRIBE, CON. LAW, supra
note 5, § 17-2, at 1680 n.15; MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 203 (1988).
518. See TUSHNET, supra note 517, at 202; Adler, supra note 74, at 867 (asserting that Mow Sun
Wong was "an unusual case").
519. See supra note 198.
520. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994).
521. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997).
522. Accord City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 311 n. 1 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he nature of the legislating institution might ... affect"
judicial analysis of "means-end fit" and citing earlier Turner case for proposition that "[w]e do not
require Congress to create a record in the manner of an administrative agency .... and we accord its
findings greater respect than those of agencies").
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values required action by the President or Congress, rather than by the Civil
Service Commission, because of (for example) the Commission's excessive
efficiency-mindedness, its lack of electoral accountability, and its
unfamiliarity with important public policy matters of substantial relevance
to the decision at hand. Likewise, according to the Turner Broadcasting
opinions, free speech values favor congressional over agency speech
restrictions because of (for example) differing levels of representativeness,
factfinding capabilities, and susceptibility to interest group capture.
Members of the Rehnquist Court have shown an openness to applying
constitutional "who" rules in other contexts as well. For example, various
opinions suggest preferences for (1) decisions by Congress, over decisions
by city councils, when free expression values are at stake;523 (2) decisions
by federal authorities, over decisions by state authorities, in framing
affirmative action policies;5 24 and (3) decisions by state courts, over
decisions by state legislatures, when government action threatens
uncompensated regulatory takings of private property. 525  The Rehnquist
Court has endorsed additional doctrines that have who-related features. It
has, for example, often invalidated laws under the so-called "dormant
Commerce Clause" principle; the essential effect of that principle is,
however, to channel decisions that significantly threaten our "national
'common market' ' '526  from locally minded state authorities to the
nationally minded Congress, by way of the subrule that permits Congress
to overturn judicial invalidations of state laws on this "constitutional"
ground.527 This Court also has made use of the constitutional vagueness
523. See id. at311 n..
524. As noted elsewhere, see infra notes 593-94 and accompanying text, the Court ruled in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), that courts must apply strict scrutiny to both
state and federal race-based affirmative action programs. Id. at 235. The Court went on to suggest,
however, the possibility that, in applying strict scrutiny, it might give more deference to federal than
state authorities, at least when the case concerns "the authority § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
confers upon Congress." Id. at 230-3 1.
525. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1780-81 (explaining why Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 432
U.S. 1, 10 (1977), embodied a who-oriented approach). See also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,
460 (2001) (quoting James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n.3 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)) (favoring closer review of legislative, rather than judicial, ex post facto
measures in part because the "court's 'opportunity for discrimination' . . . 'is more limited than [a]
legislature's, in that [it] can only act in construing existing law in actual litigation"').
526. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
527. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting congressional reversibility feature of
the Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence). The Court was particularly emphatic about the
dialogic nature of its dormant Commerce Clause rulings in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992). In reaffirming its past ruling that effectively barred state taxation of many sale-by-mail
transactions, the Court was careful to rely on only the dormant Commerce Clause, and not
congressionally nonreversible due process principles. "Accordingly," the Court explained, "Congress is
now free to decide whether, when and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order
concerns with a duty to collect taxes." Id. at 318. Put another way, the Court was not going to cut off
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doctrine-long employed to protect substantive interests in free speech,
free association, and free mobility528 -while noting that the doctrine shifts
decisional authority away from potentially idiosyncratic individual police
officers and prosecutors and into the hands of more accountable and
deliberative legislative bodies.529  In a similar vein, the current Court has
followed past authorities by deflecting some choices from legislatures to
individual decision makers when those decisionmakers are better
positioned to weigh the distinctive features of discrete cases marked by
important constitutional concerns.
530
Members of the Rehnquist Court also have recognized the
connectedness of the clear-statement-based rule of constitutional doubt and
constitutional "who" rules in cases that concern the scope of
congressionally delegated authority. This connectedness found expression
many years ago in Kent v. Dulles, when the Warren Court narrowly
construed a grant of congressional authority invoked by the Secretary of
State in promulgating a rule that prohibited the award of passports to
Communist Party members. 531  In rejecting the legality of this rule, the
Court explained:
all democratic deliberation about these matters through application of a definitive on-off constitutional
rule. However, given the important national interests at stake, it was for the national Congress, rather
than the individual states, to balance the costs and benefits of permitting state taxation.
528. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (noting that vagueness "is a matter of
special concern" when dealing with content-based criminal statutes). See generally supra notes 145-50
and accompanying text (discussing vagueness doctrine).
529. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (noting that vagueness rule imposes "the
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govem law enforcement") (quoting
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358). Accord id. at 64 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
legislative guideline-drawing is "the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine') (quoting
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
530. The Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), has this consequence for certain free-exercise claims. In particular, by carrying
forward the rule of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Smith case requires state
unemployment-compensation authorities to make individualized assessments about claims of
conscientious religious objection, rather than indulging a legislatively constructed de facto conclusive
presumption that all such claims are trumped up. In a similar vein, the Court's ruling in Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999), requires particularized and contextual assessments by federal executive-branch
decision makers about whether to expose state defendants to private money-damage suits under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. In effect, the Court concluded that a generalized congressional authorization of
FLSA actions brought by private individuals did not adequately safeguard constitutional interests in
federalism; rather a particularized (and costly) commitment to any such case by federal enforcement
authorities was necessary. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1803 n.924. Cf. Idaho v. United States, 533
U.S. 262, 272 n.4 (2001) (allowing suit by United States to establish tribal claim to submerged lands
despite earlier dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds of tribe's own suit brought to establish
ownership). For a similar analysis with regard to congressional authorization of agency adjudications
against states initiated by private parties, see Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State
Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1877 (2002).
531. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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We would be faced with important constitutional questions were we to
hold that Congress ... had given the Secretary authority to withhold
passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Congress
has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent one, the
Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens' right of
free movement.
532
Commentators have said that Kent reveals the Court's de facto use of
the otherwise moribund nondelegation doctrine "to ensure that certain
decisions are made by Congress rather than the executive branch" 533 when
they involve "constitutionally sensitive domains." 534 Even more important,
Justice Breyer recently lent his support to this characterization by
describing Kent as a case in which the Court "assum[ed] Congress did not
want to delegate the power to make rules interfering with [the] exercise of
basic human liberties."535 Building on this thought, Justice Breyer further
observed that "one might claim that courts, when interpreting statutes,
should assume in close cases that a decision with 'enormous social
consequences' ... should be made by democratically elected Members of
Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators. '536 This "who"
rule reading of Kent jibes with Professor Sunstein's earlier suggestion that
the "'clear statement' doctrine enjoys a special force as a basis for selective
insistence on explicit legislative authorization of agency action" when
important constitutional interests are at stake.537
The Rehnquist Court's recent decision in Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers538 supports this same notion (not
surprisingly) in the field of constitutional federalism. In particular, the
532. Id. at 130.
533. Sunstein, supra note 208, at 38 n.155.
534. Id. at 88. See also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79 (1969) (explaining that "delegation [does] not include[] the power to tamper
with important constitutional rights").
535. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 190 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
536. Id. (internal citations omitted). Largely because of competing structural reasons, Justice
Breyer was ultimately unwilling to invoke such a principle to override the FDA's assertion of
regulatory jurisdiction over cigarettes. In particular, Justice Breyer endorsed the FDA's assertion of
jurisdiction because "the very importance of the decision taken here, as well as its attendant publicity,
means that the public is likely to be aware of it and to hold [the elected President and politically elected
officials who support his policy in this area] politically accountable." Id. Thus, in this context, "public
scrutiny ... will take place whether it is the Congress or the Executive Branch that makes the relevant
decision." Id. at 190-91.
537. Sunstein, supra note 68, at 470 n.237. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (outlining how canons of construction may function as
nondelegation principles and arguing for their legitimacy). For a more recent decision giving further
impetus to this notion, see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (discussed supra notes 44-46, 59-65
and accompanying text).
538. 531 U.S. 159 (2000) (discussing supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text).
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Court in Solid Waste Agency set forth a corollary to the clear statement
avoidance canon in terms that speaks directly to dubious delegations of
power under the Commerce Clause or other sources of congressional
authority. Thus: "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute
invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication
that Congress intended that result." 539 This specialized clear statement
doctrine vindicates how-rule and who-rule values when substantive
constitutional interests in state autonomy are at risk.
Should the Court adopt other who-centered rules that protect
constitutional interests in federalism? Invoking "the constitutional role of
the States as sovereign entities," four dissenters vigorously argued "yes" in
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.540  That case raised the question
whether the Department of Transportation's regulatory treatment of driver-
protecting "passive restraints" in cars (pursuant to what the majority saw as
a clear grant of rulemaking power) should operate to preempt state tort law
to the extent it had authorized actions based on the theory that a failure to
install airbags constitutes negligence. The majority (in an opinion written
by Justice Breyer and joined by the ordinarily pro-federalist quartet of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy) found the state law action preempted. In ruling for the
automaker, these Justices relied largely on DOT's "comments, which
accompanied the promulgation" of its regulations and revealed (in the
majority's view) an intent to "deliberately provide[] the manufacturer with
a range of choices among different passive restraint devices." 541 Given this
purpose, the majority reasoned that permitting states to require use of one
particular restraint (that is, the airbag) would stand "as an obstacle" to
accomplishing the federal rules' goals;542 thus the state law action ran afoul
of "principles of conflict pre-emption." 543
In a dissent authored by Justice Stevens, the four other members of the
Court took issue with the majority's characterization of the objectives of
DOT's "passive restraint" regulations. 54 4  More importantly, for our
purposes, the dissenters asserted that (regardless of what goals might lie
behind the DOT rules) a who-centered preemption analysis-focusing on
539. Id. at 172. See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (rejecting
the view that agency can mend unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting a limiting
construction of the statute).
540. 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
541. Id. at 875 (majority opinion).
542. Id. at 873.
543. Id. at 874.
544. Id. at 905.
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the importance of federalism and the difference between congressional and
agency action-mandated a rejection of the majority's effort to "oust state
courts of their traditional jurisdiction over common law tort actions." 545
The dissenters relied on prior authority that had distinguished between
congressional action and agency action with regard to so-called "field"
preemption,546 arguing that the Congress-agency distinction should carry
over to "conflict" preemption cases concerning claimed state law
inconsistencies with federal regulatory goals. 547  In particular, the
dissenters urged that there is far more reason to entrust preemption
decisions to Congress than to agencies because "structural safeguards
inherent in the normal operation of the legislative process operate to defend
state interests from undue infringement,- 548 while no similar structural
safeguards mark agency rulemaking. In light of these powerful "who"-
centered concerns, the dissenters insisted that, at the very least, implied
preemption cannot properly rest on "the final commentary accompanying
an interim administrative regulation" that was "not to be found in the text
of any Executive Order or regulation." 549
As this discussion reveals, four members of the Court were prepared
in Geier to decide the case through application of a multifaceted, process-
based, semisubstantive preemption rule. In particular, in the view of the
dissenters, agency action can lay the basis for conflict preemption only
when there exists "a specific expression of agency intent to preempt, made
after notice and comment rulemaking." 550 Put another way, the dissenters
advocated an approach that weaves together a clear statement rule (by
mandating a "specific expression"), a proper-findings requirement (by
mandating "notice-and-comment rulemaking") and a semisubstantive
"who" rule (by limiting this principle to cases involving a claimed "agency
intent to preempt"). No less important, the dissenters rested their embrace
of this principle on a desire to vindicate the substantive value of state
autonomy. Given the dissent's energetic effort to safeguard this value, a
puzzling riddle arises out of Geier: How could four members of the
545. Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, the dissenters relied squarely on
institutional differences between agencies and Congress. See id. at 908 (supporting argument for
heightened presumption of nonpreemption by noting that "[u]nlike Congress, administrative agencies
are clearly not designed to represent the interests of States").
546. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1985).
547. Geier, 529 U.S. at 907-08 & n.22 (favoring rules that place "the power of pre-emption"
squarely in the hands of Congress" and objecting in particular to judicial reliance on "unaccountable
sources such as regulatory history in finding pre-emption based on frustration of purposes").
548. Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
549. Id. at 887.
550. Id. at 885 (majority opinion, characterizing dissenters' position).
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Federalism Five decline to join an opinion that thus sought to protect basic
federalism values?
One can speculate about this question until the cows come home. It
might be, for example, that the majority concluded that indications of the
rulemaker's purpose to foreclose airbag suits simply overwhelmed
countervailing concerns about "state's rights."55' It might be that the
majority feared that endorsement of the dissenters' approach would amount
to the opening of a Pandora's box in the agency-preemption context, which
would allow a virtually unlimited number of novel semisubstantive
doctrines to clamor for judicial recognition. (Notably, the majority opinion
did repeatedly express worry about "further complicat[ing] the law with
complex new doctrine." 552) It might be that the Justices of the Geier
majority (or various combinations of them) were generally hostile toward
airbag lawsuits or were inclined to defer to, rather than to question, the
views of agency experts.553  It might also be that the majority was willing
to tolerate preemption of a cause of action that lay at the frontier of the
common law of torts (in contrast, for example, to tolerating preemption of a
rule of law embodied, after significant deliberation, in a duly enacted state
statute).554 There is, however, a more interesting possibility. It might be
that the Federalism Five's fractionation in Geier reflects in large part the
Rehnquist Court's fundamental rethinking of how and why federal judges
should safeguard state autonomy values in the first place.
551. Notably, the majority did find "clear evidence of a conflict" between the authorization of
state airbag suits and federal-law objectives after painstakingly examining the DOT regulation and its
history. See id. at 885.
552. Id. at 874.
553. To the extent that this outlook motivated the Court, it comports (rather than conflicts) with
the underlying thought that drives constitutional "who" rules. The thought, which is reflected in a wide
array of Rehnquist Court precedents, is that differing government actors bring different capacities and
interests to the decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) (noting that constitutional rule of de novo appellate review of punitive
damages awards comports with "the institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges");
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994) (applying different levels of
scrutiny to bans on expressive activities imposed by legislatures and by judges); id. at 778 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with application of different levels of review, but
asserting that "injunctive relief should be judged by a more lenient standard than legislation"); id. at 791
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with majority that stricter scrutiny should
apply to judicial action; but going farther than majority by advocating full blown strict scrutiny, rather
than elevated intermediate scrutiny); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (distinguishing
"legislative determinations" with regard to land use from "adjudicative decisionis about] an individual
parcel" in applying Fifth Amendment Taking Clause). See also Strauss, supra note 208, at 192 (noting
that rules are often based on constitutional values and institutional capacities).
554. Of course, to the extent this line of thinking drove the decision in Geier, the majority (just
like the dissent) embraced a semisubstantive "who" rule. So it is because any preemption approach that
gives decisive weight to whether a rule has been promulgated by the state legislature, rather than a state
court, constitutes a "who" rule in the purest sense.
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The modern-day story of state protection from federal law controls
begins with the Court's 1976 decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery.555 In that case a five-Justice majority of the Burger Court laid down
a once-and-for-all, federalism-based constitutional rule that immunized
states from federal legislative regulation of their "integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 556 In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,557 however, the Court overruled National
League of Cities. As the Court later explained in South Carolina v.
Baker,558 Garcia held that "Tenth Amendment limits on Congress'
authority to regulate state activities ... are structural, not substantive-i.e.,
that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through
the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of
unregulable state activity." 559 The guiding thought behind Garcia was that
the state interests the Court sought to safeguard in National League of
Cities were already, as a rule, adequately accommodated in the national
political process due to the many influences state decision makers can and
do exert on national representatives. For example, senators are elected on a
state-by-state basis; the manner of selecting electoral college members is
controlled by the state legislatures; and federal representatives are chosen
from districts constructed by state authorities. 560
In keeping with this process-centered approach, the Court in Baker
recognized that "extraordinary defects in the national political process
might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the
Tenth Amendment. '561 In Baker itself, the Court found no reason to apply
this defective-process principle to invalidate Congress' decision to insist
that states issue bonds in registered, rather than bearer, form. Citing the
Carolene Products footnote, 562 the Court reasoned that "South Carolina has
not... alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in the
national political process or that it was singled out in a way that left it
555. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
556. Id. at 852.
557. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
558. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
559. Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
560. For detailed elaborations of this argument, advanced by distinguished academic observers,
see generally JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260-379
(1980) and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). More recent
treatments of state regulatory immunity include DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 58-75
(1995); Andrew Rapcynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380-408; and Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
561. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512-13.
562. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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politically isolated and powerless." 563  In short, because the "national
political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth
Amendment is not implicated.
564
In essence, the dissenters in Geier were prepared to apply the flip side
of the nondefective-process analysis the Court had spun out in Baker.
Indeed, in Geier Justice Stevens cited Garcia in arguing that the "structural
safeguards" that work well to protect state interests when Congress enacts
legislation do not operate when agencies promulgate rules.565  As he
explained:
While the presumption [against preemption] is important in assessing the
pre-emptive reach of federal statutes, it becomes crucial when the
preemptive effect of an administrative regulation is at issue. Unlike
Congress, administrative agencies are clearly not designed to represent
the interests of States, yet with relative ease they can promulgate
comprehensive and detailed regulations that have broad pre-emptive
ramifications for state law. 566
So why did four of the Court's most pro-federalism Justices not sign
on to this analysis? Maybe because they disagreed with its fundamental
premise that the structure of the national legislative process in fact fairly
safeguards the interests of the states.
It is important to recall, in this regard, that Baker was a decision of the
very early Rehnquist Court. At the time of that decision, Chief Justice
Rehnquist had held his post for only a year, and Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun still roamed the Supreme Court Building. In a
very real sense, the central story of the later-we might say, the real-
Rehnquist Court concerns the route it has taken with regard to the process-
centered vision of constitutional federalism handed down to it in Garcia
and Baker. That route has been driven by the idea-vigorously advanced
in the Garcia dissents of Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor-that
structural features of the national legislative process have not worked well
to protect legitimate state interests from congressional overreaching. 56
7
563. Baker, 485 U.S. at 512-13.
564. Id. at 513.
565. Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
566. Id. at 908. This line of reasoning dovetails with the thinking of (among others) Calvin
Massey and Stephen Gardbaum. For a discussion of their work, see Coenen, supra note 3, at 1788
n.887.
567. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 564-77 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he last two decades have seen an
unprecedented growth of federal regulatory activity"; that "[t]he political process has not protected
against these encroachments on state activities, even though they directly impinge on a State's ability to
make and enforce its laws"; and that "all that stands between the remaining essentials of state
sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint"). Notably, by the
13792002]
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Indeed, during the past decade, the Court repeatedly has rejected Garcia-
based defenses of congressional enactments in finding that those
enactments exceeded newly minted once-and-for-all limits deemed latent in
the Tenth Amendment and other features of our Constitution. It was this
later Rehnquist Court that declared that Congress could not, as a general
matter, forcibly enlist state legislatures 568 or state executive officials 569 to
implement federal regulatory programs. It was this later Rehnquist Court
that extrapolated significant limits on Congress's ability to regulate
noneconomic activities under the affecting-commerce prong of its
interstate-commerce power. 570  It was this later Rehnquist Court (squarely
overruling a decision of the earlier Rehnquist Court571) that held that
Congress could not wield its Article I powers to override state immunities
from suit in either federal or state court.572 And it was this later Rehnquist
Court that constricted Congress's ability to rely on its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power, including in efforts to override state
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional defenses.573 In all these contexts, a
substantial bloc of dissenting Justices appealed to the process-centered
logic of Garcia and Baker.574  Their mightiest efforts, however, failed to
impede a five-Justice majority intent on "substantifying" major parts of the
law of constitutional federalism in keeping with the nonprocess-centered
logic that underlay the Garcia dissents.575
This history suggests one reason why a federalism-friendly five-
Justice majority might have rejected the ostensibly state-protective "who"
time of Baker, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had also joined the Court. Justice Scalia, however,
pointedly declined to join that portion of the majority opinion that relied on Garcia, while Justice
Kennedy did not participate in the case.
568. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
569. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
570. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (discussed supra notes 217-27 and
accompanying text); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (discussed supra notes 211-16 and
accompanying text).
571. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
572. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (federal court).
573. See supra notes 228-63 and accompanying text (discussing Section 5 decisions from City of
Boerne to Garrett).
574. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 96 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As
Justice Stevens has put the point:
Federalism concerns do make it appropriate for Congress to speak clearly when it
regulates state action. But when it does so, as it has in these cases, we can safely
presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the sovereignty of the several
states were taken into account during the deliberative process leading to the
enactment of the measure.
Id. See also, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 806 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 183-84
(Souter, J., dissenting); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 205-07 (White, J., dissenting).
575. See, e.g., supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing nonsemisubstantive nature of
Morrison).
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rule proposed by Justice Stevens in Geier. Even the most ardent
"federalist," after all, might well hesitate to protect state autonomy with a
rule built on a vision of how well congressional decision makers (but not
agencies) take those interests into account. This hesitance will grow to the
extent that any particular Justice harbors concerns about semisubstantive
rules-particularly complex and nontraditional ones-as a general matter.
With this thought in mind, we now turn to an examination of how each of
the current individual Justices has approached semisubstantive
constitutional review.
II. NINE JUSTICES' APPROACHES TO SEMISUBSTANTIVE
DECISIONMAKING
A. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUSTICE SCALIA AND JUSTICE THOMAS
The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas are often
depicted as the "conservative wing" of the Rehnquist Court.57 6 This
shorthand description disguises complex realities, but one reality is
undeniable: These three Justices do band together in a large number of
cases.577 This tendency toward solidarity has carried over to key areas of
semisubstantive decisionmaking. In particular, these Justices share a strong
willingness to supplement substantive protections of state autonomy with
super-strong clear statement rules driven by this same constitutional
value.578  Outside the field of federalism, however, these three Justices
have been more hesitant to embrace provisional, semisubstantive
approaches. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, vigorously dissented
from the Court's "who" rule analysis in Mow Sun Wong 579 on the ground
that it "inexplicably melds together the concepts of equal protection, and
procedural and substantive due process." 580  Contrary to prevailing
doctrine, he has expressed qualms about considering only the actual
576. Michael Hedges, Bush v. Gore Put High Court in History Book, HOUSTON CHRON., July 2,
2001, at Al.
577. For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas voted together in every one of the 24 key cases
highlighted by the New York Times in its July 2001 end of the term review. Linda Greenhouse, In the
Year of the Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at
A12. Chief Justice Rehnquist was with them in all but two of those decisions. See id.
578. For example, these Justices have joined in all the post-Atascadero clear statement decisions
(except Kimel which is discussed infra note 607 and accompanying text), have uniformly endorsed the
strict findings-centered approach to Section 5 in Garrett and its precursors (see supra notes 228-67 and
accompanying text), and have coalesced in the Court's pro-states ruling in the Solid Waste Agency
case. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.
579. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (discussed supra notes 511-17 and
accompanying text).
580. Id. at 119.
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purposes of the lawmaking body, even when engaging in heightened
means-ends scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.581 Similarly (and
notwithstanding his commitment to the Court's purpose-centered ruling in
Washington v. Davis),582  Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed
reservations about motive-based inquiries in a variety of other personal
rights settings as well.583
If any member of the Court has emerged as the resident detractor of
semisubstantive rules, however, it is Justice Scalia. Indeed, Justice Scalia
planted the seed for a general theory of skepticism in his dissenting opinion
in Thompson v. Oklahoma.584 At the core of that dissent lay the claim that
Justice O'Connor had betrayed basic principles by insisting that a state
legislature specify in a single statute that the death penalty applied to
persons who were younger than sixteen when they committed their
crimes. 585 According to Justice Scalia, a constitutional analysis that hinged
on "the process" and "precise form" of state legislation-rather than "its
constitutionally required content" 586 -penetrates the very "heart of [state]
sovereignty. 587  Launching a parade of horribles attack, he asked why
Justice O'Connor's approach would not justify judicial imposition of "a
requirement that the death penalty for felons under sixteen be adopted by a
two-thirds vote of each house of the state legislature, or by referendum, or
by bills printed in 10-point type." 588  In short, Justice Scalia found in
Justice O'Connor's opinion the "loose cannon of a brand new principle" 589
that was unjustifiably "disdainful" of state legislative prerogatives. 590
To be sure, Justice Scalia has occasionally made use of structural
logic. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,591 for example, he offered a
defense for providing different levels of scrutiny to state and national
affirmative action programs, thus opening the door for the adoption of a
581. See Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1981) (plurality
opinion). See also United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (deprecating
purposive analysis in rational relation review context).
582. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
583. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has joined in opinions by Justice Scalia that are
strongly critical of purpose-based inquiries in both Church of Lukutni Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 588-59 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) and Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He also dissented in the Court's recent purpose-centered Fourth
Amendment rulings in Edmond and Ferguson. See supra notes 420-25 and accompanying text.
584. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
585. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text (detailing Justice O'Connor's approach to
the case).
586. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
587. Id. at 877.
588. Id. at 875-76.
589. Id. at 877.
590. ld.
591. 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
1382 [Vol. 75:1281
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1382 2001-2002
SEMISUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
"who" rule approach in this difficult field of law.592 In Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,593 however, it was Justice Scalia who supplied
the fifth vote needed to slam this door shut in a ruling that mandated strict
judicial scrutiny of both state and federal affirmative action policies.594
There are other strong hints that Justice Scalia is decidedly unenthusiastic
about process-sensitive protections of substantive values as a general
matter. For example, although Justice Scalia has defended the dormant
Commerce Clause distinction between subsidies and tax breaks, he has
taken pains to invoke only a text-based (and not a process-based)
rationale. 595 In addition, Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist)
has questioned a free exercise jurisprudence that focuses not on the facially
demonstrable "object of the laws at issue," but instead on "the subjective
motivation of the lawmakers" who enacted them.596 And in Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC,5 97 it was Justice Scalia who went out of his
way to disassociate himself from the majority's endorsement of a First
Amendment proper-findings "how" rule.598  Writing only for himself,
Justice Scalia insisted that "[n]either due process nor the First Amendment
requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or
even consideration, but only by a vote." 599 These many examples suggest a
strong drift in Justice Scalia's constitutional worldview. For him, as a
general (though perhaps not an absolute600 ) matter, it is the content of laws
that should determine their constitutionality, regardless of the processes
that led to their adoption.
592. In particular, Justice Scalia drew directly from the Federalist Papers in pointing to "the
heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units." Id.
593. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
594. id. at 227-28. But cf supra note 524 (noting potential different deference refinement of
Adarand's congruity rule).
595. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (rejecting visible-spending rationale because "[a]nalysis of interest group participation in
the political process" is not a proper tool "for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause") (quoting id.
at 215 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (applying
text-based rationale).
596. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
597. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
598. See supra note 197.
599. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Similarly
in Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), Justice Scalia invoked form-based logic to question rent
control laws by arguing that the subsidies they effectively provide can "be achieved 'off budget,' with
relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic processes." Id. at 22 (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting). He was quick to add, however, that the "fostering of an intelligent
democratic process," driven by what he saw as a Takings Clause-based invalidation of such laws, was
"perhaps accident, perhaps not." Id. at 23.
600. See, e.g., supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text (discussing Garrett).
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What about Justice Thomas? As discussed earlier, Justice Thomas has
joined his federalism-minded colleagues in endorsing and applying strong
semisubstantive clear statement how rules. In a similar vein, it was Justice
Thomas who wrote for the Court in ascribing to the Warren Court ruling in
Anders v. California60 a deeply dialogic, quasi-replaceable, common law
quality. 602 What is most noteworthy (and perhaps most surprising) about
Justice Thomas' work in the semisubstantive realm, however, is that that
work may well reflect an emerging philosophical independence from Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas, for example, elected
not to join Justice Scalia's critique of purpose-centered doctrines in Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.6 °3 Similarly, in United
States v. Williams,60 4 Justice Thomas voted to support a constitutionally
inspired supervisory rule that Justice Scalia was unwilling to tolerate.60 5 In
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 60 6 Justice Thomas wrote only for
himself and Justice Kennedy in endorsing an intensely aggressive clear
statement approach in the Eleventh Amendment abrogation context. 60 7
And in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 608 Justice Thomas once again
parted company with Justice Scalia by joining Justice Stevens's potently
semisubstantive "who" rule dissent.60 9
Is there a unifying theme that ties together this significant body of
semisubstantive work? The leading candidate for such a theme is an
intense commitment to the value of federalism. To begin with, while
Justice Thomas' vote in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye might seem "anti-
federalist" as a technical matter, only rarely will free exercise cases turn on
the difference between "subjective" and "objective" demonstrations of
illicit purpose.610  For this reason, Justice Thomas' decision not to join
Justice Scalia in that case hardly reveals a departure from a distinctively
strong commitment to protecting the prerogatives of states. In similar
fashion, Justice Thomas' position in the Williams case (endorsing federal
supervisory authority over grand jury proceedings) might at first blush
seem "anti-federalist" because it was supportive of criminal defendants'
601. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
602. See supra notes 357-70 and accompanying text (discussing Anders and Robbins cases).
603. 508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
604. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
605. See supra notes 331-44 and accompanying text.
606. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
607. See supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
608. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
609. See supra notes 540-50 and accompanying text.
610. Even Justice Scalia concurred in the result in Church of Lukuni Babalu Ave. Moreover, no
post-Smith free exercise cases suggest that motives hostile to religion commonly underlie generally
applicable criminal statutes.
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rights. In reality, however, Justice Thomas' vote in Williams did not
threaten state autonomy values in even a small way because that case
concerned only federal judges' supervisory powers over proceedings in
federal courts.611
All of Justice Thomas' other semisubstantive positions fall in line with
an overarching aim to protect state autonomy. His cutting down of the
Anders rule in Smith v. Robbins612 fits this theme like a glove.613 Likewise,
Justice Thomas' no-preemption vote in Geier and his no-abrogation vote in
Kimel corresponded directly with a powerful gravitation toward protecting
state prerogatives against federal regulatory incursions. 614  What is most
important about those cases, however, is that in all of them Justice Thomas
clearly eschewed the view, vigorously espoused by his frequent ideological
companion, Justice Scalia, that the results of constitutional cases should
depend on the "content" of rules, rather than the "process" that results in
their adoption. 615 In short, Justice Thomas' semisubstantive work reveals
something more than a hearty embrace of federalism values; it also reveals
a willingness to protect those values with innovative and energetic process-
centered rules.
B. JUSTICE STEVENS
If a "Semisubstantive Rules Hall of Fame" were ever to be
established, Justice John Paul Stevens would be its first inductee. From his
earliest years on the Court, Justice Stevens has evidenced openness to
every form of semisubstantive doctrine in the Court's expansive
repertoire.616  Justice Stevens long has applied clear statement rules of
statutory interpretation in both the federalism and nonfederalism areas. 6 17
He has signaled receptivity to form-based deliberation rules, most notably
in his opinion in Apprendi6 18 but also in the dormant Commerce Clause
611. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (emphasizing lack of federal
supervisory power over state proceedings).
612. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
613. See supra notes 357-70 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 606-09 and accompanying text.
615. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,876-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
616. See generally Jonathan C. Carlson & Alan D. Smith, Comment, The Emerging Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 155 (1978) (detailing semisubstantive tendencies
of Justice Stevens' early work).
617. Examples from the federalism area that are provided by his dissents in Lorillard Tobacco Co.
and Geier. See supra notes 109, 540-50 and accompanying text. For examples from the individual
rights area that are provided by his opinions in St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez, see supra notes 44-46,
59-73, 76 and accompanying text).
618. See supra notes 276-92 and accompanying text.
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context. 619 Justice Stevens is the great champion of findings-based "how"
rules, having vigorously embraced them in the First Amendment,620
federalism, 621 and affirmative action 622 fields. Justice Stevens probably
authored the single opinion most associated with a "when" rule approach to
sex-discrimination law623  and certainly authored the opinion most
associated with constitutional "who" rules. 62 4  He is a proponent of
semisubstantive "current head count" rules, which he has supported
unstintingly in both Eighth Amendment cases and elsewhere. 625 Justice
Stevens has not shied away from the formulation of constitutional common
law doctrines; indeed he took the lead in advocating constitutionally
inspired supervisory rulings in both the Williams case 626 and in Carlisle v.
United States.627 Finally, despite occasional expressions of concern,628
619. In particular, in his dormant Commerce Clause opinion in Camps Newfound/Owatonna v.
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997), Justice Stevens cited secondary authority relying on form-based
thinking in noting the recognized distinction between tax breaks and subsidies. See id. at 591 (citing
Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 442-43 (1996) and Walter Hellerstein & Dan T.
Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
789, 846-48 (1996)).
620. See, e.g., supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (discussing Reno v. ACLU).
621. See, e.g., supra notes 540-50 and accompanying text (discussing Geier dissent).
622. Justice Stevens' structural tendencies have been especially evident-and steady-handed-in
his affirmative action opinions. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1986), Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's invalidation of a race-based promotion plan put in
place by a school board and its teachers. In doing so, he emphasized that "not a shred of
evidence.. .suggests any procedural unfairness in the adoption of the agreement." Id. at 318 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), however, he vigorously dissented from
the Court's validation of a congressional race-based set-aside program. The problem, according to
Justice Stevens, was that Congress had given this "decision of profound constitutional importance" only
"perfunctory consideration," id. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting), accompanied by no "testimony or
inquiry in any legislative hearing." Id. at 549--50. See also Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430
U.S. 73, 97-98 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that omission of one group of Native
Americans from reparations program violated equal protection because it was "the consequence of a
legislative accident").
623. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). See also
Frickey, supra note 3, at 725 (discussing Goldfarb).
624. See supra notes 511-17 and accompanying text (discussing Mow Sun Wong). Notably, the
opinion in Mow Sun Wong also had a significant findings-and-study-rule component. See Coenen,
supra note 3, at 1680 n.435.
625. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.6 & n.7 (1988) (arguing that reliance on
"contemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of legislatures and juries," is proper in Eighth
Amendment cases so that Courts should look to "objective signs of how today's society views a
particular punishment"). Other "head count" decisions joined by Justice Stevens include Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-22 (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982); and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-97 (1977).
626. See supra notes 331-42 and accompanying text.
627. 517 U.S. 416 (1996). See id. at 454 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (narrowly interpreting
preclusive effect of FED. RULE. CRIM. P. 29 to maintain district court's "inherent authority to avert the
conviction of a legally innocent defendant despite the absence of a timely motion").
628. See United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens has not balked at applying purpose-centered doctrines in
virtually every realm of constitutional law.629
Most important, Justice Stevens has openly defended his frequent
invocations of structural doctrines on textual and theoretical grounds. 630
He has acted with substance-subordinating intellectual honesty in applying
semisubstantive doctrines all across the constitutional map-for example,
in cases involving both affirmative action and federalism.631  And, aptly, it
was Justice Stevens who first invoked the "due process of lawmaking"
rubric in an opinion filed by a Supreme Court Justice.632 Based on all the
evidence, one thing is clear: As long as Justice Stevens sits on the bench,
semisubstantive approaches will push for attention in the decisionmaking
of the Supreme Court.
C. JUSTICES SOUTER, GINSBURG AND BREYER
Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg share with Justice Stevens a
strongly "structuralist," rather than "substantivist," approach to policing
congressional interferences with states rights.633 Disciples of Garcia, these
Justices have consistently insisted that structural safeguards in the national
legislative process-rather than all-or-nothing substantive judicial
interventions-provide the most appropriate check against excesses by
Congress as it exercises its Article I powers. 634 This outlook has brought
with it predictable tendencies. Clear statement rules of statutory
interpretation constitute the bread and butter of these Justices in dealing
with federalism-based claims that Congress has overreached the bounds of
its authority.
635
Justice Breyer-in what might someday become a semisubstantive-
doctrine landmark-has gone beyond Justices Souter and Ginsburg by
floating the idea that a proper-findings-and-study rule might someday find
a place in the Court's federalism jurisprudence. As he explained in his
629. See, e.g., supra notes 434-48 and accompanying text (discussing Santa Fe case).
630. See e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting
that there is "no reason why the character of [congressional] procedures may not be considered relevant
to the decision whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property without
due process of law"); supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (detailing theory of process-centered
function of federalism-based, clear statement rules).
631. See supra notes 621-22 and accompanying text.
632. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
633. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 610-11 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing substantive restrictions from clear statement restrictions that protect federalism values).
634. See infra note 712 and accompanying text.
635. See, e.g., supra note 109; infra note 712 (discussing cigarette advertising decision in
Lorillard Tobacco).
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dissenting opinion in Morrison, "[c]ommentators... have suggested that
the thoroughness of legislative procedures-e.g., whether Congress took a
'hard look'-might sometimes make a determinative difference in a
Commerce Clause case."6 36 Following up on this thought, Justice Breyer
emphasized that:
[T]he law in this area is unstable and... time and experience may
demonstrate... the superiority of [a] procedural approach-in which
case the law may evolve towards a rule that, in certain difficult
Commerce Clause cases, takes account of the thoroughness with which
Congress has considered the federalism issue.
637
Arguably these ruminations stand in tension with Justice Breyer's earlier
comments about legislative findings in his dissenting opinion in Lopez.
638
Whether that is true or not, however, few more "semisubstantively" minded
pronouncements appear anywhere in the work of the Rehnquist Court.
It is noteworthy that neither Justice Souter nor Justice Ginsburg
(unlike the great proponent of second-look rules, Justice Stevens) were
willing to join this segment of Justice Breyer's Morrison dissent. Justice
Souter, in particular, has expressed very strong reservations about laying
weight on legislative findings in evaluating whether Congress has exceeded
its Commerce Clause powers. Indeed, sounding much like Justice Scalia in
the Thompson case,639 Justice Souter argued in Lopez that "requir[ing]
Congress to act with some high degree of deliberateness ... would be as
patently unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions
from this Court., 6 4 0 At the same time, Justice Souter acknowledged that
"as a general matter findings are important 641 in deciding whether "a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce." 642 Even more
important, in his dissenting opinion in Morrison (joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer), Justice Souter wasted no time in asserting
that "[o]ne obvious difference from United States v. Lopez is the mountain
of data assembled by Congress, here showing the effects of violence
against women on interstate commerce." 643  Perhaps Justices Souter and
Ginsburg are, in the end, only slightly less interested in congressional
studies than Justices Stevens and Breyer. At least so far, however, they
636. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 663 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
637. Id. at 663-64.
638. See infra note 718 (noting Justice Breyer's form over substance worries).
639. See supra notes 584-90 and accompanying text.
640. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
641. Id. at 612.
642. Id. at 613.
643. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-29 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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have been unwilling to dress up this interest with the same ambitiously
semisubstantive rhetoric advanced by Justice Breyer in his separate
Morrison dissent.
Justice Souter also has dipped and swayed in evaluating the relevance
of legislative findings in the Court's nude dancing cases. In particular, he
painstakingly declared in a separate concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.64 4 that legislative studies were unnecessary to justify a nude
dancing prohibition defended on the ground that it countered problems
such as neighborhood deterioration and increased crime.645 Rather, he
professed a readiness to uphold the law based on an earlier Supreme Court
opinion that had found that these "secondary effects" justified a different
form of adult entertainment regulation (there a zoning regulation) adopted
in a different state by a different lawmaking body.646 In City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M.,647 however, Justice Souter donned sackcloth and disavowed
his Barnes concurrence, proclaiming that he had "come to believe that a
government must toe the mark more carefully than I first insisted. 648
Despite this retreat, it remains unclear what legislative findings, if any,
Justice Souter now will require to support nude dancing regulations. The
confusion arises in part from his willingness to remand for further judicial
proceedings in City of Erie-a move that suggests that, at trial, the city's
lawyers might lay an adequate "evidentiary foundation," even if the city's
lawmakers themselves conduct no investigation whatsoever. Yet Justice
Souter also explained that:
That evidentiary basis [for the ordinance] may be borrowed from the
records made by other governments if the experience elsewhere is
germane to the measure under consideration and actually relied upon. I
will assume, further, that the reliance may by shown by legislative
invocation of a judicial opinion that accepted an evidentiary foundation
as sufficient for a similar regulation.
649
Where all this leads is not clear, but these latter passages suggest that
Justice Souter-in keeping with semisubstantive theory-stands ready to
put at least some premium on legislative study (and some penalty on
legislative sloth) when evaluating laws challenged on free expression
grounds.
644. 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., and Souter, J., concurring).
645. Id. at 583-86 (Souter, J., concurring).
646. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 112 n.94 (noting and criticizing this reasoning).
647. 529 U.S. 277, 311 (2000).
648. Id. at 317 (Souter, J., dissenting).
649. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
2002] 1389
HeinOnline -- 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1389 2001-2002
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Justice Ginsburg-like Justices Souter and Breyer-has shown an
openness to embracing semisubstantive techniques. 650  Her work, for
example, stands in contrast to that of most of her colleagues because it is
unmarked by expressions of reservation about recognizing and applying
proper-purpose rules. More specifically, a semisubstantive "why"-rule
approach drove her invalidation of a males-only admissions policy in
United States v. Virginia.65 1  Noting this point, Professor Sunstein has
ascribed a strongly semisubstantive reading to Justice Ginsburg's opinion
in that case. As he has written:
Virginia is linked with Kent insofar as it requires a current legislative
judgment-here, that same-sex education is necessary to promote
educational diversity .... If the state reached its decision deliberatively
and without infection from stereotypes about gender roles, and the
decision promoted rather than undermined equal opportunity, the Court
might uphold the program. 65
2
Justice Ginsburg's work with semisubstantive doctrines has reached
well beyond the sex discrimination context. In Geier, for example, she
joined (as did Justices Souter and Thomas) Justice Stevens's "who"-
rule/"how"-rule effort to protect state autonomy interests against claims of
federal agency preemption.653 In a similar vein, Justice Ginsburg drew on
semisubstantive considerations in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena654 to
urge judicial caution in the affirmative action field. There, in a brief
concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer, she declared that "in view of
the attention the political branches are currently giving the matter of
affirmative action, I see no compelling cause for [judicial] intervention" 655
and added that she "would leave [these programs'] improvement to the
political branches." 656  These expressions comport with an overarching
theory of the judicial role that resonates strongly with semisubstantive
decisionmaking. As Justice Ginsburg stated not long before her
appointment to the Court, "judges ... do not alone shape legal doctrine...
650. Justice Ginsburg's gravitation toward structural reasoning predated her ascension to the
nation's highest Court. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir.1988), the
court considered a challenge to the FCC's decision to lengthen its daily ban on "indecent" TV
programming from 18 hours to 20 hours. Id. at 1334. Invoking a defacto proper-findings-and-study
rule, Justice Ginsburg invalidated this increased free-speech restriction. As she explained: "the FCC
failed to adduce evidence or cause, particularly in view of the first amendment interest involved,
sufficient to support its hours restraint." Id. at 1335.
651. 518U.S. 515(1996).
652. Sunstein, supra note 208, at 75-76. See also supra notes 531-37 and accompanying text
(discussing semisubstantive features of Kent v. Dulles).
653. See supra notes 540-50 and accompanying text.
654. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
655. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
656. Id. at 276.
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but they participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and
with the people as well." '657
D. JUSTICES O'CONNOR AND KENNEDY
At the center of the Rehnquist Court sit Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, whose votes have proved decisive in many constitutional rulings
of the modern era. Perhaps most significantly, the votes of these Justices
have propelled the "federalism revolution" undertaken by the Rehnquist
Court.658 In particular, both of these Justices (together with the Chief
Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas) have been pulled toward a double-
barreled set of substantive and semisubstantive protections against
congressional incursions on state fiscal and regulatory autonomy.
659
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, for example, provided decisive support
for the Court's federalism supporting, findings-based approach in the
Garrett case. Likewise, it was the support of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy in Robbins that permitted the Court to render substantially
modifiable the Warren Court's protections of the right to appellate counsel
in Anders v. California.66 °
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, have shown an openness to
using semisubstantive reasoning to do more than advance the cause of
"states' rights." Both Justices, for example, seem to believe that lawmaker
findings may play a determinative role in evaluating remedial affirmative
action programs.66' In addition, it was Justice O'Connor's decisive (and
deeply dialogic) approach in Thompson v. Oklahoma that led the Court to
invalidate a death sentence placed on a defendant who was fifteen years old
when he committed his crime.662 Finally, even while expressing some
misgivings about proper-purpose rules,663 Justice O'Connor has forged new
motive-based doctrines and applied them vigorously to invalidate state and
local laws. 664
In similar fashion, Justice Kennedy has embraced semisubstantive
approaches both inside and outside the federalism field. His strong
657. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198(1992).
658. See infra note 715.
659. See infra notes 706-16 and accompanying text.
660. See supra notes 357-70 and accompanying text.
661. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
662. See supra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
663. See supra notes 401-02 and accompanying text.
664. See supra notes 413-25 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 77-78 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (relying squarely on legislative history in finding that
impermissible religious motive lay behind moment-of-silence law).
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commitment to proper-purpose doctrines-combined with an apparent
willingness to look at particular legislative proceedings in applying them-
distinguishes his work from that of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia.
665
Justice Kennedy also showed an openness to moving further than his
colleagues with super-strong clear statement reasoning when he joined
Justice Thomas' concurrence in Kimel.666 Justice Kennedy's twin opinions
in the Turner Broadcasting litigation667 suggest an inclination to bring
semisubstantive analysis to First Amendment free speech cases. More
particularly, his "who rule" willingness to distinguish between
congressional and agency actions668 suggests a gravitation toward serious
forms of semisubstantive thinking. Likewise, his references in Turner
Broadcasting to "Congress' findings" 669  and "the record before
Congress" 670 suggest a receptivity to the use of findings-based "how"
rules. 67' There are also signs, however, that Justice Kennedy's attitude
toward semisubstantive analysis is marked by some ambivalence. In
particular, as others have noted, the Turner Broadcasting opinions sent out
conflicting signals about the significance of congressional findings. In the
end, these opinions-like so much of the Court's work-are "strangely
ambiguous" about whether semisubstantive considerations should or do
matter in the decision of concrete cases. 672
E. THE COURT'S NEXT CHAMPION OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
What does this Justice-by-Justice review reveal about the future of
semisubstantive decisionmaking? To begin with, it confirms what we have
seen before. Semisubstantive approaches crop up often in the current
Court's work. Most, maybe all, of the now-sitting Justices are particularly
open to using these doctrines to protect state autonomy values. And the
work of most of the individual Justices-like the work of the Court as a
whole-reveals much ambivalence about using semisubstantive rules, at
least outside the clear statement field. This Justice-by-Justice examination
665. Justice Kennedy, for example, wrote for the Court in Church of Lukuini Babalu Aye. See
supra note 409 and accompanying text. See also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1717 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Congress and the President were aware of our [earlier First Amendment
internet-indecency-law] decision, and we should assume that in seeking to comply with it they have
given careful consideration to the constitutionality of the new enactment").
666. See supra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
667. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
668. See supra notes 519-22 and accompanying text.
669. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 196.
670. Id. at 211.
671. See supra note 198 (discussing this aspect of the Turner Broadcasting cases).
672. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 335.
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also demonstrates that the current Court's clear leader in the use of second-
look approaches to judicial review is Justice Stevens. It shows as well that
the writings of the Court's other members (with the likely exceptions of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) do not disclose clearly
crystallized philosophies toward this nuanced, and often understated, form
of constitutional decisionmaking. This point raises a question that is both
interesting to ponder and of vital practical importance to the future of
constitutional law: Who, among the sitting Justices, is most likely to
emerge as a fellow traveler of Justice Stevens in the field of
semisubstantive review? The previous Justice-by-Justice appraisal
suggests some answers to this question.
The members of the Court least likely to emerge as ardent
"semisubstantivists" are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.673 In
particular, Justice Scalia has staked out a position that seems actively
hostile toward semisubstantive doctrines outside the clear statement
statutory-interpretation context.674 It also seems clear that Justice Souter is
unlikely to step forward as a leading proponent of broad and strong
semisubstantive review. To be sure, Justice Souter has joined some
important semisubstantive opinions.675  His own opinions on findings-
based "how" rules, however, suggest a tendency to focus on the content of,
rather than the process that produced, the challenged law. 676
Justice Ginsburg, in contrast, might well move in a strong
semisubstantive direction. Particularly suggestive in this regard is her
scholarly writing, which reveals a pull toward process-centered judicial
review and a recognition that the Court has no choice but to engage in
dialogues with nonjudicial actors. 677  At this point, however, Justice
Ginsburg's work on the Court is too limited to permit much beyond
speculation about the future course of her treatment of semisubstantive
rules. 6 7 8
There are signals that Justice Kennedy's work might move toward
more active use of semisubstantive techniques. Viewed as a whole,
however, his writings suggest a significant measure of ambivalence about
this decisionmaking style. To be sure, Justice Kennedy took a strongly
semisubstantive position by joining the concurring opinion in Kimel,679 and
673. See supra notes 576-09 and accompanying text.
674. See supra notes 584-09 and accompanying text.
675. See supra notes 540-50 and accompanying text (discussing dissenting opinion in Geier).
676. See supra notes 639-49 and accompanying text.
677. See supra note 657 and accompanying text.
678. See supra notes 650-57 and accompanying text.
679. See supra note 666 and accompanying text.
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his own Turner Broadcasting opinions lend support to both constitutional
"how" and constitutional "who" rules. 680  They do so, however, in a
restrained and backhanded way since nothing in those opinions suggests
that the source of the challenged law, or the presence of legislative
findings, made a real difference in the ultimate decision in the case.
Viewed as a whole, Justice Kennedy's work with semisubstantive doctrines
does not reveal a firm, overarching commitment to this dialogic style of
judicial review. 681
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thompson does reflect the sort of bold
stroke not present in Justice Kennedy's portfolio, thus suggesting that she
might find a place in Justice Stevens' hard-core, semisubstantive decision-
making camp.682  Justice O'Connor, however, was pointedly careful to
limit her opinion in Thompson to the "unique" setting of death penalty
cases.683 Moreover, it was Justice O'Connor's opinion in the Adarand case
that jerked the Court away from its previous who-based approach to
affirmative action cases. It has been suggested that the full spectrum of
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence reflects a deep-seated, Court-centered
vision of how constitutional interpretation should occur.684 For all these
reasons, it seems likely that Justice O'Connor will continue to deploy
semisubstantive doctrines in only a selective and limited way.
Perhaps Justice Thomas' opinion in Kimel and his vote in Geier mark
him as the Court's next torchbearer for semisubstantive review.685 There is
little indication, however, that Justice Thomas stands ready to use high-
powered semisubstantive doctrines to protect constitutional values other
than "states' rights. 686 It remains to be seen whether this depiction of
Justice Thomas will prove accurate over time. If it does, however, his
work will not reinforce the past efforts of Justice Stevens. Instead it will
reflect a striking departure from Justice Stevens' approach, which has
emphasized semisubstantive decision-making across all fields of
constitutional law.
That leaves Justice Breyer. Particularly because he is the Court's
newest member, Justice Breyer has had little chance to reveal a highly
680. See supra notes 667-71 and accompanying text.
681. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 3, at 339 (finding "ambiguity" in Justice Kennedy's
Turner Broadcasting opinions). See also supra note 412 (discussing lukewarm view of purpose-based
analysis suggested in Tuan Anh Nguyen, opinion authored by Justice Kennedy).
682. See supra note 662 and accompanying text.
683. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
684. See Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2001, at 32.
685. See supra notes 606-09 and accompanying text.
686. See supra notes 601-15 and accompanying text (discussing states' rights focus of Justice
Thomas' semisubstantive jurisprudence).
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theorized enthusiasm about semisubstantive constitutional review. There
are signals, however, that such an enthusiasm is building. To begin with,
Justice Breyer has led the charge toward judicial minimalism, crafting
much work that reflects a strong pull toward modest and narrow
constitutional rulings.687 In addition, there is evidence that Justice Breyer
may prove open to formulating constitutional "who" rules that respond to
differing institutional capacities.688 Most important, Justice Breyer already
has placed his own strong semisubstantive imprint on the pages of the
United States Reports. In his concurring opinion in BMW v. Gore,689 for
example, he outflanked even Justice Stevens, whose majority opinion took
a more once-and-for-all substantive approach.6 90 No less significantly, his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Morrison69 '-in a section joined only
by Justice Stevens-openly invited the Court to take a highly innovative
findings-centered view of how to assess debatable claims of congressional
Commerce Clause authority. 692
687. See infra note 692 (quoting from Justice Breyer's concurrence in Bartnicki v. Volper, 532
U.S. 514 (2001)).
688. Particularly illuminating in this regard is Justice Breyer's analysis in the Brown &
Williamson case. See supra notes 535-36 and accompanying text. See also Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct.
2428, 2447 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (adopting "who"-oriented rule requiring jury, as opposed to
judge, sentencing if the death penalty is to be imposed; emphasizing jury's "comparative advantage,"
even over elected judges, in being able to reflect "'the community's moral sensibility"') (quoting
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Notably, in his pre-judicial life, Justice Breyer gave much thought to the institutional characteristics of
administrative agencies and other organs of government. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 383 (1986).
689. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
690. See supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
691. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
692. See supra notes 636-38 and accompanying text. Justice Breyer's openness to dialogue was
also imminent in his concurring opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), discussed supra
note 687. As he explained: "Legislatures ... may decide to revisit statutes such as those before us,
creating better tailored provisions designed to encourage, for example, more effective privacy-
protecting technologies." Id. at 1541 (Breyer, J., concurring). Notably, two very recent opinions by
Justice Breyer-authored after the preceding discussion was written-confirm this overall impression.
First, in Board of Education of Independent School District v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002), the Court
upheld a program of random drug urinalysis tests for public school students engaged in extracurricular
activities. Justice Breyer filed a distinctively semi-substantive concurring opinion in which he wrote:
Some find the procedure no more intrusive than a medical examination, but others are
seriously embarrassed by the need to provide a urine sample with someone listening "outside
the closed restroom stall," ante, at 2256. When trying to resolve this kind of close question
involving the interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it is important that the school
board provided an opportunity for the airing of these differences at public meetings to give
the entire community "the opportunity to be able to participate" in developing the drug policy.
App. 87. The board used this democratic, participatory process to uncover and to resolve
differences, giving weight to the fact that the process, in this instance, revealed little, if any,
objection to the proposed testing program.
Id. at 2571. Likewise in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122 S.Ct. 2080
(2002), Justice Breyer emphasized structural concerns in concurring in the Court's decision to
invalidate a registration requirement for person engaged in door-to-door expressive activities. Id. at
2091-92 (Breyer, J., concurring). In particular, he faulted the dissent's invocation of a crime-
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It is true that the work of Justice Breyer reflects some (though perhaps
not much) ambivalence about strong forms of semisubstantive review. 693
Given the pervasiveness of mixed feelings throughout the Court about
these doctrines, that fact is hardly surprising. In any event, there is reason
to believe that Justice Breyer-more so than any of his colleagues-might
one day join Justice Stevens in leaving these feelings of ambivalence
behind.
III. THE THEMES OF THE REHNQUIST COURT'S
SEMISUBSTANTIVE WORK
What can we say about the Rehnquist Court's vision of
semisubstantive rules? Our survey suggests three central points. First, the
use of semisubstantive doctrines constitutes a vital part of the Rehnquist
Court's constitutional work. Second, the Court has been particularly
activist in applying these doctrines to safeguard substantive constitutional
interests in state autonomy. Third, despite the Court's widespread use of
these doctrines, there is a persistent ambivalence among the Justices about
whether these rules should be widely applied. Identifying these themes is
important in and of itself. In particular, advocates who argue real world
constitutional cases must be mindful of these forces at work in the
collective mind of the Court.
In considering these themes, it is also important to recognize that each
of them is part of larger story about the Court and its constitutional work.
Looking at these themes in a broader context thus is an additional
necessity. In particular, this sort of "big picture" appraisal may provide
telling clues about the future direction of semisubstantive decisionmaking
and perhaps about other forms of constitutional decisionmaking as well.
We turn now to a broader-context appraisal of each of the three key themes
that reach across the Court's semisubstantive work. We consider in turn
the themes of (1) pervasiveness; (2) federalism; and (3) underlying
ambivalence.
prevention justification for the ordinance on the "why rule" basis that "in the intermediate scrutiny
context, the Court ordinarily does not supply reasons the legislative body has not given." id. at 2091.
He added that: "[W]e expect a government to give its real reasons for passing an ordinance" and that "if
the village of Stratton thought preventing burglaries and violent crimes was an important justification
for this ordinance it would have said so." Id. at 2091-92.
693. See infra note 718 and accompanying text.
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A. PERVASIVENESS
As we have seen, the Rehnquist Court has applied many different
types of semistructural doctrines-"how" rules, "why" rules, "when" rules,
and "who" rules-in many different constitutional settings. This reality
suggests that these doctrines will persevere. So does an assessment of the
jurisprudential backdrop against which the Rehnquist Court's many
semisubstantive rulings have come down.
As explained by Professor Sunstein, "the analytical heart of the
current Court"-made up of Justices O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-prefers a "mininimalist" judicial role in expounding
constitutional law.6 94 Indeed, Professor Sunstein has devoted a book to
documenting why "judicial minimalism has been the most striking feature
of American law in the 1990s. ' '695 In keeping with its minimalist
philosophy, when the current Court invalidates laws it often issues
"narrow" and "shallow" opinions. 696  (In Romer v. Evans, 697 by way of
example, the Court did not consider such matters as excluding gays from
the military and was careful to avoid broad theoretical pronouncements,
including as to whether rational relation or heightened scrutiny applies to
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.698) Even more
important, this self-abnegating style of judicial decisionmaking reflects
important policy goals: It facilitates "deliberative democracy"; 69 9 it reduces
the "countermajoritarian difficulty" associated with judicial review;700 and
(at least across the run of cases) it should generate sounder, better
considered and more constitutionally sensitive legislative outcomes.70'
The Rehnquist Court's general gravitation toward minimalist
decisionmaking helps explain its frequent use of semisubstantive doctrines.
The essential purpose of these process-centered doctrines, after all, is to
avoid judicial monopolization of constitutional decisionmaking, while
"promot[ing] more democracy and deliberation" with regard to
constitutionally troublesome issues. 70 2 Indeed, it is hard to conjure up a
694. SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 9.
695. Id. at xi.
696. See id. at 4-5.
697. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
698. SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 10.
699. Id. at 25.
700. See BICKEL, supra note 24, at 16.
701. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 28.
702. Id. at 4. Sometimes the Court itself is quite explicit about its minimalist ambitions. For
example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), the Court considered the criminalization of a
newspaper's knowing publication of information which had lawfully come into its hands, but had been
initially secured by a third party's unlawful interception of a cell-phone conversation. In finding a
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judicial approach that will better "increase the space for further reflection
and debate at the local, state, and national levels" 70 3 than one which invites
political decision makers-if they act carefully-to reinstate exactly the
same law the Court has only provisionally invalidated.
The key point is that there is an intimate linkage between a general
philosophy of judicial minimalism and the more specific (though
multifaceted) practice of semisubstantive review. To be sure, it is
theoretically possible to argue that a minimalist tribunal can and should
steer clear of these remand-to-the-legislature doctrines. 704  But, especially
in light of the Court's now-common use of these doctrines, such an
argument seems unlikely to carry water in the real world. In short, the
Rehnquist Court's overarching commitment to a "democracy promoting"
constitutional minimalism bodes well for the future use of semisubstantive
review. 7
0 5
B. FEDERALISM
It should come as no surprise that the present-day Court has been
particularly activist in using semisubstantive doctrines to safeguard state
constitutional violation, the Court pointedly refused "to answer categorically whether truthful
publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 528. Quoting from
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532-33 (1989), it added:
Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future
may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily .... We
continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes
between [the] First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.
Id. at 529. See also id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring) (expressing preference to "emphasize the
particular circumstances before us because, in my view, the Constitution permits legislatures to respond
flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual's interest in basic personal
privacy" and adding that "we should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which
would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility"). On other occasions, some Court members criticize
others because they eschew a minimalist approach. For example, in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001), the opinion of Justice Scalia (perhaps the most "maximalist" member of the current Court, see,
e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)), laid out a four-part test for determining when use
of modem technologies to obtain incriminating evidence violates the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Stevens, writing for himself and three other Justices, responded: "[Tlhe Court ... has unfortunately
failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather
mundane issue that is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has endeavored to craft an all-
encompassing rule for the future. It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to
grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional
constraints." Id. at 2052. See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 n.24 (2001) ("We
decline to accept the dissent's invitation to make a foray into dicta and address other situations not
before us.").
703. SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 4.
704. Key arguments against true semisubstantive doctrines are collected in Coenen, supra note 3,
at 1845-51. These arguments (or at least most of them) are not arguments against a minimalist
philosophy. They are, however, arguments against semisubstantive review.
705. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 26.
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autonomy.7 °6 Viewed from a broad angle, however, the evolution of the
law in this direction is problematic. The root of the difficulty is that the
early emergence of energetic semisubstantive doctrines in the federalism
field was justifiable on the theory that, absent the recognition of such
doctrines, federalism values would suffer from underenforcement. °7 This
risk of underenforcement, in turn, emanated from the Court's insistence in
the Garcia case (consistent with a half-century of hands-off, post-New
Deal decisionmaking) that safeguards of state interests built into the
national government's political structure mitigated the need to afford those
interests protections in the form of judicially constructed on-or-off rules.708
Indeed, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,709 the Court (in an opinion written by
Justice O'Connor) relied squarely on this underenforcement rationale in
significantly expanding its state-favoring clear statement rule
jurisprudence. 710
In the years following Gregory, however, a five-Justice coterie of the
Rehnquist Court has largely abandoned Garcia's philosophy by
recognizing and applying significant substantive constitutional doctrines
that protect "states' rights. '711 At the same time, the Court as a whole has
not retreated from the now-deep-seated semisubstantive protections of
federalism (particularly in the form of strong clear statement rules) that
were devised and nurtured in the pre-Rehnquist Court era. Indeed, the four
Justices who remain deeply committed to the Garcia philosophy-that is,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer-continue to hold fast to the
view that semisubstantive protections should operate in this area.712  The
706. See supra notes 78-119, 210-63, 348-89 and accompanying text (discussing clear statement
cases, Section 5 findings-and-study rules, and constitutional common law).
707. See supra note 266 (noting views of Eskridge and Frickey). See generally Lawrence G.
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212 (1978) (detailing theory of underenforced constitutional values).
708. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (asserting that "effective restraints on
[the commerce power] must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes").
709. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
710. As Justice O'Connor explained in her opinion for the Court: "We are constrained in our
ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress' powers under the
Commerce Clause." Id. at 464 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985)). She continued: "Indeed, inasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers,
we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise. '[T]o give the state-displacing
weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking
on which Garcia relied to protect states' interests."' Id. (quoting TRIBE, supra note 5, § 6-25, at 480).
711. See supra notes 568-74 and accompanying text (discussing key developments in Lopez,
Morrison, New York, Printz, Seminole Tribe, and City of Boerne and its progeny).
712. An all-out reliance on Garcia-based reasoning appeared in Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), which was joined in full by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at 92-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Notably, while Justice Stevens
used this rationale to reject states' rights arguments in Kimel, he has invoked the clear statement
concomitant of Garcia to protect state interests (against private ordering alternatives) in other contexts.
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result is that the Rehnquist Court has effectively said to states rights
advocates: "You can have your cake and eat it too."
In an article published only months after Justice Thomas came on the
Court, Professors Frickey and Eskridge challenged the Court's
preoccupation with applying clear statement rules in the federalism field,
reasoning that other constitutional values were no less deserving of "quasi-
constitutional" protection. 71 3  A decade later, the Frickey and Eskridge
critique may be supplemented by another objection that is directly tied to
the appointment and work of Justice Thomas.714 Put simply, the fifth vote
of Justice Thomas has caused the reinvigoration of constitutional states'-
rights claims to become the Rehnquist Court's most successful project.715
It logically follows that the once-sound underenforcement rationale for
state protective semisubstantive rules rests today on an unsteady
foundation, if not feet of clay. 716
The question remains: Does any of this matter? At least in the short
term, the answer seems to be "no." The Rehnquist Court has not yet even
hinted that it might retreat from the activist, federalism-driven, clear
statement rules that (as in Gregory) it has enthusiastically embraced. Nor
has there been even quiet grumbling among dissatisfied Justices about the
reality that these rules have persevered. The Federalism Five seems well-
satisfied, at least for now, to have two lines of defense-one substantive
and one semisubstantive-for protecting state autonomy from
congressional control. It matters not that the second set of safeguards was
developed precisely because, at the time of their emergence, the first set of
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 589 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against
preemption of state cigarette marketing regulations); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
907-08 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against preemption of state law imposing liability for
defective air bags). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, once again, joined Justice Stevens's opinion
in Lorillard. His opinion in Geier was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg (as well as Justice
Thomas).
713. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 597. For a later expression of much the same thought,
see Frickey, supra note 3, at 697-98, 728-29 (arguing that newly emerging structural rules in
federalism area "cannot be cabined short of having applications outside the review of commerce-power
exercises" and represent "a plausible technique" for curbing legislative excess in noneconomic cases in
general).
714. See supra notes 601-15 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas' semisubstantive
work).
715. Focusing attention on only the Court's institutional (and not individual rights) cases, Justice
Thomas has supplied the fifth vote in support of states rights arguments in (among other cases) Lopez,
Morrison, Printz, Seminole Tribe, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett. See supra notes 568-74 and
accompanying text. See also Linda Greenhouse, In the Year of the Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also
Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A12 (describing "federalism revolution" as
"arguably the most consequential development in constitutional law of the last decade").
716. Of course, other particular structural rules may be subject to additional and less generalized
critiques. See supra note 86 (discussing Atascadero's Eleventh Amendment immunity-abrogation clear
statement rule).
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safeguards did not exist. The mood of this Court-consistent with its
strong general state autonomy orientation-leans in the direction of leaving
well enough alone.
C. UNDERLYING AMBIVALENCE
We have seen that both the Court and its individual Justices often have
signaled an ambivalence about the legitimacy of semisubstantive rules.717
The reasons for this ambivalence, I suspect, are so complex that they are
not fully understood by the Justices themselves. But some possible reasons
for this mixed reaction seem not too hard to spot. To begin with,
fundamental attitudes widely shared in the legal community tug in different
directions when judges contemplate the use of process-centered
semisubstantive doctrines. On the one hand, judges are likely to see the
"substance" of a rule as far more important than its "form" and to sense
that a rule's "content," rather than its purpose or packaging, should be
decisive in evaluating its constitutionality.718 On the other hand, persons
trained in law know that process is always critical. They also know the
value of preserving the Court's institutional capital, and they recognize that
semisubstantive doctrines fit neatly into strong traditions of judicial
restraint.719
A checkered willingness to embrace semisubstantive doctrines may
also reflect the rich matrix of loyalties that different Justices bring to
different substantive constitutional values. According to one highly
oversimplified depiction, for example, the Court's most intensely
federalism-minded Justices are eager to push forward the cause of state
717. See, e.g., supra notes 198-99 (discussing Turner Broadcasting cases); notes 211-16
(discussing Lopez); notes 228-60 (discussing Section 5 congressional-findings rulings).
718. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 617-18 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(worrying that relying on findings could prove "unfortunate" because it "would appear to elevate form
over substance"). See also supra note 272 (noting substance-over-form argument that recurs in dormant
Commerce Clause cases). This way of thinking supports, for example, the critique that purpose-
centered rules are troublesome because "emphasis on actual motivation may result in identically worded
statutes being held valid in one state and invalid in a neighboring state." United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). From a "substantivist" perspective such a
result seems incoherent. From a "semisubstantive" perspective, however, it is not troubling at all.
719. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
6 (1988) (stating that "[b]ecause of the shaky foundation of judicial review, the Court consciously
circumscribes its activities and invites other branches to participate"); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature
of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 502 (1982) (asserting that "perhaps we can accept more readily
the legitimacy of judicial review" if "there is less finality in a constitutional decision than meets the
eye"). See also BICKEL, supra note 24, at 19 (noting that traditional "[j]udicial review works counter"
to "the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process"; thus
advocating alternative means for judicial protection of constitutional values); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Jiudicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an
expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review.").
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autonomy as far as they can on all fronts. On this view, those Justices
stand ready, whenever able, to put aside semisubstantive doctrines in favor
of fully-substantive doctrines that more aggressively protect "states'
rights." At the same time, those Justices remain poised to protect state
interests with semisubstantive doctrines if nothing more is achievable.72 °
Of course, Justices committed to substantive constitutional values other
than state autonomy-such as free speech or free exercise-also may seek
to combine the use of both semisubstantive and fully-substantive doctrines
in a similar effort to maximize constitutional protections. 721 The important
point is that semisubstantive doctrines always will interact in complex
ways with the substantive values they are forged to protect.722 This
complexity, in turn, inevitably will produce a decisional pattern in which
semisubstantive doctrines sometimes find favor and sometimes give way.
Finally, the Court's ambivalence about strong forms of
semisubstantive doctrines reflects the unsurprising reality that there are
strong arguments of law and policy to be made both for and against their
use. Some of these arguments already have been identified in this
Article,723 and others have been detailed elsewhere.7 24  In addition, wholly
apart from the overarching arguments for and against semisubstantive
decisionmaking, specialized arguments may bolster or diminish the case for
particular forms of these rules. Findings-based "how" doctrines, for
example, have generated opposition on the ground they are a prescription
for make-work,725  while some purpose-centered "why" rules may be
distinctively defensible in light of constitutional history and text. 726
720. See, e.g., supra notes 244-63 (discussing findings-based approach in Garrett case).
721. For example, many viewed the Court's original flag burning decision as inviting a legislative
reprise. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning
and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111 (1989) (discussing the Johnson case and arguing that it was
correctly decided). After Congress passed a new post-Johnson, flag burning law, however, the
Supreme Court struck it down as, in effect, per se invalid. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990).
722. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 24, at 1876-79 (asking "what role is left for substantive
subconstitutional review" in light of Court's "catalogue" of structural doctrines).
723. See, e.g., supra note 272-74 and accompanying text (identifying and critiquing substance
over form argument with regard to form-centered "how" rules).
724. See Coenen, supra note 3, at 1834-51.
725. See Devins, supra note 3, at 1197, 1208-09; H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and
Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 651-52 (1995). See also Frank B. Cross, Realism About
Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1326-27 (1999) (worrying about separation of powers
implications of judicial use of findings rules). For an illustrative commentary that takes a more
sanguine view of findings-and-study rules, see Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The Illusion
of Certainty," 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1723, 1729 (1995) (suggesting that movement toward requiring
congressional findings "is not all bad").
726. For example, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990), Justice Scalia suggested that, as "a textual matter," it was reasonable to read the Free
Exercise Clause as focusing on "the object," rather than "the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision." Id. at 878. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 42-43
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Perhaps most important of all, an ambivalence about semisubstantive
decisionmaking comports with the historical fact that the Court has never
offered an overarching theoretical justification for this style of judicial
decisionmaking. Indeed, the Court's members have never paused to
consider (at least in the opinions they write) the latent kinship of the
various forms of semisubstantive doctrines we have explored.727 It is not
surprising that Justices are ambivalent about doctrines whose use tends to
be episodic, under-theorized, and woven into opinions that do not trumpet
their operation, their essential features or their underlying justifications.
This last point is of great significance as one considers the future
prospects of semisubstantive decisionmaking. Consider, by way of
contrast, the Court's tiered levels of judicial means-ends review based on
strict, intermediate, or rational-relation scrutiny. As a theoretical matter,
this multilevel rhetoric of review carries the seeds for controversy. (At
least to my knowledge, for example, the Framers never catalogued these
tests; rather these formulations seem to be-in a very pure sense-
nonoriginalist judicial extrapolations.) Yet even the most wild-eyed
reformer would hesitate to argue that these tiers of review should now be
scrapped. Their place in constitutional law is simply too well-settled
because they have been transparently used and theoretically justified in key
Supreme Court decisions over a long period of time. In contrast,
semisubstantive doctrines (or at least many of them) have not generated the
same measure of open and persisting acceptance. As a result, they are
marked by an inherent instability. And for this reason they have an
exposure to large-scale retrenchment by the Court.
It is unlikely that the Rehnquist Court or a near-term successor will
undertake a massive rollback of existing semisubstantive rules. It is
important to acknowledge, however, that the thinness of these rules' openly
stated theoretical underpinnings renders this result at least a possibility.
Whether this possibility becomes a reality will depend, more than anything
else, on who comes to sit on the Supreme Court bench. And, again, it is
important to acknowledge in this regard that Justice Stevens, the Court's
great champion of semisubstantive decisionmaking, is also its oldest
member.728 No less important (and regardless of who next leaves the
(1998) (suggesting that text, history and structure of original Constitution and Bill of Rights-though
not of the Fourteenth Amendment-give the Smith rule "even more ... support than its author, Justice
Scalia, claimed for it").
727. See, e.g., supra notes 151-83 and accompanying text (discussing subtle similarity of
concurring opinions in Thompson and Kimel).
728. See supra notes 616-32 and accompanying text (discussing views of Justice Stevens).
Justice Stevens was born in 1920. The Court's next oldest member, Chief Justice Rehnquist, was born
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Court), President Bush seems eager to appoint new Justices who share the
philosophies of Justice Scalia, the Court's harshest critic of semisubstantive
styles of review. 729 One never knows how these things will turn out. But
the often-evidenced judicial ambivalence about stronger forms of
semisubstantive decisionmaking (as well as the under-theorization of those
rules that that ambivalence in part reflects) creates an opening for
rethinking and reform. At the very least, a departure from the Court by
Justice Stevens during the Bush presidency would surely decrease a strong
existing pull toward endorsement and use of broad-based semisubstantive
review.
CONCLUSION
In the final days of its October 2000 term, the Supreme Court handed
down two high-profile decisions in which it vindicated constitutionally
grounded claims of resident aliens by deploying "how"-based clarity
doctrines. 73° Reflecting on these rulings, New York Times columnist
Anthony Lewis observed that "[t]he court's approach, reading a law
narrowly to avoid a serious question of individual rights, used to be fairly
common in the Supreme Court [but] it had not been seen lately." 73  This
comment is off the mark. While the Rehnquist Court has expanded the use
of aggressive clear statement doctrines to protect interests in state
autonomy, 732 it has not backed away from simultaneously invoking those
same doctrines to protect individual interests in liberty and equality.
7 33
Indeed, as this Article reveals, the Court has deployed a rich variety of
clarity rules to safeguard all sorts of constitutional values.734 It has done so
as part of a much larger, though little recognized, program of applying
"how" rules, "why" rules, "when" rules, and "who" rules to protect in
provisional ways almost every constitutional value there is.
in 1924. All other sitting Justices were born in the 1930s, with the exception of Justice Thomas, who
was born in 1948.
729. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
730. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
731. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; At the Heart of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at
A 15.
732. See supra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
733. See, e.g., supra note 76 (citing Jones case concerning jury trials; X-Citement case concerning
free speech; Gomez case regarding felony defendants' rights to Article III judges; and Edward J.
DeBartolo case concerning free association); supra note 49 (citing Castillo case about the jury right);
supra notes 44-47 (discussing St. Cyr case regarding habeas corpus jurisdiction and Webster case
regarding court authority to review constitutional questions). See also supra note 56 (citing Johnson ex
post facto law case).
734. See generally supra notes 39-183 and accompanying text.
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The bottom line is that the Rehnquist Court is broadly open to using
semisubstantive doctrines to protect constitutional values, particularly
(though not exclusively) when federalism values make a claim for judicial
protection. At the same time, the Justices have often expressed
ambivalence about the most aggressive uses of semisubstantive analysis.
7 35
Because of this ambivalence, there is reason to suspect that near-term
changes in the Court's membership might weaken-and perhaps weaken
greatly-its existing commitment to semisubstantive review.
736
Predicting the course of constitutional law is a business fraught with
difficulty. Here, as elsewhere, the best guide to the future may lie in the
recent past. And if the recent past is our guide, it clearly suggests one
thing. Semisubstantive analysis-rooted in practical notions of decisional
minimalism and judicial restraint-will continue to play a prominent part
in the Court's protection of substantive constitutional values.
735. See supra notes 717-27 and accompanying text.
736. See supra notes 728-29 and accompanying text. This possibility is enhanced by the current
Court's marked tendency to decide important cases by five-to-four votes. See Greenhouse, supra note
715, at A 12 (noting that thirty-three percent of Court's decisions during it 2002-01 term came in five-
four rulings).
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